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The traditional master-narrative in histories of rhetoric assumes that formal 
democratic institutions make possible a flourishing rhetorical culture (as at Athens in the 
fifth-fourth centuries B.C.E.). This dissertation, however, offers a counter-view, with two 
main lines of argument. On one hand, the traditional master-narrative is open to critique 
for failing to recognize or fully attend to rhetorical activity outside of operative 
democracies, and it also fails to account for rhetorical activities that are not recognized as 
legitimate speech within democracies. On the other hand, one may argue that rhetorical 
activities (or certain kinds) embody practices that make democracy possible, whether 
formal democratic institutions exist or not. This dissertation, then, contends that 
rhetorical practices that presuppose equality are not a product of democracy, but are 
democracy’s condition of possibility. 
This counter-narrative is developed through four chapters. Chapter One 
hypothesizes that individuals presuppose equality while engaging in rhetorical practices 
that disrupt the smooth operation of “settled” ideologies. Turning to specific cases, I 
examine politics in Athens during the fifth century B.C.E. (Chapter Two), education in 
nineteenth-century Europe (Chapter Three), and digital media in the present era (Chapter 
Four) as public spheres in which unauthorized voices speak with as much rhetorical 
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effect as credentialed experts. When a community tries to account for these voices, I 
conclude, moments of democracy occur. 
This alternative vision of rhetorical practices as proto-democratic activities both 
offers a new way to account for instances of marginalized rhetorical activity and an 
intervention in rhetorical studies generally. If there is a presumption of equality inherent 
in certain kinds rhetorical activity, and if that presumption is a precondition for 
democracy, then we might write the history of rhetoric differently, and reconceive its 
relation to formal civic institutions.  
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I began this dissertation with the intention of refuting the master narrative that 
continues to organize most histories of rhetoric, specifically, the “rise and fall” story in 
which rhetoric flourishes or declines with the fortunes of democracy. What I found 
especially problematic about this narrative was the idea that democratic institutions had 
exclusive purchase on rhetorical culture. My first impulse was to deconstruct the cause-
effect supposition, point out its conceptual limitations, and thus to undermine and do 
away with the narrative entirely. As I quickly realized, this approach was severely 
limiting. Even if causation could be taken off the table, attempting to refute the narrative 
outright also meant disavowing any correlation between rhetorical activity and 
democratic institutions. Obviously such a position is difficult to support, since the logos 
of the traditional narrative is indeed persuasive in many ways. But there is a more 
productive approach: the same logos—the same key terms, the same facts, the same 
propositions, etcetera—can be redeployed in service of an alternative account of the 
rhetoric/democracy relation and the history of rhetoric itself. 
This dissertation contends that rhetorical practices that presuppose equality 
between speakers and listeners and that put in question established ideologies (as in the 
Protagorean practice of “antilogy”) give rise to moments of democracy, whether the 
formal institutions of democracy exist or not. Chapter One begins by pointing out that 
rise-and-fall narratives tend to assume that rhetorical activity requires established 
democratic institutions and infrastructure (e.g., courts, councils, assemblies, and other 
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fora) to effectively contest established ideology. In response to this assumption, the 
chapter examines the term agôn (in athletics, music, politics, science, and education) to 
problematize the binary of domination and overcoming so often invoked in contemporary 
critical discourse, and to challenge the belief that agônes must be sanctioned. 
The remaining chapters examine examples of rhetorical activity at different points 
in history where marginalized voices enter into dominant discourses and disrupt the 
smooth operation of “settled” ideologies. Chapter Two, for instance, reads Gorgias’s 
Defense of Palamêdês as a speech in which the protagonist unsettles an anti-barbarian 
ideology by presupposing equality. In one register, Gorgias’s speech is fairly 
uncomplicated. It is a fictive speech, perhaps a school exercise, based on an episode from 
the epic cycle: Palamêdês is falsely accused by Odysseus of committing treason against 
the Greek forces at Troy, and Odysseus wins the day by using false witnesses and planted 
evidence. Since Palamêdês has no hard evidence to support his innocence, Gorgias uses 
every available probability argument to mount a defense. In this view Gorgias has 
composed the speech as an example of the uses and limits of such arguments. But one 
can also read the speech in another register: by the time Gorgias settled in Athens, a 
militant nationalism had taken root, and women, slaves and foreigners were prohibited 
from speaking in law courts or the Assembly. As a resident alien Gorgias likewise was 
excluded from the city’s civic forums (except under special conditions), but by setting his 
speech in a Panhellenic law court out of Homer, he tacitly claims equality for the “other” 
in the civic discourse of fifth-century Athens. When the reader hears this voice in the 
Palamêdês speak, I argue, there is a moment of democracy. 
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Chapter Three considers the extent to which presuppositions of equality underpin 
an early-sophistic pedagogical tradition that teaches speakers to generate persuasive 
discourse, off-the-cuff, on any given subject. Gorgias was apparently famous for this 
ability, but based on the sparse examples of his work that have survived, we know almost 
nothing about how he did it, how he may have learned to do it, what his extempore 
discourses might have looked like, and whether they were actually persuasive. Evidence 
also suggests that Gorgias could teach others to do what he did, but the few summaries of 
his teaching method recorded by his contemporaries are regrettably brief. In the 
nineteenth century, however, something resembling Gorgias’s practice resurfaces in the 
pedagogy of Joseph Jacotot. The purpose of his pedagogy, briefly summarized, is to train 
people to teach themselves, without a master, how to move from the known to the 
unknown. Jacotot simply asks his students to learn something, commit it to memory 
through repetition, and connect what they know to what they do not know by drawing 
comparisons. There is no “method,” strictly speaking, because Jacotot does not explain 
anything to his students—it is they who are made to discover relations between what is 
unknown and what is known already. Of course, this approach to learning infuriated 
university officials, but in the end, all who witnessed its effects were forced to admit that 
Jacotot’s students were indeed able to generate persuasive discourse, off-the-cuff, on any 
subjects suggested to them. Insofar as the compositions made by these self-taught 
students were comparable in quality and rhetorical effect to those made by credentialed 
experts, Jacotot’s pedagogy claims intellectual equality for all, including those who do 
not enjoy the intellectual legitimacy that formal education confers. A similar claim of 
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equality, I suggest, can be found in certain variants of early-sophistic rhetorical pedagogy 
(especially the Dissoi Logoi). Taking a broad view, then, these pedagogies can be seen as 
counter-statements that challenge established ideology in educational discourse. In effect, 
the distinction between the legitimacy of authorized speakers and the illegitimacy of non-
authorized others is briefly leveled, and there is a moment of democracy.  
Chapter Four contends that, broadly speaking, histories of rhetoric have yet to 
articulate precisely how the relation between rhetoric, democracy and epistemology 
hinges on equality. To promote the inclusion of this relation in future histories, I examine 
a series of contemporary examples that includes the Egyptian revolution, the Bay Area 
Rapid Transit protests, Anonymous, and WikiLeaks, as well as the “fake experts” 
Jonathan Lebed and Marcus Arnold, who taught themselves to give financial and legal 
advice online. In these examples, I suggest, we see both the “democratizing” of rhetorical 
authority—Lebed, for example, assuming equal authority with licensed stock brokers to 









Chapter One: Rhetorical Continuities 
GENETIC NARRATIVES   
Among the commonly circulated histories of rhetoric, two “rise and fall” 
narratives have traditionally dominated. The first, which is often echoed in modern neo-
sophistry, underscores the longstanding conflict between the history of rhetoric and the 
history of philosophy. Briefly summarized, the story is driven by the assumption that 
when the polis endorses eidô (knowledge from looking), or what is sometimes called 
“empirical epistemology,” rhetoric flourishes; conversely, when the polis endorses 
Platonic metaphysics, rhetoric languishes (McComiskey 25). By this logic, rhetoric and 
epistemology rise and fall together, but it is always according to the degree to which the 
polis endorses eidô that rhetorical activity either flourishes or fails to flourish—not the 
other way around. 
The logos of the second narrative, which is remarkably similar to that of the first, 
assumes a particular relation between rhetoric and democracy. In this case, the story is 
driven by the assumption that when a government endorses the principles of democracy 
(or manifests a politics predicated on some vision of equality and popular sovereignty), 
rhetoric flourishes (Bizzell 1); conversely, when a government endorses the principles of 
oligarchy and autocracy (or manifests a politics predicated on some vision of inequality 
and heteronomy), rhetoric fails to flourish. Although various articulations of this 
narrative exist, most are rooted in an origin story that begins with the constitutional 
reforms initiated by Solon, in Athens, at the beginning of the sixth century B.C.E. 
According to Book II of Aristotle’s Politics, it was indeed Solon who first “put an end to 
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the exclusiveness of the oligarchy” by extending participation in the Ekklêsia to all 
Athenian citizens and establishing an appellate court wherein jurors were chosen by lot 
(Jowett 1274a3; 1274a15).  
It is worth noting, however, that Solon’s general purpose was not to supplant the 
existing aristocracy with a government administered exclusively by the demos; instead, 
his aim was to establish a constitution that would allow the populace to participate along 
with the upper class in a greater number of juridico-political matters.1 Although the 
government became more “democratic” under these reforms, as Aristotle recalls in Part 8 
of the Athenian Constitution, because Solon had “assigned to the Council of the 
Areopagus the duty of superintending the laws, acting as before as the guardian of the 
constitution in general,” the oligarchic element retained its status as supreme arbiter 
(Kenyon 14). It was not until roughly two decades following the Persian wars that the 
demos, led by Ephialtes, successfully revolted against the Areopagus by stripping “the 
Council of all the acquired prerogatives from which it derived its guardianship of the 
constitution” and then redistributing these privileges among The Council of Five 
Hundred, the Ekklêsia, and the law courts (Kenyon 47). Thanks to this shift in legislative 
and judicial privileges, Athens consequently manifested a political structure that, for 
perhaps the first time in the history of Western thought, “recognized the need to entertain 
opposing views when expressed with rhetorical effectiveness” (Kennedy 3). “Under 
democracies,” writes George Kennedy in A New History of Classical Rhetoric, “citizens 
                                                
1 See Aristotle’s Athenaion Politeia, Parts 12-13. Solon’s reforms apparently prompted backlash from both 
the masses (who demanded that he redistribute all property) and the upper class (who demanded that he 
“restore everything to its former position”). Feeling beset by both classes, Solon wisely departed for Egypt, 
declaring that he would not return for at least a decade. Cf. Plutarch’s Lives I (XV. 7). 
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were expected to participate in political debate, and they were expected to speak on their 
own behalf in courts of law;”2 in effect, “[a] theory of public speaking evolved, which 
developed an extensive technical vocabulary to describe features of argument, 
arrangement, style and delivery” (3).3  
After establishing this initial relation between rhetoric and early democracies, 
articulations of the narrative frequently map the subsequent development and refinement 
of democratic politics to the constitution in Rome’s res publica (Kennedy 3), the civic 
humanism espoused by the libertas populi in Renaissance republics (Bizzell 555), and the 
doctrine of natural rights that safeguards the vox populi in modern liberal democracies 
(Hauser 3). Presumably, the development and refinement of rhetoric coincides with this 
historical trajectory because democracy, ideally conceived as a progressive politics, 
increasingly affords individuals opportunities for equal participation in deliberative and 
                                                
2 Cf. Jaroen Bons, who maintains in “Gorgias the Sophist and Early Rhetoric” that “life in the polis 
requires participation, especially in Athens where, eventually, both in the political arena of the citizens’ 
Assembly and in the law courts with their large-sized jury-committees, citizens exercise their democratic 
rights of participation. In both domains it is up to the individual citizen to persuade others, in the Assembly 
that his proposed policy is advantageous, or in the law courts that their [sic] case is just” (38-39). 
3 Victor Vitanza’s Negation, Subjectivity, and The History of Rhetoric cites a rise-and-fall narrative that 
virtually parallels this one, but it locates the genesis of rhetoric via the advent of democracy in fifth-century 
Sicily. According to this narrative, following the overthrow of the tyrants Gelon and Heiron, the Sicilians 
established a tentative democracy, but “fearing a return to tyranny, the people wanted to have absolute 
control over all things, upon which they fell into a state of disorder. However, a person by the name of 
‘Korax,’ who had been in ‘Hieron’s’ service—yes, Korax was/is a bureaucrat—used speech to soothe the 
people back to a state of order (!). As he spoke, his speaking taught the people how to control (discipline) 
themselves; as he spoke, he referred to the first part of his speech as ‘introduction,’ and subsequent parts as 
‘narration,’ ‘argument,’ ‘digression,’ and ‘epilogue.’ By these means, he contrived to persuade . . .” (327). 
Cf. Michael Gagarin’s account in “Probability and Persuasion: Plato and Early Greek Rhetoric,” which 
bridges Vitanza, Kennedy and Bons: “According to the current view, rhetoric originated in Sicily with the 
handbooks of Corax and Tisias as a response to the large number of legal suits which arose after the 
overthrow of the Syracusan tyrants in 467. The study of rhetoric then became a primary interest of the 
sophists, who advertised their skills to young men desirous of getting ahead in the world of the democratic 
polis, especially at Athens. Success in these circumstances depended on one’s ability to persuade large 
audiences in the Assembly or the courts, the latter of which became more important after the judicial 
reforms of Ephialtes in 462” (46). 
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judicial matters germane to the public sphere. And of course, when democracy falls—as 
when Macedon conquered Athens, when Augustus assumed power in Rome, and when 
large-scale monarchies came to dominate most of Europe—rhetoric declines. In short, as 
with rhetoric and epistemology, rhetoric and democracy also rise and fall together, but it 
is always according to the level of democracy present in a politics that rhetoric either 
flourishes or fails to flourish—again, not the other way around.  
Both of these rise-and-fall narratives are what Paul de Man calls genetic 
narratives, or narratives in which “history and interpretation coincide, the common 
principle that mediates between them being the genetic concept of totalization . . . which 
necessarily underlies all historical narrative” (Allegories 81-82). And clearly such a 
principal is required for either of these narratives to function as historical narratives, 
since the logos of each depends upon interpreting an organic relationship between terms, 
a relationship of restricted economy which is said to reflect the natural order of things 
within language, and which is made possible by positioning politics and epistemology as 
prior to rhetoric so that it can be born out of them.  
What often follows from the genetic logic are a number of assumptions about 
rhetoric and its principal function, which Jeffrey Walker summarizes with concision in 
his Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity:  
These assumptions are, to put the matter as briefly as possible, that the 
“primary” and most essential form of “rhetoric”—and the form in which it 
originates from the traditional, “preconceptual” or predisciplinary 
discourse practices of archaic Greek society—is the practical oratory of 
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political assemblies and courts of law. And further, that poetic, epideictic, 
or “literaturized” forms of rhetoric are “secondary,” derivative 
manifestations, in which the pristine virtue of the civic speech act is 
reduced to little more than genteel ornament, or decorative display, and 
made to serve the purposes of elegant consumption or entertainment or the 
reinforcement of existing values and beliefs. (4)  
To provide a more accurate picture of the function of epideictic rhetoric in antiquity—to 
reintroduce it as a form of “argument that intends to create, intensify, or change beliefs 
and attitudes in its audience” (168)—Walker contests these assumptions. I will also 
contest them; however, my strategy will be to do so by changing the registers in which 
we traditionally read the functions of democracy and epistemology in relation to rhetoric.  
As I will argue in this chapter, a connection exists between democracy and 
epistemology that hinges on equality, and this connection makes it is possible to account 
for particular instances of rhetorical activity that cannot be assimilated into the logos of 
the two genetic narratives I have described. To demonstrate that this is so, I will first 
question whether these narratives can account for instances of rhetorical activity that do 
not serve recognizable ethical-political agendas, these being a priori illegitimate rhetorics 
since they do not derive from any preexisting epistemological criteria for rhetorical 
activity as it relates to the concept of democracy. I then argue that one of the central 
presumptions of the genetic narratives derives from a restricted conception of agôn, a 
conception which demands that legitimate rhetorical activity be either communally or 
politically sanctioned. By undertaking a review of contemporary literature on agôn, I 
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attempt to widen its scope, and in conclusion, I offer an alternative to the incumbent 
logos of the genetic narratives. 
DEMOCRACY AND RHETORIC 
While the standard rise-and-fall narrative concerning rhetoric and democracy is 
certainly persuasive in many contexts, its general historiography appears to eschew an 
important question: namely, if we are to believe that the level of democracy present in a 
politics is the necessary precondition for a flourishing rhetorical culture, then why do 
instances of rhetorical activity, predicated on equality, occasionally appear to flourish 
without democracy?4 Several responses to this question are conceivable. We could 
suppose, for example, that a government is only marginally democratic, so it cannot 
account for certain instances of rhetorical activity because the structure upon which its 
politics are built is still residually oligarchic or autocratic: it merely substitutes an order 
of rule based on kinship with an order of rule based on class, wealth, or property 
ownership. This sort of governance would closely resemble the timocracy established in 
Periclean Athens, where the poor Thetes, who were excluded from holding any public 
offices, nevertheless were able to participate in the Assembly and elect archons.5  
                                                
4 Gagarin responds to a similar question in “Background and Origins: Oratory and Rhetoric before the 
Sophists” by citing the famous story of Tisias going to study with Corax and promising to pay a fee if he 
won his first case. As Gagarin explains, Tisias uses a reverse-probability argument, presupposing “the same 
argument [as Corax], altering nothing” (33). Gagarin therefore concludes that Tisias’s work “must be 
understood as an intellectual contribution to ideas about logos or argument rather than a practical 
contribution to the training of litigants or politicians. This is just one reason why I am skeptical of the 
historical context in which the later tradition set Tisias’ work—the rise of democracy after the overthrow of 
tyranny—for he could just as easily have carried out his intellectual work under any form of government” 
(31).   
5 See Plutarch’s Solon (XVII. 2) in Lives I. 
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Moving up the chain, we could suppose that a government is reasonably 
democratic, but the structure upon which its politics are built does not fully recognize that 
it bears residual presuppositions of inequality and heteronomy owing to longstanding 
cultural attitudes that have been thoroughly naturalized (e.g., attitudes related to gender, 
race, levels of education, etcetera . . .). Consider, for example, the pater familias in Rome 
where, under certain circumstances, a woman could be granted her independence from 
the head of house: sui iuris (of one’s own laws) she was excluded from participation in 
general matters of the courts, but she nevertheless had the right to speak on her own legal 
matters at court should she care (or be called upon) to do so.6  
Pushing the genetic logic further, we could suppose that a government is largely 
democratic, but the structure upon which its politics are built ultimately privileges the 
superiority of a divine exemplar. This setup was often indicative of the large-scale 
monarchies in the later period of the Renaissance where, in many instances, secular 
citizens were allowed to participate in public decisions and legal matters by “autonomous 
right,” but the enabling condition for participation was generally established with 
deference to “the common good,” which largely relied on interpretations of religious 
doctrine authorized by monarchs.7  
                                                
6 For more on the relationship between women and law in the Roman Republic, see Jan Thomas’s chapter 
“The Division of the Sexes in Roman Law” in History of Women in the West, Volume I: From Ancient 
Goddesses to Christian Saints. 
7 Athanasios Moulakis’s entry on “Civic Humanism” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy suggests 
that even during periods of great upheaval in Renaissance Europe, revolutionaries were generally willing to 
compromise with monarchs to achieve a definition of the common good (sometimes granting them secular 
titles like “commander-in-chief” to downplay the religious emphasis). 
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Finally, we could suppose that a government is fully democratic in its 
constitution, and the entirely open-ended structure upon which its politics are built has 
the ability to correct inequalities by progressively recognizing and legitimating voices not 
previously accounted for within the structure. More than any other, this form of 
government ostensibly resembles modern democracy in the United States, where by way 
of protests and elections, inequalities based on race, class, gender, nationality, sexuality, 
education, religion, and so forth can be exposed and corrected through the free speech 
exercised by marginalized publics.  
Of these four possibilities, the last perhaps makes the most obvious case for ideal 
democracy as being a truly progressive politics (though the other three could just as 
easily do so as well, given that all mark a progression from less equality to more 
equality). Following the logos of the genetic narrative, a democratic government may not 
account for all voices at all times, but because the structure of democratic politics is 
open-ended and adaptive, in theory it will someday account for all rhetorical activity 
issued by the demos. As I hope to make clear, however, certain instances of rhetorical 
activity cannot be reconciled even by this final possibility. Solon’s reforms, for example, 
predated democracy as a social form of organization, but his rhetorical activity 
nevertheless presupposed equality in a way that shook Greek politics to the core. Despite 
having grown up under an oligarchic regime, Solon was an able speaker who achieved 
democratic agency without the rights to free speech and assembly afforded by democratic 
institutions. In other words, Solon’s rhetorical activity appears to be coextensive with 
certain features of democracy, but it is not an effect of the social form of organization 
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that is democratic politics. For this reason, the genetic narrative cannot properly account 
for it. This failed accounting, I contend, is based on a restricted conception of democracy. 
Of course, etymologically the word “democracy” derives from the Greek 
elements δῆµος and κράτος, and it is generally translated into English as “rule of the 
people,” but exactly how to interpret this word in relation to politics and government has 
recently become a point of contention for a number of contemporary thinkers, perhaps 
none of whom has been simultaneously more revered and censured than French 
philosopher Jacques Rancière. His Hatred of Democracy embarks on an analysis of the 
word with an unexpected philological account:  
[democracy] was, in Ancient Greece, originally used as an insult by those 
who saw in the unnameable government of the multitude the ruin of any 
legitimate order. It remained synonymous with abomination for everyone 
who thought that power fell by rights to those whose birth had predestined 
them to it or whose capabilities called them to it. (3)  
It is not difficult to recognize in this insult the stentorian voice of a Plato, whose 
stratifying agenda in The Republic guards against the democratic impulse to assign 
positions by lot, or that of an Aristotle, whose rationalist agenda in the Politics guards 
against the democratic impulse to dispense with explicit rules for social organization. Of 
greater rhetorical import, however, is that the insult substitutes “democracy” for 
“unnameable government,” which signals the main definitional problem: the metonymy 
suggests what appears to be a paradox, for a government, by definition, always names the 
structure of its politics. In response to this apparent contradiction in logic, Rancière 
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explains that while democracy is not indifferent to juridico-political forms, it nevertheless 
cannot be identified with them (Hatred 54) because “[u]nder the name democracy, what 
is being implicated and denounced is politics itself” (Hatred 33). The following passages 
help to clarify this claim:  
Democracy is not a type of constitution, nor a form of society. The power 
of the people is not that of a people gathered together, of the majority, or 
of the working class. It is simply the power peculiar to those who have no 
more entitlements to govern than to submit . . . The scandal [of 
democracy] lies in the disjoining of entitlements to govern from any 
analogy to those that order social relations, from any analogy between 
human convention and the order of nature. It is the scandal of a superiority 
based on no other title than the very absence of superiority . . . Democracy 
really means, in this sense, the impurity of politics, the challenging of 
governments’ claims to embody the sole principle of public life and in so 
doing be able to circumscribe the understanding and extension of public 
life. (46; 42; 62) 
Following Rancière’s formulation, the “challenge” initiated by democracy can be read as 
operating in the form of an insurgent rhetorical pattern, one that unsettles ideological 
entitlements to legitimacy founded on totalizing political claims.8 Furthermore, because 
this challenge signifies the impurity of politics rather than a type of constitution or a form 
                                                
8 It should be noted that Rancière himself never undertakes this reading of democracy, and he would 
probably scoff at the notion that insurgent rhetorical patterns are compatible with his sense of democracy as 
a process of political subjectivation. His objections bear relevance on this argument, and they will be 
formally addressed in Chapter Three. 
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of society, democracy as insurgency would not necessarily name the activities of general 
movements that militate in order to seize the state form, but it would instead name 
particular moments of discursive insurgency that unsettle the smooth operation of 
established ideologies. Crucial to this distinction is that general movements (social 
revolutions, protests, uprisings, and so forth) tend to consider their challenges successful 
only insofar as they can be identified as correctives to official political structures. This is 
not always the case, and other identifications are certainly possible, but in 
contradistinction to the corrective aim, particular moments of democracy as insurgency 
would distinguish themselves foremost as events, which is to say that they would herald a 
breakdown of the counting practices that structure a dominant discourse.9  
The suggestion that democracy occurs as a discursive insurgency—and that it is 
therefore evental rather than something that can be realized structurally—is of course not 
exclusive to Rancière’s thinking. Though they differ radically in formulation, Rosa 
Luxemburg’s dialectic of spontaneity and organization in “Organizational Questions of 
Russian Social Democracy,” Alain Badiou’s analysis of the French Communards in The 
Communist Hypothesis, and even Noam Chomsky’s descriptions of the Israeli kibbutzim 
and the Spanish revolution of 1936 in “The Relevance of Anarcho-Syndicalism” offer 
generally compatible claims. But if these thinkers have made persuasive arguments that 
render democracy as something other than an official politics, what are we to make of the 
                                                
9 For a more thorough description of “event” and “counting practices,” see Alain Badiou’s interview with 
Peter Hallward at the conclusion of Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil. 
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genetic narrative that suggests rhetorical culture flourishes or fails to flourish according 
to the level of democracy present in a politics?  
Following Walker’s lead, we see that, at best, the genetic narrative can account 
for the relationship between rhetoric and democracy only when the primary function of 
rhetoric is reduced to pragmatikos logos, or “the practical oratory of political assemblies 
and courts of law,” and he persuasively challenges this narrative by providing ample 
evidence for epideictic rhetoric as a form of argument that shapes cultural beliefs and 
values. Since the scene of epideictic discourse is one of ideological contest or struggle, 
the democratic potential of epideictic rhetoric effectively derives from a speaker’s ability 
to enter a variety of agônes and forward arguments in favor of different ideologies, while 
simultaneously operating within the constraints imposed by specific audiences. The 
democratic potential of rhetoric therefore lies in the nature of the speaker/audience 
transaction and not necessarily in the forms of rhetoric practiced exclusively in and by 
political and legal institutions.  
This account seems entirely reasonable as a response to the logos of the genetic 
narrative. What remains puzzling, however, is how even epideictic rhetoric can take place 
without democracy, since the minimum condition of possibility for using epideictic to 
contest ideological positions is the opportunity to speak freely, which has historically 
required the protections afforded by democratic institutions. (In a dictatorship, for 
example, a citizen appears to have no available scene in which to discourse and challenge 
prevailing ideologies.) But given the aforementioned arguments for conceptualizing 
democracy in another register, for reading it as an event that heralds a breakdown in the 
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counting practices of a dominant discourse, it becomes possible to see how rhetorical 
activity can flourish when speakers are not granted the freedom to speak. Borrowing from 
Rancière’s philosophical apparatus, it is a matter of presupposing the equality of 
intelligence between speaking beings. For Rancière, it is an equality that must be 
presupposed for the simple reason that it is an opinion: as he makes clear in Hatred of 
Democracy and The ignorant Schoolmaster, we cannot prove that all intelligence is 
equal, but the simple fact that even tyrants can understand their slaves enough to 
command them, and that even slaves can understand their tyrants enough to obey them, 
gives reason to believe that speaking beings understand one another not because they are 
of unequal intelligence, but because all speaking beings are capable of understanding 
what other speaking beings say and do (Hatred 48; Schoolmaster 88). Consequently, this 
presupposition does not depend on an institutional guarantee of equality; instead, it takes 
equality as its epistemological starting point. Here is what Rancière has to say on the 
matter:  
Reason begins when discourses organized with the goal of being right 
cease, begins where equality is recognized: not an equality decreed by law 
or force, not a passively received equality, but an equality in act, verified, 
at each step by those marchers who, in their constant attention to 
themselves and in their endless revolving around the truth, find the right 
sentences to make themselves understood by others . . . [for] only an equal 
understands an equal. (Ignorant Schoolmaster 72)  
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In this book and in others, Rancière highlights several cases wherein different individuals 
presuppose equality, but for very specific reasons (which will be addressed in the later 
chapters), he does not take into consideration that such a presupposition might be found 
in the epistemological starting point of rhetorical activity generated by one of the earliest 
sophists. It is to this activity that we now turn. 
EPISTEMOLOGY AND SOPHISTIC RHETORIC 
Early-sophistic rhetoric famously championed the study of logos, and perhaps no 
rhetor has become better known for doing so than Gorgias of Leontini. While many of the 
pre-Socratics argued that logos served only a referential function, a function ultimately 
responsible for re-presenting the phenomena of the external world to us, Gorgias takes 
the view later espoused in deconstruction: affirming the status of writing as 
representational is problematic because it assumes that a rational connection exists 
between referents (external reality) and their signifiers (logos/language). Bruce 
McComiskey claims that because Gorgias was working against the thinking of natural 
and metaphysical philosophers—who felt that if logos only worked to refer to that which 
really exists, it was more fruitful to study the existing “things” themselves, and not the 
writing that re-presented them in a one-to-one correlation—in order to legitimate logos 
epistemologically, Gorgias turns the problem of representation around: logos does not 
reveal or represent reality; instead, “reality is the representation of language, since 
language is the force that gives meaning and intelligibility to the things that surround us” 
(88). A passage from On the Nonexistent articulates this turn with greater precision: “For 
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logos is the means by which we communicate, but logos is different from substances and 
existent things. Thus we do not communicate existent things to our neighbors; instead we 
communicate only logos, which is something other than substances” (Bizzell and 
Herzberg 36). In other words, if reality reveals logos, and by extension logos (as form) 
can be separated from any conjectural reality (its supposed content), then the study of 
logos and not the study of unmediated reality becomes the most legitimate and profitable 
line of epistemological inquiry.  
Predictably, the issue of legitimacy is precisely the issue at the fore of the initial 
debate in Plato’s Gorgias. When Socrates challenges the status of rhetoric as a technê—
arguing, in essence, that a technê necessarily produces a knowledge aligned with the 
universal form of its object—he simultaneously legitimates the practitioners of 
recognizable technai (medicine, astronomy, music, and so forth) who could lay claim to 
particular discursive conventions and who could also restrict the availability of those 
conventions to outsiders in varying degrees. Gorgias, hailing from Sicily, was such an 
outsider, and it is possible that, at least in some register, Plato’s dialogue was meant to 
restrict the conventions of oral discourse to the dialectical conventions deemed legitimate 
by Socrates. But of course, one must suspect that in the agonistic culture of the Greeks, 
the practitioners of every technê were regularly in competition with one another for the 
discursive territory of the technê itself, which would mean that dominant opinions were 
frequently being challenged by new and different opinions about how any field should 
operate and, more, how it should be taught.  
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It seems reasonable to suggest that for Gorgias, logos was never meant to operate 
in the service of Knowing Truth; in agonistic encounters, what logos instead makes 
possible is its own undoing, the unsettling of established ideologies, the production of 
rhetorical patterns that presuppose all logoi are equally available for figuration. The 
following passage from the Encomium to Helen suggests as much: 
To understand that persuasion, when added to speech, is wont also to 
impress the soul as it wishes,10 one must first study the arguments of 
astronomers, who replace opinion with opinion: displacing one but 
implanting another, they make incredible, invisible matters apparent to the 
eyes of opinion. Second, compulsory debates with words, where a single 
speech to a large crowd pleases and persuades because it is written with 
skill, not spoken with truth. Third, contests of philosophical arguments, 
where it is shown that speed of thought also makes it easy to change a 
conviction based on opinion. (Gagarin, “Probability” 57-58) 
In other words, if there is an epistemology that accords with Gorgias’s practice of 
rhetoric qua logos, perhaps it recognizes language both as inherently deceptive and as 
something linguistic beings cannot escape. Rhetoric then becomes the force capable of 
temporarily unsettling discursive formations that have been constrained by an established 
ideology (the Platonic discourse of Universal Truth being one such formation). Following 
the unsettling, however, a new ideological regime necessarily takes hold, so to what 
extent can we say, as McComiskey does, that this sort of epistemology is “empirical,” or 
                                                
10 This portion of the passage was taken from Sprague’s The Older Sophists, 82 B 11.13. 
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that its purpose is primarily to shape belief through public deliberation and social 
consensus? As Michael Gagarin points out in “Did the Sophists Aim to Persuade?” 
rhetors like Antiphon and Gorgias often engaged in antilogistic argumentation, which did 
not carry the expectation that generating a valid opposing logos would or should 
necessarily persuade anyone to change their values, customs, attitudes or beliefs, though 
they might. To what extent, then, would the epistemology implicated in this sort of 
rhetorical activity be of any empirical value relative to the practical concerns of the day, 
if at day’s end no one actually does anything differently as a result? Suppose, for 
example, that an official politics justifies itself with reference to an essentialized trope—
say divine justice; even were one to unsettle this trope (and, by extension, the ideology 
that enforces it) by generating a valid critical argument, there is no guarantee that those 
being addressed, even those who have been persuaded, will necessarily change their 
longstanding attitudes or beliefs.  
In parallel with the genetic narrative concerning rhetoric and democracy, we 
might therefore conclude that while the standard rise-and-fall narrative concerning 
rhetoric and epistemology is certainly persuasive in many contexts, its general 
historiography also appears to eschew an important question: namely, if we are to believe 
that the degree to which the polis endorses empirical epistemology is the necessary cause 
for rhetoric to flourish, then why do instances of rhetorical activity occasionally appear to 
flourish without any requisite community sanction? In other words, if an empirical 
epistemology considers that “knowledge is unstable and that laws and policies (nomoi) 
grow out of discussion,” that these discussions are always intersubjective, “communal” 
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practices, and that “rhetoric [therefore] supplies the necessary tools for mastery over 
opinion and, consequently, the ability for anyone to function effectively in a democratic 
society” (McComiskey 20), then how does the narrative account for rhetorical activity 
that generates valid arguments but is not recognized as legitimate speech within the 
sanctioned discourse that is public deliberation? For example, in a medical policy debate 
about best practices for treating breast cancer, can we imagine arguments from a 
homeopathic doctor would be taken seriously by the American Medical Association? Or 
if the debate were focused on best practices for administering anesthesia, would the AMA 
be amenable to arguments issued by a doctor suspected of practicing euthanasia? These 
examples are not meant to suggest that such arguments would be good (though they 
certainly could be, depending upon other aspects of the rhetorical situation); they simply 
point out that under democratic forms of government there are instances of rhetorical 
activity wherein public deliberation does not recognize potentially valid arguments as 
legitimate speech based on presumptive identifications. 
Undoubtedly at issue in these kinds of examples is the role of agôn and its status 
in relation to rhetorical activity. In general, contemporary rhetorical scholarship tends to 
read agôn as a community institution that encourages speakers to present opposing 
viewpoints for public judgment, thereby making it possible to mount arguments that 
challenge prevailing ideologies. As a result, should an argument prove persuasive to 
those judging the contest, the values, beliefs, practices, or customs of the community 
would ideally change. Consider the following passage from Demosthenes’s First 
Olynthiac:  
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You would, I expect, men of Athens, accept it as the equivalent of a large 
amount of money, if it could be made clear to you what will prove our best 
policy in the matters now under discussion. This then being so, you are 
bound to give an eager hearing to all who offer advice. For not only if 
someone comes forward with a well-considered plan, could you hear and 
accept it, but also I count it part of your good fortune that more than one 
speaker may be inspired with suitable suggestions on the spur of the 
moment, so that out of the multitude of proposals, the choice of the best 
should not be difficult. (Vince 5) 
This is an ethical, “collaboration-through-competition” model of public discourse meant 
to check public policy against both public and private interests, and it is this very model 
that sets the groundwork for what several contemporary scholars call “agonistic 
democracy.” It is also the ethical manifestation of what Scott Consigny claims underpins 
Gorgianic epistemology. His claim is worth quoting at length here:  
[Gorgias] promotes the institution of the agon, an institution in which 
people advocate opposed viewpoints and which is therefore an institution 
of change that encourages people to challenge established beliefs. It is 
certainly the case that in nonagonistic communities, such as those ruled by 
a divine king, Gorgian conventionalism would reinforce acceptance of the 
status quo and offer little means of resisting the established order. But in a 
[Panhellenic] community informed by various types of agons, 
conventionality encourages change. Unlike communities in which people 
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are unable to challenge the dictates of their rulers, the Hellenic community 
is informed by agons in which challenging established positions is 
definitive of its very existence. In the agonistic culture everyone will not 
share the same views; on the contrary, individuals differential themselves 
from others by advancing their views in a variety of agons. What people 
share is a commitment to the institution of the agon itself and the 
acceptance of the decision rendered by acknowledged judges who in effect 
speak for the community. (Gorgias 131) 
All well and good, if one happens to be lucky enough to live in a flourishing Panhellenic 
(or democratic) community. But is rhetorical activity truly of little value to those who 
live in “nonagonistic” communities and wish to resist the status quo? And if history 
suggests that individuals in “nonagonistic” communities sometimes do challenge the 
dictates of their rulers, regardless of the form of government they live under, what would 
a “non” agonistic community even look like?  
The problem, in my estimation, is that Consigny’s argument cannot make room 
for sophistic rhetoric if it does not conform to his belief that agônes, properly conceived, 
must be communally—and indeed, politically—sanctioned. Against what he calls the 
“subjectivist/romantic” readings of Gorgias first advanced by Hegel, as well as the 
“empiricist/rationalist” readings advanced by Grote (McComiskey fits here as well), 
Consigny concludes that Gorgias was an anti-foundationalist, yet he largely arrives at this 
conclusion—and it is a conclusion unmistakably indebted to Rorty’s contextualism—by 
arguing that Gorgias’s technê is constitutive of a communal ethics which depends upon 
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agônes “fostering cooperation and agreement about the rules of competition […because] 
without agreement about the rules or procedures of a competition and agreement to abide 
by the outcome of the contest,” he claims, “the agon is not possible” (131; my emphasis). 
Although I agree that Gorgias can be read as an anti-foundationalist, my purpose in the 
following section will be to question whether this general insistence upon a 
communitarian definition of agôn is in fact the consequence of an unconscious fidelity to 
the genetic narratives.  
MORE READINGS OF AGÔN 
While there is no reason to dismiss Consigny’s reading of agôn (at its best, it 
helps to affirm the concept as being capable of producing a more equitable, and therefore 
more tolerable, politics11), I shall try to articulate the complexity of agôn somewhat 
differently in relation to rhetoric by considering a selective genealogy of the term as it 
has been variously appropriated within the twentieth-century discourses of athletics, 
music, biochemistry, politics, and education. The initial purpose of this review is to 
question why agôn has at times been linked metonymically with domination and violence 
that is set against rational discourse, and why it has at times been linked with healthy 
competition and overcoming. This questioning then leads to considerations of whether 
community sanction is a necessary prerequisite to agonistic encounters. In conclusion, I 
will argue that audience reactions need not be the determinate factor in judging the 
success or failure of rhetorical activity in agônes: at bottom, my claim is that irrespective 
                                                
11 For an excellent book on the possibilities of an “agonistic democracy” that would be compatible with 
Consigny’s ethical-political agenda, see Chantal Mouffe’s The Democratic Paradox. 
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of its reception, when events of democracy occur in agônes they often does so because an 
insurgent rhetorical pattern, predicated on equality, challenges the epistemological 
certainty that enforces an established ideology, and whether or not this challenge actually 
persuades an audience to behave differently, it nevertheless holds the potential to herald a 
breakdown in the official counting practices that structure the politics of a discourse. 
Athletics 
 In this century, as in others, because we find sporting events taking place between 
virtually every social group on the planet, it feels quite natural to associate “competition” 
or “contest,” and “assembly” or “gathering,” with some form of athletics. Although the 
Greeks were not the first civilization to engage in athletic events, it is of course from 
them that we have inherited our Olympic games and a general (Western) notion of what it 
means to display feats of the body in front of an audience. Thomas Cahill writes that the 
Greeks “loved games of all kinds, which they called ‘agônes’ . . . in which antagônist is 
pitted against antagônist until one comes out on top. A better English term for what they 
had in mind might be ‘contest’ or ‘struggle’ or even ‘power performance’” (par. 1). He 
maintains that for the Greeks, “In war, there was nothing that thrilled them more than a 
fight to the death, one army’s champion pitted against the other’s . . . [and] there always 
had to be a declared winner on whom the laurels could be heaped and at least one 
miserable loser” (par. 3). The initial emphasis worth noting here is that Cahill, like others 
we shall consider shortly, sets out defining agôn in terms of domination and violence. In 
contrast, we find that for writers such as Richard Avramenko, the purpose of the agôn 
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was not to encourage death or pure domination but to create the conditions for 
overcoming a particular image of humanity, or to engender an act that “temporarily 
erases the limitations of human existence by transfiguring man into a participant in the 
world of the gods” (16). But the appropriations of Cahill and Avramenko are not entirely 
at odds with one another. Cahill goes on to argue that agônes “taught and reinforced 
favorite Greek themes of honor and glory, of winning over others, of triumph in combat” 
(par. 10), and Avramenko seems to agree:  
In the agonistic culture of the Greeks, especially at the athletic 
competitions . . . Winning was all-important because, as Pindar writes, “he 
who has won luxuriant renown in games or war, once he has been well 
praised, receives the greatest of gains: regard in the speech of his fellow 
citizens, and on the lips of strangers.” (25)  
Unlike Avramenko, however, Cahill’s estimation of agôn in ancient Greece tends to 
focus exclusively on its pejorative dimensions, suggesting (quite rightly) that competition 
conceived thusly is outmoded and that, today, “We hardly need to imitate ancient Greek 
bellicosity, racism, classism and sexism, or to laude the supreme worth ancient Greece 
placed on domination” (par. 17). Cahill thus dismisses the antiquated designation of agôn 
as domination and optimistically reframes modern athletic competition as that which 
creates “the sense of human solidarity that comes to bind athletes from so many different 
places to one another and also gives the immense Olympic audience an abiding feeling 
for the interconnectedness of the human family” (par. 18). Domination obviously does 
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not sit well with the brand of humanism Cahill espouses, and, in a revisionist move, he 
therefore reverts to the familiar trope of solidarity as family in his appropriation of agôn. 
Avramenko undertakes a similar move, but he extends the trope even further, 
substituting (by synecdoche) “family” for “community.” In this way, he is much closer to 
Consigny when he links agôn to an overcoming legitimated by community sanction. In 
“Nietzsche and the Greek Idea of Immortality,” for example, Avramenko begins by 
discussing “a legendary boxing match between Creugas of Epidamnus and Damoxenus of 
Syracuse at the ancient Nemean games” (1). According to Pausanias’s Description of 
Greece, the match had gone on for so long that the judges “decided to produce a klimax 
by ordering the athletes to exchange undefended blows until one of them yielded” 
(Avramenko 1). The exchange begins with Creugas, who strikes Damoxenus in the head; 
although the blow is sound, being so equally matched, Creugas is unable to best his 
opponent. Before Damoxenus takes his turn, he first asks Creugas to raise his arm over 
his head, leaving the ribcage fully exposed. Damoxenus then readies and strikes: “with 
the sharpness of his nails and the violence of the blow his hand pierced [Creugas’s] side, 
seized his bowels and dragged and tore them out” (Avramenko 1). Creugas dies 
immediately; however, the judges also recognize him as the victor of the competition 
because “in dealing his opponent many blows instead of one [Damoxenus] had violated 
his mutual agreement [with Creugas]” (Avramenko 1).  
It is tempting to read this boxing match as an allegory for what happens when 
“winning at any cost” becomes the endgame of athletic competition. Because the judges 
of this contest do not consider the death of Creugas as a determinate factor in their 
 29 
decision, because the price paid for “winning at any cost” was indeed death, and because 
this sort of competition was celebrated by the Greeks, it is not difficult to see in this 
appropriation of agôn the very essence of domination that saturates the term with 
barbarism; however, to rescue agôn from this sense, Avramenko interprets the outcome 
of the contest using a recognizable maneuver. Instead of assuming that declaring Creugas 
the victor was the only morally appropriate course of action to take after the pugilist was 
murdered by another athlete in competition, Avramenko claims that “the decision to 
recognize Creugas as the victor . . . was influenced by neither the cruel circumstance of 
his death nor the death itself . . . [for] Creugas was recognized as the victor because he 
won—his death was only incidental” (1). Thus, we have before us an example that 
supports Consigny’s insistence on agreement about the rules of competition and 
agreement to abide by the judges’ decision, these judges being the ones who effectively 
“speak for the community.” Adding further support to Consigny’s estimation of agôn, 
Avramenko maintains that even though Damoxenus is not the victor in this competition 
(he is banished from the stadium), the decision to declare Creugas as the victor holds a 
key to understanding how the Greeks viewed the concept of agôn in terms of 
overcoming.  
Following Nietzsche, who writes that “the belly is the reason man does not so 
easily take himself for a god” (6), Avramenko says that “When man becomes aware of 
his mortality, he becomes aware of the limits that perforce accompany finite individual 
existence” (13). This awareness is very close to the effect produced by what Nietzsche 
calls “the Apollonian,” where the human “lives and suffers . . . amid the dangers and 
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terrors,” where the boundaries of mortality are starkly drawn, and the fear that enforces 
these boundaries fosters a sense of life wherein one becomes terrified of one’s own 
finitude (qtd. in Avramenko 13). The Greeks, according to Avramenko, were aware that 
they were paralyzed by this fear of their own finite biology, and the quest to overcome 
this paralysis therefore became one of the highest order:  
The state of nature [in which one fears death] no longer exists when man 
begins to address his fear of death: it ends when man transforms his 
natural fear into an unnatural courage . . . [and] it is through this 
transformation that . . . human beings in general are able to muster the 
courage required to put themselves in perilously dangerous situations, to 
opt for death, or to carry on living despite the terrible specter of death. 
Man’s natural cowardice and the knowledge of the certainty of death are 
mitigated by the idea of immortality. (6-7; 8)  
The transformation (or transvaluation) of which Avramenko speaks is closely aligned 
with the Nietzschean concept of the Dionysian. Where Apollo becomes the formal 
discursive encoding of our experiences, Dionysus becomes the destroyer of these forms; 
however, there is no permanence in either this formal encoding or its destruction:  
the oblivion of Dionysian intoxication is only temporary because the 
terrors of everyday reality . . . necessarily re-enter man’s consciousness. 
These art impulses are simultaneously present in the Greek man; these two 
separate inclinations run parallel to each other and are, for the most part, 
openly at odds in each man. As such, the two art impulses impel each 
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other constantly to create new and more powerful artistic births, which in 
turn perpetuates the antagonism. (17-18)    
For Avramenko, these two impulses—the Apollonian, which both produces and is 
constrained by foreboding images of death, and the Dionysian, which obliterates these 
images—most properly constitute the things that are in contest in an agôn. His opinion on 
the matter is that “Participation in this struggle was a playful participation in the painful 
‘death struggle’ that is life . . . and as the order of nature was reflected in the athletic 
festival, the Hellene . . . was able to realize in himself the eternal joy of becoming—a joy 
which also encompasses joy in destruction” (28-29).  
If we return to the boxing match between Creugas and Damoxenus, perhaps the 
reason that Avramenko reads the contest in terms other than pure domination is that he 
sees the Greeks were able to overcome, or transvalue, the sense of necessity that values 
the continuation of life at any cost. But all hermeneutics aside, what seems clear enough 
is that Avramenko’s appropriation of agôn in the discourse of athletics aligns with 
Consigny on the issue of community sanction. Furthermore, his appropriation suggests 
that metonymies which position agôn either as domination or as overcoming need not be 
entirely at odds with one another, though they may be “openly at odds in each man.” 
Ultimately, the relationship itself proves not to be an individuated exchange between 
individual tendencies so much as a symbiosis or a cyclical union that necessarily 
implicates both overcoming and domination.  
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Stravinsky’s Agôn 
  Although it would be reductive to assume that Igor Stravinsky’s musical aesthetic 
implicates the same metonymy that Avramenko fleshes out in his work, striking 
continuities exist between the ways in which each conceptualizes agôn, the most notable 
being an attempt to depart from a particular set of coordinates imposed by Apollonian 
images of thought.  
 Stephanie Jordan argues that when the Russian-born composer Stravinsky 
finished his ballet Agôn in 1957, it constituted a “marked shift in Stravinsky’s own dance 
aesthetic” (58). Agôn was the last piece Stravinsky wrote in a triad of “Greek” ballets he 
composed for the stage. Apollo (1928) and Orpheus (1948) were the other two, and both 
of them were firmly rooted in the classical tradition of dance. Within this tradition, 
Stravinsky praises “the triumph of studied conception over vagueness, of the rule over the 
arbitrary, of order over the haphazard;” in sum, says Stravinsky, “I see exactly in it the 
perfect expression of the Apollonian principle” (Jordan 66). In line with this principle, 
working within this image of thought, Stravinsky composed according to the classical 
tradition for almost thirty years.  
Agôn marks the first of Stravinsky’s works to move beyond the canon of 
traditional Western harmony and into the “serial” or “twelve-tone” method of composing 
championed by Schonberg, Berg, and Webern. Unlike the formalized harmonic 
maneuvers we find in everything from Bach to Stravinsky’s own Apollo, one important 
feature of the serialized music that came out of the Second Viennese School is that it 
gives no more weight to one note than it does to another, thereby generating music that is 
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no longer in a recognizable “key.” This lack of a tonal center disrupts our typical 
expectations for what music should sound like and how it should proceed, which may 
explain why many audiences tend to have difficulty acclimating to the chaotic, abstract, 
and dissonant works of composers like John Cage, Béla Bartók, and Dmitri 
Shostakovich. 12 The Swiss conductor Ernest Ansermet declared that Agôn was “the first 
truly abstract ballet he had ever seen” (Jordan 76). To no great surprise, it was also one of 
the least performed of all of Stravinsky’s works.  
 But why, one might ask, did the greatest living composer of his time choose to 
move away from the formal composition techniques that had garnered him such immense 
fame and success? Critic Alastair Macaulay reads Stravinsky’s Agôn as a work “full of 
shapes, phrases, rhythms, sounds that hadn’t been encountered before but embodied New 
York modernism itself” (par. 5). Stravinsky had recently emigrated from Russia to the 
United States, and it is certainly conceivable that, in addition to his desire to overcome 
the compositional techniques he had inherited from the neo-classical tradition, Agôn was 
a product of his desire to overcome the Stalinist injunctions for socialist realism imposed 
upon Russian artists. 
Such a hypothesis may not be too far off the mark if we consider that when 
choreographer George Balanchine—whom Stravinsky declared his “Chosen One”—set 
the music to dance, he enlisted (and for the first time in the history of modern ballet) a 
cast of mixed racial backgrounds. Macaulay speculates, “it’s possible that Balanchine 
                                                
12 The parallel to abstract modernism, both in terms of aesthetic procedures and dates of composition, is 
evident.  
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introduced the black-and-white coloration of the ‘Agôn’ casting in response to 
Stravinsky’s atonal music. Himself an excellent pianist, he was dramatizing a new 
relation between the piano’s white and black notes” (par. 10). Thus, the casting of the 
dancers ostensibly mimics the act of serializing the music, which unsettles the tonal 
center of the work by presupposing an equal relation between the black and white keys. 
On the other hand, Stravinsky was famous for asserting that “amateurs borrow; 
professionals steal,” and upon a closer examination of serialization itself, we find that it 
is, in fact, a rigorous application of the very classical forms it purports to destroy. Is there 
not, perhaps, a particular sense of agonistic domination at work within the desire to 
serialize music, the aim of which is to necessarily value atonality over a tonal center “at 
any cost?” It is quite possible that this return from Dionysian destruction to the 
Apollonian image is precisely what Avramenko is referring to when he suggests “the two 
art impulses impel each other constantly to create new and more powerful artistic births, 
which in turn perpetuates the antagonism” (18). Jordan appears to be in accord with this 
discursive appropriation of agôn in terms of its productive powers: 
It seems like blasphemy today to suggest that it would be interesting to see 
other Agôns, to consider new questions posed of the Stravinsky score by 
choreographers, indeed to be asked to hear the music differently . . . And 
here is an irony: as works play off and against each other, perhaps 
alternative settings of the music might refresh our conception of the one 
and only Agôn that we know so well. (78)   
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Whatever we might divine from Stravinsky’s appropriation of the term agôn—that it 
values overcoming an Apollonian image of composition that constrains thought, that it 
merely reproduces that very image in a new formal encoding, or that, standing as an 
exemplar of agônes, it embodies the cyclical union of composition and decomposition 
which marks the artistic birth—it seems appropriate to suggest that the meaning of agôn 
for Stravinsky is neither compatible with the kind of domination that Cahill derides nor 
the ideal of community sanction Avramenko, Consigny, and McComiskey use to replace 
it. The absence of sexism (the cast is composed of both male and female dancers), racism 
(Balanchine’s contribution), classism (the dancers hold no rank), a performance 
celebrated by the community (it was ill-received by the public), and a narrative that 
privileges domination (the dance has no plot) all speak to a more complicated sense of 
the term.   
Biochemistry 
 Further complicating agôn is its appearance in the discourse of biochemistry. On 
the face of it, the appropriation is familiar, since the term generally signifies power 
wresting, violence and domination. Ruth Russo puts it bluntly: receptor theory posits that 
in a molecular agôn, agônists “[battle] it out to win access to the binding site of the 
receptors” (354); however, she clarifies, “when scientists use agônist today, very few 
think of vivid agonistic pictures like matricide, athletic games, naval battles, or jury trials. 
The word is used in its conventional, not metaphoric, sense” (357). According to her 
research, “Not until the 20th century does agônist appear in scientific discourse…when H. 
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Gaddum, in a 1943 paper, discusses how the opposing action of a poison and its antidote 
might be described by competition for the same receptor” (353-354). For a contemporary 
usage of the term, consider the following definition offered by a practicing 
anesthesiologist: 
It is, at its most basic, a molecule that turns something on or off. When 
you give a patient an agonist—adrenaline, for example—it attaches to a 
particular receptor and ultimately speeds up the patient’s heart and 
increases their blood pressure; and when you give them an antagonist, like 
inderal (a beta-blocker), their heart rate goes down, and their blood 
pressure drops. The term is essentially trying to describe the beginnings of 
an electro-chemical reaction in the body. (Rechnitz)   
One of the complicating aspects of agôn afforded by its appropriation in biochemical 
discourse is that we have an example of competition detached from a community of 
human subjects and judges. And because agônes in biochemistry take place between 
molecules, the humanistic sense of overcoming afforded to the term by Consigny, 
Avramenko, McComiskey, and perhaps even Stravinsky is notably absent from the 
definition. In fact, Cahill’s initial appropriation of the term in its reactive sense of 
“domination over others” appears to better approximate the interaction. Molecules 
introduced into the body “battle it out” for dominion over a receptor, and to the victors go 
the electro-chemical reactions.  
Interestingly, however, the physician adds the familiar agonistic caveat that this 
domination is only temporary. Apparently, molecular agônes establish some degree of 
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dominance and initiate a reaction, but their time on the receptor is finite. When an agonist 
is bumped off of a receptor, the receptor returns to its previous shape, which may suggest 
that the image of agôn Cahill derides in ancient Greek athletics—one of complete and 
totalizing dominance that does not acknowledge a capacity for change and a power of 
return—may not fully account for the chemical interaction. In fact, the physician explains 
that if something sticks permanently to a receptor and dominates it completely, no 
molecular agôn is taking place: “When lead is introduced into the body, for example, it 
not only gains access to cell receptors but creates reactive radicals that damage the cells 
themselves” (Rechnitz). In other words, in biochemical discourse, complete domination 
of a cell does not constitute a molecular agôn—it constitutes a very bad chemical 
reaction, which generally results in cellular death. To further complicate matters, Russo 
cites scholarship contending the following:  
as the understanding of a drug’s action at a receptor becomes more and 
more refined, the boundary between agônist and antagônist gets blurred; 
all neurotransmitters and drugs are just contenders at the molecular agôn, 
binding with more or less affinity, exerting more or less physiologic 
response. (354) 
How tightly each (anti)agonist sticks to a particular receptor constitutes this affinity, this 
molecular attraction, and because a multiplicity of outcomes might occur from any of 
these molecular agônes, biochemists Zernig and Saria think of this sticking in terms of 
“agônist promiscuity” (qtd. in Russo 357). Russo adds, “the fact that the molecular 
agônist can become ‘promiscuous’ means that even defined, delimited, technical terms 
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are fertile; they have a life of their own” (357). If nothing else, Russo’s claim that 
agonists “have a life of their own” points out that other manifestations of life can be seen 
as agonistic in their concrete materiality, that agônes may have destinies other than as 
official competitions sanctioned by gatherings of people. Furthermore, her statement 
highlights precisely the problem we face when we split the term agôn: by aligning the 
concept metonymically with either domination or with overcoming as exclusive domains 
of being, the nuances of degrees of becoming are lost.  
Politics 
 Brandon Turner might agree. His argument in “The Thrill of Victory, The Agôny 
of Defeat: The Nietzschean Vision of Contest” is that agônes work to challenge binaries, 
and if particular appropriations of the term agôn have indeed created a strict binary 
(domination/overcoming), an agonistic approach to defining the term might suggest we 
challenge that binary as well. 
 Structurally, Turner’s essay contrasts the appropriation of agôn as it is used by 
contemporary political theorists—such as Chantal Mouffe, William Connonly, Sheldon 
Wolin, and Bonnie Honig—to the concept of the agôn as conceived by Nietzsche. He 
begins by suggesting that “The branch of democratic theory labeled ‘agonistic’ emerged 
largely as a corrective to the procedural consensualist liberal theories of thinkers like 
John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas” (3). Where Habermas in his Transformation of the 
Public Sphere suggests that public deliberation should work towards “rational 
agreement” (82), or consensus by way of public deliberation, agonistic democracy 
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assumes that “Any consensus arrived at through public deliberation must be reached by 
either overpowering through compromise or by willfully ignoring opposing and 
dissenting views, meaning that ‘social objectivity is constituted through acts of power’” 
(Turner 3). Habermas would, of course, reject agonistic democracy not only on the 
grounds that consensus conceived thusly negates marginalized speech positions but also 
because such forms of consensus would not arrive at an enlightened form of deliberation. 
Moreover, he argues, “The conduct of the [Greek] citizen was agônsitic merely in the 
sportive competition with each that was a mock war against the external enemy and not 
in dispute with his own government” (52). Discursively, then, Habermas appears to view 
agônes as exercises in domination bent on reproducing illusory blood battles, essentially 
suggesting that the practice is uncritical and therefore incapable of advancing universal 
ideals that might foster a better politics.  
Hannah Arendt’s theory of the public sphere in The Human Condition suggests 
something altogether different. Her feeling is that actions become political when poleis 
are “permeated by a fiercely agônal spirit” (41), and their competitions create a space for 
beginning anew. This appropriation of agôn recalls Avramenko’s appropriation of the 
term in athletics that emphasizes the “eternal joys of becoming,” as well as appropriations 
of the term in music and biochemistry that feature a power of return. According to 
Turner, Arendt showed great concern “over the interplay between truth and politics” 
because “the introduction of universal or objective truth (such as a procedurally-
legitimated consensus) must bring about the temporary suspension of the political sphere 
and likewise the suspension of freedom itself” (5). Similar to the “agonistic promiscuity” 
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that captivates Russo, for Arendt, action in the political sphere depends upon a 
multiplicity of possible outcomes, and this multiplicity becomes nullified whenever 
consensus produces a truth purported to be universal. Proponents of agonism as a 
political theory therefore lean heavily on Arendt’s appropriation of agôn because she 
gives them a powerful narrative of legitimation against the deliberative school. Instead of 
reveling in complete domination, the purpose of an agôn becomes overcoming an image 
of universal truth that has been legitimated via consensus at the expense of other images 
of thought. With this purpose at the fore, Turner cites a passage from Mouffe’s The 
Democratic Paradox to explain how the proponents of contemporary democratic politics 
should deal with binary oppositions established through consensus:  
Friends and enemies, like other us/them constructions, must be made fluid 
and temporary, since [according to Mouffe] “the aim of democratic 
politics is to construct the ‘them’ in such a way that it is no longer 
perceived as an enemy to be destroyed, but as an ‘adversary,’ that is, 
somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas 
we do not put into question.” (6) 
But for all of this emphasis on treating binaries as “fluid and temporary,” proponents of 
agonistic democracy still seem intent on valorizing overcoming (if only in aesthetic 
dimensions) at the expense of the very real acts of domination their agônes often 
produce. Just to be clear, agonistic democracy might very well be the most ethical and 
practical form of democratic politics ever conceived. It attempts to deal with very real 
political issues in ways that are sensitive to social inequalities produced by master 
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discourses. Still, it could be argued that to presume the sole aim of democracy is to 
combat the ideas of an adversary is a thoroughly territorializing move. Perhaps that is the 
aim of democratic politics, but by narrowing the scope of democracy to politics, and 
agonism to a politics of tolerance sanctioned by a governing body, these proponents tend 
to efface not only events of democracy that cannot be identified with juridico-political 
forms but also the position of political privilege from which they define the aims of 
democracy itself. 
Education 
 Of course, definitions are always slippery, and the definition of agôn as it has 
been appropriated in the discourse of education is no exception. The agonism of the 
sophistic classroom, for example, bears only a distant family resemblance to the agonism 
that colleges in the United States practiced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and, 
it could be argued, an even more distant resemblance to some of the contemporary 
pedagogy that is attempting to resuscitate the ancient practice. Nevertheless, in light of a 
recent wave of scholarship on agonism, it has become possible to trace how the term has 
been appropriated by select voices and to examine arguments that have been made both 
for and against it.  
 Perhaps something to consider at the outset of such an examination is why 
particular features of the ancient methods became incompatible with the rhetorical 
pedagogy of later centuries. Scholars disagree. Robert Connors suggests that, at least in 
the United States, the dismissal of agonism in the academy can be traced to the inclusion 
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of women being admitted to Harvard and other formerly all-male colleges in the 
nineteenth century. In his history of Composition-Rhetoric: Backgrounds, Theory, and 
Pedagogy, Connors argues that “There were elements of confession, of intimate 
personalism, and of anti-agonistic admission of weakness in the new topics [specifically, 
in personal writing] that could not have existed prior to women’s entrance into higher 
education” (65); teaching “analytic rhetoric—ars stripped of praxis—was a way of 
avoiding what male college administrators feared: the bringing together of women and 
the agônistic arena of debate” (53). Connors uses the term “analytic” to explain an “old 
fashioned” rhetorical education predicated on performing analyses of “ideas, arguments, 
and arrangement of certain pieces pointed out by the teacher. [The female students] are 
also required to compose examples of the various figures of rhetoric, and of the various 
modes of argument, syllogisms, etc., pointed out in logic” (53), but without participating 
in the activity of public speaking, which administrators considered to be a dangerous use 
of rhetoric by women.  
 In her “‘Ars Stripped of Praxis’: Robert J. Connors on Coeducation and the Demise 
of Agonistic Rhetoric,” Lisa Reid Ricker takes Connors to task for his historical 
narrative. Connors, she writes, argues that “gender-integrated instruction forced the all-
male classroom, an environment he depicts as ‘red in tooth and claw’ with agonistic 
impulsion, to mutate into a more peaceful setting” (237). Supposedly, the environment 
became more “peaceful” because the addition of female students required the university 
to adopt personal writing into its rhetoric curriculum—this of course being an entirely 
“feminine” writing practice. Ricker counters that if the practice of rhetoric vis-à-vis 
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personal writing “appeared to be the antithesis of agonism, as Connors has argued (65), it 
was not because it represented supposedly feminine interests but because the presence 
and/or approval of the collective was no longer required in order to authorize the 
individual as speaker or author” (245; my emphasis). There are several conceptual issues 
at stake in Connors’ historical reading of the turn to the new topics of rhetorical 
education, and at least two deserve brief address.  
 The first issue has to do with the residual patriarchy and dominance Connors ties to 
agonism. “Fighting with a woman, to the agonistically charged male, is ignoble on the 
face of it,” he argues; “To be victorious in such a contest would confer only slightly less 
shame and loss of face than to be defeated” (49). But as Debra Hawhee points out in 
Bodily Arts, agônes in antiquity were not, properly speaking, outcome-driven 
competitions: “For outcome-driven competition, the Greeks used the term athlios . . . 
meaning to contend for a prize. The agôn, by contrast, is not necessarily as focused on 
the outcome” (15), and as such its central concern was not to secure victory over an 
opponent, nor did the practice suggest that there was nothing to be gained from defeat. 
Losing was not necessarily a cause for shame; the only real cause for shame resulted 
from a failure to produce arête on the stage of the agôn. Connors therefore appears to 
understand nineteenth-century agonism in a way that is starkly at odds with Hawhee’s 
understanding of the practice in antiquity. The idea that agônes necessarily foster an 
environment “red in tooth and claw” because they are inextricably bound to nike [victory] 
is fundamentally incompatible with her research.  
 The second issue of address has to do with personal writing being antithetical to the 
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aims of agonism. While personal writing may appear to be at odds with the public-
performative dimensions of agonistic encounters, Hawhee reminds us that “even the self 
can be the other in agonistic preparation” (155). What Connors therefore appears to 
misread about agonism is that contesting or challenging one’s sense of “self,” which of 
course happens frequently in personal writing, cannot be an agonistic encounter. The only 
material difference seems to be that the cultural, bodily, and discursive forces being 
discharged by the rhetor occur in a performance that takes place in front of an internal 
rather than an external audience, perhaps an audience of other selves rather than other 
bodies. Generally, we think of overcoming in terms of overcoming some sort of personal 
limitation (Avramenko’s appropriation), and that can of course be true. What may also be 
true is that overcoming an image of one’s self means overcoming an image of the self 
that requires the authorization of the collective in order to speak. 
 The requisite authorization of the individual by the collective is also an issue 
taken up by Patricia Roberts-Miller and Susan Miller. Traditionally, we know that agônes 
are not only witnessed by a public but also evaluated and validated by a public, and these 
requirements of course leave such competitions open to charges of elitism, favoritism, 
and public whim. In “Agonism, Wrangling, and John Quincy Adams,” Roberts-Miller 
uses the example of nineteenth-century debates on slavery to demonstrate how a 
particular public is able to dismiss a speaker with a valid or reasonable argument by 
claiming that the speaker has strayed from argument into mere wrangling. Her thesis is 
essentially that audience reactions cannot be the determinate factor in deciding whether 
an argument has shifted from productively engaging a conflict into unnecessary 
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disputation. The argument recalls a passage from Plato’s Republic wherein Socrates 
cautions against the dangers of public reception for the young man who would speak: 
[Whenever] the multitude are seated together in assemblies or in 
courtrooms or theaters or camps or any other public gathering of a crowd, 
and with loud uproar censure some of the things that are said and done and 
approve others, both in excess, with full-throated clamor and clapping of 
hands . . . in such case how do you think the young man’s heart, as the 
saying is, is moved within him? What private teaching do you think will 
hold out and not rather be swept away by the torrent of censure and 
applause, and borne off on its current, so that he will affirm the same 
things that they do to be honorable and base, and will do as they do, and 
be even such as they? (Shorey 492b-c) 
As to how an agonistic pedagogy should be framed in order to combat this issue, Roberts-
Miller is not entirely optimistic that the ancients offer the best example for us to emulate. 
For if agonism in the classical period did indeed provide a model for the first democratic 
system of government, the fact that women and slaves were not allowed to participate in 
speaking or authorizing other speakers to speak poses a substantial ethical problem. As 
McComiskey argues, “when language has no basis in communal truth, then its use may 
be devoid of ethics” (39).  
Both Consigny and McComiskey generally agree that this claim was central to 
sophistic pedagogy, and it seems to point to the contradiction Roberts-Miller senses when 
she hesitates to return to the ancient models. When only members of the hegemony have 
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the power to participate in and effectively challenge official discourses, any possibility of 
a healthy democratic community quickly degenerates. McComiskey (citing Bialostosky) 
might counter that “sophistic rhetoric…[treats] official discourse as one kind of 
discourse, however locally and temporally powerful, that must hold its own over time 
against other discourses that criticize its decisions and challenge its authority” (71). Since 
all victories in the agôn are by definition contingent, if an official discourse—and, by 
extension, those authorized to participate in it—cannot “hold its own” in a rhetorical 
competition with other discourses, a new discourse has the opportunity to emerge as 
official discourse. Near the end of Bodily Arts, Hawhee affirms the contingent nature of 
agôn as being central to its proper functioning: 
The kind of agonism this study discusses and regards as productive would 
take the form of insistent questioning, intense engagement with the issue 
under consideration, and/or an exchange between colleagues . . . Such 
prolonged engagement ensures that the resulting position (and disposition) 
is thorough, responsive, and—importantly—likely never finished. (193) 
While this reading of agonism helps to mitigate the problem of separating the practices of 
agonism from the social contexts in which they appeared in antiquity, for the purposes of 
this study, the more immediate problem of evaluating the success of rhetorical activity 
based on audience reactions cuts deeper. 
 In “How Writers Evaluate Their Own Writing,” Susan Miller recalls her difficulties 
implementing agonism into a classroom where she, the teacher, is ultimately held 
accountable for “the quality of what is written down” (176). In her opinion, when 
 47 
students are asked to present a piece of writing to a class for evaluation, it poses two 
problems: first, what the collective may approve or disapprove of may be at odds with a 
teacher’s estimation of “good writing” (hence, Roberts-Miller’s objection); second, a 
writer who evaluates their own writing only in reference to the opinions of others fails to 
understand that “those who do not evaluate their own writing do not gain from having 
written” (181).  
 It is perhaps this latter point that can help us to see how our understanding of 
agonism has changed so radically from the classical period to the present. In ancient 
Greece, the self-reflexive activity of evaluating one’s own production of arête was the 
generative element in self-overcoming. Thus, while audiences may have had an official 
role in determining the victors of some agônes, the only real losers of any agônes were 
the agonists who, on a particular occasion, were unable learn from the contest itself. As 
Hawhee concludes, even losing may be productive of overcoming in agonistic 
encounters. This conclusion seems reasonable considering that even in defeat, a rhetor 
will have had the opportunity to challenge what counts as a valid discursive move, the 
opportunity to experiment with moves that have not been accounted for by the incumbent 
logos, and the opportunity to expose the counting practices (i.e., the metaphysical 
privileges granted to particular arrangements of signifiers) that a particular discourse 
values. The important thing to emphasize pedagogically seems to be that the competitor 
must play the game—regardless of whether the rules of the game afford the opportunity 
to do so—in order to gain from having played it. And what might enable the competitor 
to participate in an agôn when the rules do not allow it? Simply this: presupposing that 
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one is equally capable of entering any discursive agôn, since logoi are available for 
figuration in every discourse. 
Becomings of Agôn  
Given the variety of discursive appropriations that have been discussed, what 
scholarship on agôn apparently has yet to take into account is the possibility that all 
agônes have the potential to manifest domination and overcoming, in degree, depending 
on the particular presuppositions of equality and inequality of the individuals who engage 
in them. Further distinguishing itself from previous arguments for or against agônism, 
this accounting contributes to the idea that agôn names an impulse of contradiction, or of 
“speech against itself,” as the minimum condition for democracy to occur as discursive 
insurgency. More specifically, to enter and unsettle discursive formations in agônes—
regardless of the historical, cultural, political, or economic forces that authorize them—an 
insurgent will have been able to discover the contingency of an established ideology by 
presupposing a substantial degree of equality with its logos. In these instances, agôn 
names precisely the impulse of contradiction that becomes legible when an established 
ideology confronts its own contingency. By presupposing a substantial degree of 
inequality, agôn again names the minimum conditions of possibility for democracy to 
occur, but instead of confronting the contingency of an established ideology, an 
individual will have been able to read only the legislated sense of its received inscription.  
According to this distinction, where we will have found discursive competitions 
presupposing substantial degrees of inequality with dominant logoi, we will have found 
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dependence upon and submission to the consensual procedures that structure an essential 
politics, meaning the only legitimate speech positions available to a given speaker will 
have been positions already authorized by the consenting body politic and, thus, already 
accounted for by an official politics. In contrast, where we will have found competitions 
presupposing substantial degrees of equality with dominant logoi, we will have found 
connections to a way of using language that risks speaking with no promise of a decisive, 
structural victory that can be identified with a particular juridico-political form. 
By entertaining this account of agôn, what will perhaps be of most interest to 
scholars of rhetoric is the prospect that successful rhetorical activity will no longer be 
reducible to the structural success of democracy as a progressive form of socio-political 
organization. Instead, we might find that, on occasion, particular rhetorical patterns make 
it possible for anomalous events of democracy to occur by covertly challenging the 
established ideologies that structure dominant discourses. This does not mean, however, 
that the rhetorical in knowledge production stands in opposition to all structures as some 
kind of anti-structure (itself a structural metaphor), nor does it mean that successful 
rhetoric will simply be able to discard dominant discourses and replace them with 
marginalized, individualistic, or relativistic discourses (which would again assume that 
democracy is something that can be realized structurally). It simply means that 




Because contemporary articulations of the genetic narratives cannot adequately 
account for rhetorical activity in an agôn when it is not epistemologically sanctioned by a 
community, or when democracy is not coextensive with an official politics, I propose the 
following counter-narrative: the degree to which rhetorical patterns presuppose the 
equality of intelligence as an epistemological starting point in agônes deregulates the 
degree to which democracy flourishes or fails to flourish. Importantly, while the terms of 
the genetic narratives remain in play, rather than grounding rhetoric in an essential 
politics that is empirically sanctioned, this chiasmus keeps the ungroundedness of 
rhetoric in the foreground, which challenges the genetic narratives on several fronts.  
Foremost, the counter-narrative contests the logic that political or communal 
institutions are a necessary precondition for a flourishing rhetorical culture. Instead, the 
counter-narrative presupposes that equality is always already available to rhetorical 
activity (i.e., that all logoi are equally available for figuration and thus do not require 
political or communal sanction). In practical terms, for the purpose of generating 
rhetorical activity, speakers need not depend upon deliberative spaces or community 
sanction to generate valid arguments, nor do they need to depend upon political 
institutions to grant them the “right” to speak—presupposing the equality of intelligence 
means speakers already can speak. Rancière offers the following qualifying remarks: 
We must therefore reverse the critic’s questions. How, they ask, is a thing 
like the equality of intelligence thinkable? And how could this opinion be 
established without disrupting the social order? We must ask the opposite 
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question: how is intelligence possible without equality? Intelligence is not 
a power of understanding based on comparing knowledge with its object. 
It is the power to make oneself understood through another’s verification. 
And only an equal understands an equal. Equality and intelligence are 
synonymous terms. (72) 
What Rancière offers us is thus a way of conceptualizing “intelligence” without empirical 
epistemology and “equality” without political institutions. This concept of equality also 
affords the counter-narrative the space to question whether the degree to which 
democracy flourishes or fails to flourish is regulated exclusively by the rise or fall of an 
official politics. According to the logos of the counter-narrative, democracy can flourish 
or fail to flourish depending on the degree to which insurgencies challenge ideological 
entitlements to epistemological legitimacy. In other words, if the ungroundedness of 
rhetoric is kept in the foreground, democracy is no longer regulated exclusively by its 
recognizable, political fate.  
Deregulation does not imply, however, that the counter-narrative can consistently 
locate events of democracy in some inherent quality of figural language. It is far from 
certain that democracy is always discursive, and even if it does in fact occur as discursive 
insurgency, figuration certainly does not guarantee that a breakdown in counting 
practices will actually happen. Nevertheless, the counter-narrative does make it possible 
to account for rhetorical activity predicated on equality when democracy is not 
coextensive with an official politics and when epistemology is not empirically 
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sanctioned: it accounts for them by reading these instances of rhetorical activity as events 
that challenge ideological entitlements to legitimacy founded on arbitrary identifications. 
Finally, whereas articulations of the genetic narratives generally point back to an 
origin or a “primal scene” wherein either the level of empirical epistemology endorsed by 
the polis or the level of democracy endorsed by a politics establishes the conditions of 
possibility for rhetoric to flourish, the trajectory of the counter-narrative is significantly 
more nomadic and kairotic. By releasing the concept of democracy from its juridico-
political identifications, events of democracy might crop up in discourse whenever and 
wherever we find rhetorical patterns that have challenged the epistemological legitimacy 
of essentialized discourse by presupposing some degree of equality in an agôn. The 
rhetorical mode of the counter-narrative therefore makes it possible to locate insurgent 
events of democracy regardless of the form of government or the prevailing epistemology 
that happens to be operative at any given time. And in turn, the philosophical apparatus 
animating the counter-narrative makes it possible to trace a rhetorical continuity between 
democratic events, a continuity that is not corroborated by either rhetoric or democracy 
seizing the state form, but by particular moments of discursive insurgency that unsettle 





Chapter Two: Entering and Breaking 
 
O Palamêdês, do thou forget the wrath, wherewith thou wast wroth 
against the Achaeans, and grant that men may multiply in numbers and 
wisdom. Yea, O Palamêdês, author of all eloquence, author of the 
Muses, author of myself.  
Flavius Philostratus, The Life of Apollonius of Tyana (4.13) 
 
Don’t forget that [Odysseus] was a war-dodger who tried to evade 
military service by simulating madness. He might never have taken up 
arms and gone to Troy, but the Greek recruiting sergeant was too clever 
for him . . . . 
James Joyce, Conversations (16) 
 
In the previous chapter, my purpose was to challenge the logos of the prevailing 
genetic narratives by changing the registers in which we traditionally read the functions 
of democracy and epistemology in relation to rhetoric. This purpose led me to examine 
various discursive appropriations of agôn, to problematize the standard binary 
(domination/overcoming), and to argue against the move that restricts skillful rhetorical 
activity to speech acts legitimated by communally or politically sanctioned agônes. I then 
theorized that all discursive agônes manifest domination and overcoming, in degree, and 
I conjectured that presuppositions of equality (or inequality) might serve as conditions of 
possibility for these manifestations. In the end, I attempted to articulate a counter-
narrative capable of accounting for instances of rhetorical activity that are neither 
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epistemologically nor politically sanctioned by claiming that all logoi are equally 
available for figuration in discursive agônes. I therefore concluded that speakers do not 
require the sanction of political or communal institutions to challenge established 
ideologies; events of democracy can occur with or without sanctioned speech. We posit 
these events in discourse by reading breakdowns in official counting practices; we verify 
them by avowing the equality of intelligence between speaking beings; we recall them by 
tracing rhetorical patterns that press upon—and go beyond—the limits of acceptable 
speech. Each time, these events will have confronted us with a miscount. Each time, they 
will have called us back to the rhetoricity of our failed accountings.  
In the remaining chapters of this dissertation, my intention is to conduct a series 
of experiments related to the logos of the counter-narrative. The basic hypothesis I wish 
to test is whether presuppositions of equality are characteristic of speakers who are able 
to generate skillful rhetorical activity in discourses where the legitimacy of their speech 
positions has been foreclosed by an established ideology. As a corollary, Chapter Three 
will consider the extent to which presuppositions of equality underpin an early-sophistic 
pedagogical tradition, and Chapter Four will attempt to confirm that this tradition is still 
alive in the digital age, even if it has been largely forgotten. The artifacts under 
examination in these experiments will be examples of rhetorical activity, from a range 
historical periods, where unauthorized voices speak in essentialized discourses. More 
specifically, I will target politics in Athens during the fifth century B.C.E. (Chapter Two), 
education in nineteenth-century Europe (Chapter Three), and technology in the present 
era (Chapter Four) as essentialized discursive spaces wherein particular voices invent 
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rhetorical patterns that presuppose, to varying degrees, equality with an incumbent logos. 
Stated in Kenneth Burke’s vocabulary, we might conceive of these examples as engaging 
various “mysteries” produced by ideological “mystifications,” since they implicate 
“struggles” that are generated by classifications of citizenship in political discourse, by 
classifications of mastery in educational discourse, and by classifications of age and 
expertise in technological discourse. At stake in each of these examples, I will contend, is 
the legitimacy of unsanctioned rhetorical activity when it threatens to unsettle the 
counting practices of dominant discourses. 
THE RISE OF NATIONALISM IN FIFTH-CENTURY ATHENS  
As Burke reminds us in A Rhetoric of Motives, “the conditions for ‘mystery’ are 
set by any pronounced social distinctions, as between nobility and commoners, courtiers 
and king, leader and people, rich and poor, judge and prisoner at the bar, ‘superior race’ 
and underprivileged ‘races’ or minorities” (115). These distinctions, he continues, 
“represent two different classes (or ‘kinds’) of people . . . [who are] identified with and 
by different social principles,” causing them to appear mysterious to one another (115). 
In context, the last distinction Burke mentions—a class distinction predicated on racial 
identifications—of course speaks to many different mysteries. The mysteries of 
colonialism, of eugenism, and of fascism highlight but a few of the more recent examples 
in Western memory. One of the earliest known examples, however, concerns the mystery 
of nationalism in fifth-century Athens, starting with the Persian Wars, as it is expressed in 
the Hellene/barbarian polarity.  
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Though neither race nor ethnicity were, properly speaking, fully-formed social 
constructs in antiquity, a number of ancient sources discuss how the mystery of 
nationalism in Athens came to be associated with a similar set of social distinctions that 
were based on kinship or blood.13 One of the earliest and arguably most comprehensive 
of these historical accounts undoubtedly belongs to Herodotus. Briefly summarized, the 
narrative of his History goes something like this: following the Ionian Revolt of 499 
B.C.E. in which the Hellenes of Asia Minor rose up against the Persian tyrants who ruled 
their city-states, the king of the Achaemenid Empire, Darius I, sought to subjugate the 
Athenians as punishment for supporting the Ionians and burning the lower city of Sardis, 
the Persian capital (5.100). The king’s first attempt to invade Athens through the nearby 
pass of Marathon was unsuccessful, however, and he died soon after (6.102). Darius’s 
son, Xerxes I, then took charge of the empire and resumed his father’s longstanding 
vendetta. Although Athens remained his primary target, it soon became clear that other 
poleis were also under threat of Persian aggression, and that Xerxes’ desire to avenge his 
father by subjugating the Athenians was only part of a larger and more ambitious goal, 
which was to extend the Achaemenid Empire throughout all of Europe. As Herodotus 
remembers, “the march of the [Xerxes’] army was in name against Athens, but in fact it 
was going against all Hellas” (Macaulay 7.138).14  
From a logistical point of view, although the Athenians commanded an 
impressive naval fleet, on land they knew that they were grossly outmatched by the 
                                                
13 E.g., by Plato’s Menexenus (245d), Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian war (Book I), 
Demosthenes’s Third Philippic, and Diogenes Laertius’s Lives (1.34).  
14 Cf. Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian war (1.18 1-2). 
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Persian military, which boasted an impressive cavalry, hundreds of thousands of foot-
soldiers, and a special forces unit of ten thousand “Immortals”15 (7.81; 7.83). In an effort 
to increase the number of available ships and ground troops—and thereby strengthen the 
resistance to Xerxes’ advances—Athenian politicians held a congress in Corinth (ca. 481 
B.C.E.) calling for a Hellenic unification of the numerous Greek city-states (οἱ Ἕλληνες) 
against their common barbarian enemy:16  
Presently, learning that Xerxes was at Sardis with his army, they planned 
to send men into Asia to spy out the king’s doings and to dispatch 
messengers, some to Argos, who should make the Argives their brothers 
in arms against the Persian, some to Gelon son of Dinomenes in Sicily, 
some to Corcyra, praying aid for Hellas, and some to Crete. This they did 
in the hope that since the danger threatened all Greeks alike, all 
of Greek blood might unite and work jointly for one common end. 
 (Godley 7.145; my emphasis)17  
Denigrations of the (Persian) barbarian in literature and in political discourse (logos 
politikos) probably amplified this call for unification and, in turn, reinforced a sense of 
Greek identity that helped to bolster the Athenian forces (a point to which I will return 
shortly). But despite the increase in military power afforded by the Greek alliance, 
                                                
15 So called “because, if any one of them made the number incomplete, being overcome either by death or 
disease, another man was chosen to his place, and they were never either more or fewer than ten thousand” 
(Herodotus 7.83). 
16 Incidentally, Isocrates echoes this call for unification in his Panegyricus roughly a century later (circa 
380 B.C.E.). See Albrecht Dihle’s History of Greek Literature: From Homer to the Hellenistic Period, 
which culls together evidence confirming “Isocrates’ political goal was the unification of the Hellenic 
states, with Sparta as the leading land power and Athens the leading maritime power” (207). 
17 Cf. 7.139. 
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Xerxes eventually took Thermopylae and, with it, most of southern Greece, including 
Athens, which to Xerxes’ delight had been “delivered . . . to the fire” (Macaulay 8.61; 
8.102).  
The Greek navy, however, was still operative after Athens fell to the Persians, and 
knowing that the remaining fleets stood in the way of a total victory (8.136), Xerxes, on 
the advice of his commanding office, Mardonios, offered to forgive the offenses done to 
him if the Athenians and the Spartans agreed to join the empire (8.101; 8.140). 
Mardonios sent Alexander of Macedon to negotiate the proposed accord with a group of 
Athenian and Spartan envoys, since “he was informed that Alexander was a public guest-
friend and benefactor of the Athenians” (Macaulay 8.136). Although the Athenian envoys 
rightly acknowledged the superior power of Xerxes’ military, they roundly rejected 
Alexander’s offer, refusing to acquiesce to a tyrant who had “no respect when he set fire 
to their houses and to their sacred images” (Macaulay 8.143). “Because we long for 
liberty,” the Athenians declared to Alexander, “we will defend ourselves to the best of 
our ability. But as regards agreements with the barbarian, do not attempt to persuade us to 
enter into them, nor will we consent” (Godley 8.143).  
What is written next in the History is sometimes regarded as its most 
controversial section.18 After responding to Alexander, the Athenian envoys address the 
                                                
18 See, for example, Adrian Tronson’s paper on “The Relevance of Herodotus 8.144 to the Debate on 
Greek Ethnicity” (delivered at the 2006 conference of the American Philological Association). His thesis is 
that “Herodotus is not making a patriotic assertion or defining to Hellenikon” (1). This line of argument is 
gaining ground with many scholars, and I take it into account in the discussions of Greek identity that 
follow. 
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Spartan envoys concerning the proposed treaty; Herodotus puts these words into their 
mouths:  
It was most human that the Lacedaemonians should fear our making an 
agreement with the barbarian. We think that it is an ignoble thing to be 
afraid, especially since we know the Athenian temper to be such that there 
is nowhere on earth such store of gold or such territory of surpassing 
fairness and excellence that the gift of it should win us to take 
the Persian part and enslave Hellas. For there are many great reasons why 
we should not do this, even if we so desired; first and foremost, the 
burning and destruction of the adornments and temples of our gods, whom 
we are constrained to avenge to the utmost rather than make pacts with the 
perpetrator of these things, and next the kinship of all Greeks in blood and 
speech, and the shrines of gods and the sacrifices that we have in common, 
and the likeness of our way of life, to all of which it would not befit 
the Athenians to be false. (Godley 8.144; my emphasis)  
In the wake of these failed negotiations, no further peace efforts were made between the 
Persian Empire and Hellas, and the warring between them continued for another three 
decades. Finally, in 450 B.C.E., following Greek victories at the Battle of Salamis, the war 
ended, at which time a period of relative peace ensued in Athens until the outbreak of the 
Peloponnesian Wars (ca. 431 B.C.E.). 
From the highly-condensed story recalled here, it is probably not difficult to 
understand how the mystery of nationalism arose in Athens during the first half of the 
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fifth century and how sections 7.145 and 8.144 in Herodotus’s History support blood 
identifications as a defining feature of the Hellen/barbarian polarity. As section 8.144 
also highlights, however, the opposition is not everywhere and at all times derived from 
bloodlines. In fact, historical evidence suggests that a fairly wide variety of 
identifications were used to ferment the opposition during this period. In literature, for 
instance, a host of examples can be found in the dramatic renderings composed by the 
great tragedians (Aeschylus, Euripides and Sophocles), writers for whom the subject of 
Greek identity appears to have been an important thematic resource throughout the wars. 
“By contrast with epic and archaic non-epic poetry,” writes Efi Papadodima, “the term 
‘barbarian’ appears quite frequently in [fifth-century] drama, either as an ethnic 
designation or as a (pejorative) value term . . . [and] often defines the entire non-Greek-
speaking world as an indistinguishable whole” (1-2). Paraphrasing Edith Hall’s Inventing 
the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy, Papadodima catalogues the most 
prominent dramatic characterizations: 
[The barbarians are portrayed as] effeminate, luxurious, highly emotional 
and cowardly . . . despotic and servile . . . savage, lawless and unjust . . . 
unsophisticated or unintelligent . . . or even a combination of all [of these], 
as opposed to the dramatic Hellenes, who exhibit the correlative virtues 
(that is manliness/bravery, political freedom, lawfulness/justice and 
intelligence/reason). (3)19 
                                                
19 For a contemporaneous catalogue of characterizations that appear outside of drama and that also address 
barbarians who were non-Persians, see Craige Brian Champions’ Cultural Politics in Polybius’s Histories 
(35-36). 
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Along with the fifth-century dramatic renderings, a similar preference for non-racial 
characterizations of the barbarian can be found in some of the political discourses from 
the fourth century. In Isocrates’s Panegyricus, for example, the orator eschews bloodlines 
outright, opting instead for identifications that portend intellectual and cultural 
superiority.20 But whether characterizations of the barbarian targeted racial, ethnic, 
religious, linguistic, intellectual or political differences, and whether they appeared in 
historical documents, in logos politikos or in dramatic works, the frequency with which 
the Greeks were at war with the Persians for well over a century in many ways suggests 
that the Hellene/barbarian polarity was instituted primarily as an ideological defense 
mechanism against the Achaemenian drive for empire. 
It is certainly makes for common sense that, fearing the prospect of takeover by 
Persian tyrants, many Greeks would have been keen to proliferate a Hellenocentric view; 
however, the notion that all Greeks were in agreement with and fully supported the 
evaluative distinctions that were being made between the Hellene and the barbarian is, 
quite simply, false.21 When Herodotus writes his History, for example, he seems to give 
the Persians a somewhat sympathetic hearing—aside from using the “barbarian” 
moniker, he never really slanders them, and by this he seems to recall the history of the 
wars in fairly neutral terms, to the extent that such a thing is possible. Several centuries 
later Plutarch even goes so far as to accuse Herodotus of being philobarbaros, or “fond of 
the barbarians” (Moralia 857a). Furthermore, as a number of contemporary scholars have 
                                                
20 For more on Isocratean paideia and its putative relation to Hellenic identity, see Jeffrey Walker’s 
Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity, 178-179. 
21 This was no doubt due in part to the fact that different city-states had different relationships with the 
Persians. See Herodotus, 7.138.  
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pointed out, the tragedians often left the Hellenic-self/barbarian-other divide in 
question,22 possibly to highlight a covert political message, or perhaps because the aporia 
helped to accentuate the tragic aesthetic (e.g., by provoking catharsis following periods of 
great bloodshed).23 One scholar of this stripe, Helmut Heit, argues, “in Aeschylus’ 
framework you will not find the typical pejorative or hostile attitude. He advises his 
Hellenic audience not to blame the poor Persians. The Persians lost not because they are 
inferior by culture or nature, but because the gods so decided. The mighty and ruling 
gods blinded and misled the mind of Xerxes” (729). Even outside of literary contexts, the 
deeper Hellenocentric sentiments espoused by public figures appear to have waned 
substantially following the Persian Wars. In fact, many were actively contesting them. 
Consider the following fragment from Antiphon’s On Truth:  
We <respect> and revere those who are of good parentage, but those who 
are not of good family we neither <respect> nor revere. In this behavior 
we have become like barbarians one to another, when in fact by nature we 
all have the same nature in all particulars, barbarians and Greeks. We have 
only to consider the things which are natural and necessary to all mankind. 
These are open to all <to get> in the same way, and in <all> these there is 
no distinction of barbarian or Greek. For we all breathe out into the air by 
                                                
22 The body of work on this subject is extensive, but see Papadodima (2010), Champion (2004), Long’s 
Barbarians in Greek Comedy (1986), Mitchell’s Panhellenism and the Barbarian in Archaic and Classical 
Greece (2007), and Arapopoúlou’s A History of Ancient Greek: From the Beginnings to Late Antiquity 
(2007). 
23 General support for these possibilities can be found in Aristotle’s Poetics (see 1450b6 for the former and 
1449b23 for the latter). 
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the mouth and the nose, and we <all eat with our hands>. (Morrison 87 B 
91) 
In this example, Antiphon equates a base Greek practice (honoring only those who are of 
illustrious lineage) with barbarian behavior, but he immediately points out that both 
Greeks and barbarians share in the same biology, which effectively refigures the trope of 
the barbarian and instantly problematizes the dualism. Although this was probably 
considered a radical view, additional examples wherein the line between the Hellene and 
the barbarian becomes blurred are legion, and they give reason enough to believe that the 
polarity was, at times, fairly protean. But if historical evidence suggests that the 
opposition between Hellene and barbarian was not particularly stable, it behooves us to 
question why the mystery of nationalism continued to persist at all.  
Clearly, in some respects it is undeniable that the Persian Wars were responsible 
for the anti-barbarian ideology that gave rise to the mystery of nationalism in fifth-
century Athens. War typically necessitates closing ranks, and distinguishing the Hellene 
from the Persian on racial, ethnic, linguistic, and intellectual grounds plays into a 
ruthless, albeit effective, identity logic. In other respects, however, the rhetorical patterns 
implicated in the anti-barbarian ideology deserve further scrutiny on at least two 
accounts. Firstly, the ideology generates an entire set of beliefs about foreigners that have 
nothing to do with the Persians in particular; these beliefs, I would argue, suggest the 
presence of “mystical” connections to other “mysteries” of class distinction. Secondly, 
we know that, despite the threat of conquest, the Athenians were not simply defending 
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their lands from Persian tyrants; often, they too were questing for empire,24 and this 
motive suggests that while the mystery of nationalism reveals certain political interests 
(e.g., defending the city-states), it simultaneously conceals others (e.g., gaining influence 
over other polities).  
Taking these features of the rhetorical situation into account, in the remaining 
pages of this chapter I will consider how the mystery of Athenian nationalism perpetuates 
itself by appropriating dialectical reasoning (logos) to exploit religious affinities. I will 
then suggest that this appropriation finds its ideological counterpart in organized political 
institutions and repressive government. Finally, I will attempt to read Gorgias’s Defense 
on Behalf of Palamêdês as an example of insurgent discourse that disidentifies with the 
mystery of nationalism and covertly unsettles the anti-barbarian ideology.    
A Reasonable Theodicy 
Dialectical reasoning became a powerful expression of Greek thought in Athens 
during the fifth century. Following in the vein of the natural philosophers (physiologoi) of 
the sixth century, it marked a movement away from the mythological explanations of 
phenomena handed down through Homer and Hesiod and toward a rational mode of 
                                                
24 Herodotus clearly identifies this motive in Book 8 of his History: “For it had come to be said at first, 
even before they sent to Sicily to obtain allies, that the fleet ought to be placed in the charge of the 
Athenians. So as the allies opposed this, the Athenians yielded, having it much at heart that Hellas should 
be saved, and perceiving that if they should have disagreement with one another about the leadership, 
Hellas would perish: and herein they judged rightly, for disagreement between those of the same race is 
worse than war undertaken with one consent by as much as war is worse than peace. Being assured then of 
this truth, they did not contend, but gave way for so long time as they were urgently in need of the allies; 
and that this was so their conduct proved; for when, after repelling the Persian from themselves, they were 
now contending for his land and no longer for their own, they alleged the insolence of Pausanias as a 
pretext and took away the leadership from the Lacedemonians” (8.3; my emphasis).  
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inquiry that privileged the use of arguments and counter-arguments. Both Plato’s 
Socrates and a number of the sophists practiced it in one form or another,25 and it 
eventually became aligned, metonymically, with a power of intelligence that 
characterized the educated Hellene—that is, one who could argue well in law courts, the 
Assembly, and other public and private venues. By extension, it sometimes served to 
underscore the national superiority of an enlightened populace over unintelligent 
barbarian populations, the typical rationale behind this conviction being that linguistically 
inferior societies were destined to remain trapped in the babble of pre-philosophical 
darkness.26 There is a sense, however, in which the turn to reason can be seen as the 
continuation of a much older and, therefore, decidedly “less enlightened” mystery. An 
ideologist might construct the reverse genealogy as follows: from a strong cultural 
tradition of ancestor worship vis-à-vis the heroes in Homer’s Epic Cycle, a superior 
nation of “rational” Greeks in the fifth century forms a mystical connection with a 
superior bloodline of “heroic” Greeks championed by the aristocratic warrior classes of 
the eighth century. 
To understand this connection as a symptom of ideological mystification is to 
understand it as a manifestation of what Burke refers to as “the hierarchic principle.” The 
mystical connection between “nation” and “blood” implicates a hierarchic motive, which 
in this case is compelled by the sacrifice of mythological reverence to rational thought. 
                                                
25 Just to be clear, the Socratic dialectic is predicated upon a dialogical, “question and answer” mode of 
inquiry. In any case, “dialectic, as understood by Aristotle, was the art of philosophical disputation,” and it 
therefore stressed the use of logical arguments related to general issues. Moreover, it differed from the 
traditional practice of rhetoric in that rhetoric typically “contain[ed] the parts of a public address,” dealt 
with specific cases, and proceeded by “continuous exposition” (Kennedy, On Rhetoric 26). 
26 Evidence for this sort of emphasis can be found in Pericles’s Funeral Oration. 
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Burke explores the motives of nationalism at some length in his Rhetoric, analyzing them 
primarily in relation to Marx and Machiavelli. Ultimately, like all ideologies that 
implicate the hierarchic principle, nationalism entails a principle of gradation that 
operates dialectically, which is to say that while a particular order or rank implies a 
specific set of relations (e.g., high/low, brave/cowardly, rational/unintelligent, noble/base, 
etcetera), the gradation cuts both ways, making “a reversal of the ranks just as 
meaningful as their actual material arrangement” (Burke 138). For the purpose of 
rhetorically analyzing any dialectical operations that may have been at work in the anti-
barbarian ideology, it is helpful to read alongside Burke as he describes the critical 
procedures used by Marx to analyze the reverse genealogy in Hegel’s dialectic.   
As is well known, according to Hegel there is a progressive logic to history that 
can be explained through the movement of World Spirit (Weltgeist). Marx saw in this 
explanation only romantic idealism, and he sharply criticized Hegel’s philosophy for 
appealing to abstract universals and hypostatizing humanity. In The German Ideology, 
Marx and Engels challenge the inheritors of this philosophy, the Young Hegelians, by 
articulating “three telltale tricks of such theodicy” (Burke 107; my emphasis). Burke, 
paraphrasing, explains that the first “trick” is to abstract the “ruling ideas” from their 
material conditions of emergence (the ruling classes) so that these ideas can be made the 
“ruling force of history” (107). For fifth-century Greeks, this would have been 
tantamount to separating the ruling ideas of, for example, “nobility,” “manliness,” 
“intelligence,” or any number of interest-motivated “virtues” from the genos, thereby 
essentializing them as “pure Ideas.” The second trick is to arrange these ideas according 
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to a progressive logic, “a developmental series” of ideas “with a ‘mystical’ connection 
among them,” which is achieved by “treating the successive ideas as though they were 
‘acts of self-determination’ on the part of the divine, absolute, or pure Idea” (107). In this 
way, a succession of ruling ideas—e.g., “bravery,” “justice,” “freedom,” “reason”—can 
be assigned to a particular ideological trajectory. Burke offers the “gradual increase of 
freedom or of self-consciousness” as examples (106)—coincidentally, both inform our 
present analysis, since both are commonly ascribed to the socio-political development of 
Greek culture from the eighth to the fifth century. The ideological trajectory is then 
hooked up to a universal Trajectory by synecdoche, causing the progression to appear 
natural rather than arbitrarily contrived. Admittedly, what follows from this hookup is 
nothing short of a masterstroke of hermeneutic brilliance: because the ruling ideas are 
considered apart from the ruling classes, “all the material relations in history are 
interpreted as the products of [World Spirit], manifesting itself in the empirical world” 
(106). The final trick in which the “‘hegemony’ or ‘hierarchy’ of spirit in history is 
proved” therefore involves a form of sublation:  
The “mystical appearance” can be removed by putting progressively 
increasing “self-consciousness” in place of “the self-determining 
concept;” or [the mystical appearance] can be made to look thoroughly 
materialistic (despite its underlying principle of “mystification”) if it is 
transformed into a developmental series of persons, thinkers, philosophers, 
“ideologists,” who are said to be the historical representatives of the 
“concept.” (107)  
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Thus, we can observe how a superior race of Greek heroes (Jason, Achilles, Odysseus, 
and so on) forms a mystical connection with a superior nation of Greek rationalists 
(Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, Socrates, and so forth) in a developmental series 
of personages who represent “‘moments’ in the expression of the Universal Idea 
underlying all historical development” (Burke 107). Basically, the mystery of nationalism 
as it is identified with and by intellectual classes would partake of the same underlying 
mystification that informs the mystery of ancestor worship as it is identified with and by 
aristocratic warrior classes. In this way, the mystification would enable progressive 
Greek rationalists to identify as enlightened individuals by appropriating the transcendent 
lineage of Homeric Greek heroes.27 
Of course, one might easily counter that the turn towards reason in the fifth 
century marked a forceful rejection of any mystical connections to the eighth-century 
mythos. And at least to some extent, for certain individuals—particularly those who had 
grown weary of the Homeric tone and traditional explanations for the gods—this remains 
a distinct possibility. But consider that even among eminently rational groups, like the 
sophists and the Platonists, many respected thinkers continued to believe that a “pure” or 
“divine” Idea ordered the cosmos. The following passage from Anaxagoras of Miletus, 
which bears a rough conceptual resemblance to Hegel’s theory of World Spirit, stands as 
a case in point:  
                                                
27 Indirectly, Foucault undertakes a similar approach to analyzing ideology in his theorization of 
power/knowledge. Since power/knowledge does not imply that knowledge is power, but that knowledges 
which appear to be universal are merely the most dominant and powerful discourses, in Foucault’s scheme 
power becomes a form of practice, and knowledge becomes a form of discourse. Thus, (the power of) 
reason is not the antidote to (the gods’) power, but simply another form of it.  
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The other things have a share of everything, but Nous [divine intellect] is 
unlimited and self-ruling and has been mixed with no thing, but is alone 
itself by itself. For if it were not by itself, but had been mixed with 
anything else, then it would partake of all things, if it had been mixed with 
anything (for there is a share of everything in everything just as I have said 
before); and the things mixed together with it would thwart it, so that it 
would control none of the things in the way that it in fact does, being alone 
by itself. For it is the finest of all things and the purest, and indeed it 
maintains all discernment about everything and has the greatest strength. 
(Curd 59 B12, in part; my emphasis) 
Variants of these fifth-century beliefs similarly crop up in the Parmenidean “One” (On 
Nature 8.21-25) and the Socratic diamonion (Apology 40a-c). It is interesting to note, 
however, that the concept of nous reaches back at least as far as Homer. A famous 
example appears in Book III of the Iliad, where Homer uses the verb form of nous 
(noein) to signal Helen’s sudden awareness that Aphrodite has disguised herself as an old 
woman (ln. 471). According to J. H. Lesher, “one salient feature of noein . . . in a very 
large number of cases . . . [involves] becoming aware of the true identity or nature of the 
object (or person) one perceives, or the true meaning of the situation one has 
encountered” (11). Unlike Anaxagoras’s Nous, however, Lesher claims that “‘Homeric 
knowledge’ . . . takes on a special character: it is primarily a matter of what one makes of 
his immediate surroundings, rather than a matter of general information, or knowledge of 
truths, or well defended propositional belief” (12).  
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Indeed, Homer’s nous is not the same Nous we find in Anaxagoras. The former 
applies the concept of mind to individuals capable of discerning truth from appearance in 
particular situations; the latter applies it to a cosmological force that organizes the 
universe according to a progressive logic, à la Hegel. This difference does not, however, 
entirely separate fifth-century rationalism from eighth-century hero worship. In the 
Odyssey, for example, Zeus says of Odysseus that he is “beyond all mortals in nous” 
(Lesher I 66). The attribution of nous to a hero of the aristocratic warrior classes who 
surpasses all mortals in recognizing the true nature of objects, persons, and situations is 
telling. Since these are recognitions wherein the mind derives knowledge from seeing, in 
the figure of Odysseus we find an epistemological connection to eidô, a cornerstone of 
fifth-century rationalism. As Timothy Long remarks, “already Heraclitus (22 B 107 
Diels-Kranz) attests that ‘eyes and ears are poor witnesses for men with barbarian souls,’ 
that is, the sense perceptions require interpretation by an intelligent mind, something that 
a man with a soul like a barbarian’s cannot give them” (133). Thus, while the turn to 
reason may have marked a conscious rejection of the Homeric mythos, far from 
completely eliminating any mystical connections to the earlier aristocratic class 
distinctions, there is at least some evidence to suggest that fifth-century rationalism 
unconsciously appropriates the underlying mystification.  
Citizen Enforcers 
In a lecture delivered by classicist Nicholas K. Rauh, he maintains that, following 
the success of the Persian Wars, “Greek thinkers and politicians became convinced that 
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they had defeated the Persians because of the superiority of the Greek way of life, its 
reasoning power, its polis system, and its gods” (par. 12; my emphasis). By reading 
Rauh’s statement closely, we can see that national interests are reconciled with “the 
superiority of the Greek way of life” by invoking a common collection of terms: 
education, organized politics, and religion serve as featured points of identification 
between the polity and its citizens, or between the ruler(s) and those ruled.28 Thus far, we 
have considered how the mystery of nationalism in fifth-century Athens can be seen as a 
continuation of the mystery of hero worship vis-à-vis the turn to reason. The purpose of 
this consideration was to account for the mystical connection between religion and 
education as a supporting feature of the anti-barbarian ideology. What now remains to be 
considered is whether (and to what extent) the Athenian government used classifications 
of citizenship to politically enforce identifications that were characteristic of the 
Hellene/barbarian polarity. 
If we remember Gorgias’s statement about the Larisians in Aristotle’s Politics, we 
recall that he defines citizens as creations of public servants, and from this definition 
Aristotle concludes that sharing in government must be what makes one a citizen, for the 
words “born of a father or mother” cannot apply to those who are the first to found a state 
(Jowett 1275b22). Although Aristotle claims that his definition is more satisfactory than 
the initial definition Gorgias offers, he admits that it is still troubled by a number of 
                                                
28 Precedent for this practice (that is, combining education, government, and religion into a statement of 
national conviction) can be found in many fifth- and fourth-century funeral orations. For a rigorous 
discussion of the formal features of epitaphios logos and how they worked to identify the Athenian citizen 
with the nation, see Chapter Three of Katharine Derderian’s Leaving Words to Remember: Greek Mourning 
and the Advent of Literacy.  
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contextual issues. For one, a citizen in a democracy very well may not be a citizen in an 
oligarchy (1275a), and for this reason, Aristotle suggests that his definition best applies to 
those living under a democracy. He also he recognizes that differences exist between 
democracies whose constitutions are dedicated to the common good and democracies 
whose constitutions are engendered by violence (1276a2). Again, he concludes that his 
definition of citizenship best applies to the former, though in some cases it can 
occasionally be germane to the latter—for instance, in the midst of a transition between 
the rule of a tyrant and the rise of a new democracy.  
Predictably, Aristotle supplements these definitional criteria with reference to the 
kind of person who is best suited to share in democratic government. Put in the 
affirmative, Aristotle believes that it should be the province of virtuous adult males to 
“[share] in the administration of justice, and in offices” (1275a6); thus, “He who has the 
power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any state is said by us 
to be a citizen of that state; and speaking generally, a state is a body of citizens sufficing 
for the purpose of life” (1275b12; my emphasis). Of course—and to no great surprise—
the only people who did not have the power to share in Athenian government throughout 
the fifth and fourth centuries were those who, for whatever reason, could be classed with 
the barbarians. As I mentioned previously, this designation was not exactly rigid, but in 
general people who fell under the heading included foreigners, slaves (who in some 
instances were also foreigners, not that it really mattered), and resident aliens, all of 
whom were summarily excluded from participating in the Assembly and the law courts. 
As for Greek women, who were also excluded from participating in these democratic 
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institutions, an argument forwarded by Constance Tagopoulos suggests they too would 
have been classed with the barbarians: 
The dramatic model of barbarian women . . . introduced the possibility of 
identifying all women, Greek and non-Greek alike, as barbarians. There is 
too great an affinity between the female nature and certain qualities 
inherent in the construct of the “barbarian” to ignore the connection. From 
Hesiod to Semonides and from Plato to Aristotle, ancient Greek poets, 
philosophers, and even physicians of Hippocrates’29 and Galen’s caliber 
testified to the fact that the female nature is fundamentally different from 
the male in every aspect and in ways that render it beyond doubt inferior 
to the male. Therefore, the ideological conviction of female inferiority to 
the male citizen, coupled with philosophical and even “scientific” 
assertions, gave rise to the symbolic identification of women with the 
“barbarians.” (par. 19) 
Placing women in the same class as foreigners, slaves, and resident aliens helps to frame 
Aristotle’s definition of citizenship in the negative: as to the question of which kind of 
person should share in government, the answer seems to have been “not the barbarian.”  
                                                
29 Catherine Eskin elegantly problematizes this assertion in “Hippocrates, Kairos, and Writing in the 
Sciences.” First off, Hippocrates probably did consider the male to be superior sex, but he also “was 
probably the first physician to record in writing the vital recognition that women’s health was different than 
men’s without implying that women were somehow deficient as a result” (104). Although Hippocrates 
ultimately does not suggest women should be included in the art of medicine, he professes a great deal 
professional respect for female patients and midwives, and Eskin even goes so far as to conclude that he 
ultimately made “some protofeminist distinctions in his discussions of gender” (104). 
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Taken together, what the affirmative and negative definitions of citizenship tell us 
is that a principal function of democratic institutions (and their public servants) is to 
create citizens who will share in the administration of government so as to uphold the 
political and cultural ideals of the state (i.e., sovereignty and equality). And because these 
ideals remain under the constant threat of outsiders who seek to gain a class advantage, 
maintaining political and cultural unity requires state protection, which often takes the 
form of societal repression over minority influences (i.e., over slaves, foreigners, women, 
and any other “barbarian” classes that could potentially contaminate the ideals of the 
state). Importantly, these features of citizenship point to a general truth; namely, the 
presence of citizens always already implies the (non)presence of non-citizens. Consider 
that, even in the extreme case of certain modern idealists who image themselves as 
“global citizens,” anyone (or anything) beyond the globe would imply the (non)presence 
of non-citizens, since any foreign forms of life would be, quite literally, alien to citizens 
of the earth and thus excluded from participating in human politics. But if evidence 
suggests that many ancient Greeks did not agree with the repressive treatment of non-
citizen barbarians, then what stake did they have in continuing to identify as citizens? Put 
differently, what motive could have been powerful enough to compel the Athenians to 
support a government whose institutions necessarily reinforced the very social 
distinctions they sometimes vehemently opposed?  
Possible answers to these questions can be found in a rhetorical pattern that Burke 
reads in the final chapter of Machiavelli’s The Prince. In the “Exhortation to Liberate 
Italy from the Barbarians,” writes Burke, Machiavelli calls for a ruler “whose acts will 
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simultaneously be in tune with the times and with himself” (163). According to Burke, 
Machiavelli’s call for such a ruler opens the possibility for identification between ruler 
and ruled, since the ruler’s private interests become identified with the common good of 
the public, and “by such identification of ruler and ruled,” he explains, “Machiavelli 
offers the ruler precisely the rhetorical opportunity to present privately acquisitive 
motives publicly in sacrificial terms” (166). Burke offers several examples of how 
“sacrifice” plays into identification, but perhaps the clearest of these occurs in his 
discussion of a group of boys who, after witnessing the death of a rattlesnake, form a 
Rattlesnake Club: “their members were made consubstantial by the sacrifice of this 
victim, representing the dangers and triumphs they had shared in common. The snake 
was a sacred offering; by its death it provided the spirit for this magically united band” 
(266). If we apply this concept of sacrifice to Machiavelli’s final chapter, what first 
becomes clear is that by publically sacrificing the barbarian oppressor for the sake of 
redeeming the nation, the Italian citizens are made consubstantial; what next becomes 
clear is that the sacrifice itself fulfills the privately acquisitive motives of the prince. For 
sake of the common good, the prince “shall deliver [Italy] from these wrongs and 
barbarous insolencies” (166), all the while expanding his empire and extending his reign. 
In this way, citizens will have identified with the prince (and each other) through a shared 
national sacrifice, but the very experience of identification as such will have required 
citizens to dissociate from those who do not share in the same order of rule (i.e., any non-
citizens). As Aristotle says, “one citizen differs from another, but the salvation of the 
community is the common business of them all. This community is the state; the virtue of 
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the citizen must therefore be relative to the constitution [i.e., the government] of which he 
is a member” (1276b3; my emphasis).  
If we consider Aristotle’s statements in relation to Burke’s analysis of The Prince, 
it is not difficult to see how the common good offers a powerful motive for identification 
between the nation (ruler) and its citizens (ruled) and how democratic institutions in 
Athens could capitalize on this motive by conspiring against non-citizen barbarians for 
the purpose of forwarding private interests. In more general terms, this helps us to 
understand that while citizens identify with the nation through the principle of 
unification, they initiate into the mystery of nationalism through the principle of 
dissociation. In other words, although the Athenian government may have created 
citizens by uniting them under the ideals of political sovereignty and social equality, 
because these institutions were responsible for upholding a factional division that 
expurgated non-citizens, they ultimately manifested a process of social fragmentation. 
The entire process is mystifying (and somewhat ironic) precisely because this sort of 
institutional fragmentation would have required a cooperative effort on the behalf of the 
citizenry to enforce the various social distinctions implicated in the anti-barbarian 
ideology. Thus, although some Athenian citizens may have been outwardly opposed to 
the maltreatment of non-citizen barbarians, much like the contemporary American citizen 
who outwardly opposes the US government’s maltreatment of non-citizens in 
Guantanamo Bay, deference for the common good becomes a powerful motive for 
continuing to identify with the nation as a citizen, and this identification affords 
opportunities for empire to those who command state power.  
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Hey, You There! 
Earlier in this chapter, I suggested that the mystery of Athenian nationalism 
perpetuates itself by appropriating dialectical reasoning to exploit religious affinities, and 
I also suggested that this appropriation finds its ideological counterpart in organized 
political institutions and repressive government. My hope is that the logic which first 
spurred these conjectures has become sufficiently apparent, but to ensure that it has, I 
would like to offer, very briefly, an alternative way to conceive of the mystical 
connections between dialectical reason, hero worship, and democratic institutions.  
Considered in Louis Althusser’s vocabulary, education, religion and organized 
politics become functions of “the State Apparatus,” the sole purpose of which is to ensure 
that the ruling classes remain in power. In his essay on “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses,” Althusser explains that “the State apparatus contains two bodies: the body 
of institutions which represent the Repressive State Apparatus on the one hand, and the 
body of institutions which represent the body of Ideological State Apparatuses on the 
other” (Lenin 148). Government, in the exercise of laws and the enforcement of 
punishments, belongs to the former body; religion, education, and organized politics, as 
they are in league with the ruling ideology, belong to the latter. That being said, Althusser 
reminds us, “every State Apparatus, whether Repressive or Ideological, ‘functions’ both 
by violence and by ideology” (145). What separates the two is that the RSA “functions 
massively and predominantly by repression (including physical repression), while 
functioning secondarily by ideology,” and the ISAs “function massively and 
predominantly by ideology, but they also function secondarily by repression, even if 
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ultimately, but only ultimately, this is very attenuated and concealed, even symbolic” 
(145).  
By viewing the democratic government in fifth-century Athens as the RSA, it 
stands to reason that minority influences (both foreign and domestic) were legislated out 
of legal and political institutions because these influences threatened to undermine the 
ruling classes’ hold over state power. But because some citizens were not fully in 
agreement with the repressive treatment of barbarian classes, in order to perpetuate the 
mystery of nationalism (especially under the auspices of democracy) the ruling classes 
also must have required more subtle methods of coercion, methods that could rationalize 
the expulsion of minorities and forestall the objections of potential detractors. Put 
differently, the Athenian citizen would have needed to believe that acts of violence on the 
part of the RSA (and the ISAs) were a necessary, though perhaps regrettable, means of 
protecting the common good, and for this, he would have needed to spontaneously 
believe, a priori and against his critical sensibilities, that any barbarian identifications—
whether predicated on bloodlines, gender, religion, ethnicity, language or philosophy—
were capable of posing an imminent threat to the common good.  
To inspire this sort of spontaneous and largely unconscious belief is precisely the 
function of the ISAs. By viewing rationalism as an expression of the educational ISA, 
hero worship as an expression of the religious ISA, and citizenship as an expression of 
the political ISA, what becomes clear is that although the social distinctions propounded 
by the Hellene/barbarian polarity and the citizen/non-citizen polarity may appear to speak 
to unrelated “mysteries,” they in fact constitute an entire set of beliefs about foreigners 
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that coalesces in the ruling ideology of the ruling classes.30 Moreover, Althusser explains, 
the RSA is entirely complicit in the unification of these seemingly disparate ISAs: 
If the ISAs “function” massively and predominantly by ideology, what 
unifies their diversity is precisely this functioning, insofar as the ideology 
by which they function is always in fact unified, despite its diversity and 
its contradictions, beneath the ruling ideology, which is the ideology of 
“the ruling class”. Given the fact that the “ruling class” in principle holds 
State power (openly or more often by means of alliances between classes 
or class factions), and therefore has at its disposal the (Repressive) State 
Apparatus, we can accept the fact that this same ruling class is active in 
the Ideological State Apparatuses insofar as it is ultimately the ruling 
ideology which is realized in the Ideological State Apparatuses, precisely 
in its contradictions. (146) 
The main point I wish to establish is that we can understand the RSA (Athenian 
Government) and the ISAs (education, religion, and organized politics) as working in 
tandem to forward the ruling ideology that gives rise to the mystery of nationalism in 
Athens.31 Because the conspiratorial motive is so utterly pervasive, unsettling the 
network of beliefs implicated in the anti-barbarian ideology would be no small task, and 
any attempt to undertake such an endeavor would carry great risk, both politically and 
                                                
30 As Althusser explains, the essential function of the ruling ideology is to help secure the reproduction of 
the relations of production. By securing these relations, the ruling classes control capital process and can 
therefore “present privately acquisitive motives publicly in sacrificial terms.” 
31 Other ISAs (family, athletics, media, the arts, and so forth) are potentially at work here as well; I have 
chosen to concentrate on only these three for the sake of scope and, more so, because they often serve to 
legitimize “the superiority of the Greek way of life.”  
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socially. A web of identifications is involved, and the ISAs depend upon each 
motivational strand to forward the interests of the ruling classes. To ensure that nothing 
disturbs these strands, that nothing shakes this nebulous web of identifications, that 
nothing interrupts the smooth operation of the ruling ideology, discourses that safeguard 
the mystery of nationalism are heavily policed. But occasionally we find human beings 
who are daring enough—some would say foolish enough—to enter into agônes with 
these discourses. In the pages that remain, I will argue that we can count Gorgias as one 
of them.  
PALAMÊDÊS AND PROBABILITIES 
Although many are familiar with the story of Palamêdês from the Troy legend, for 
the sake of contextualizing Gorgias’s speech, it merits a brief retelling here. Palamêdês 
was either the son of Nauplius I or Nauplius II. In the Bibliotheca, Pseudo-Apollodorus 
traces Palamêdês’ lineage to Nauplius I, founder of Nauplia and son of Poseidon (2 1.5), 
a lineage that is also confirmed by Philostratus in On Heroes (25.15). Most other 
accounts identify him as the son of Nauplius II, the Argonaut, and claim he was either 
from Nauplia, Euboea or Locris. As a hero of the legendary period, he is frequently 
associated with the invention of writing and draughts, as well as several other Minoan 
arts.32 His story, which first appears in the Cypria as part of the Epic Cycle, begins at the 
outset of the Trojan War, where he is tasked with locating Odysseus in Ithaca and 
persuading him to join the Greek campaign. Before Palamêdês arrives, however, an 
                                                
32 E. D. Phillips undertakes a thorough analysis of the connection between Palamêdês and Minoan arts in 
“A Suggestion about Palamedes.”  
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oracle prophesizes that should Odysseus leave his homeland to fight at Troy, he will not 
return for twenty years. In an attempt to avoid this fate, when Palamêdês finally reaches 
Ithaca, Greek troops in tow, the clever Odysseus feigns madness. To carry off the 
pretense, he dons the cap worn by madmen, yokes together two ill-matched beasts (one a 
horse, the other an ox), and begins wildly hot-hoofing it around his fields while salting 
the earth. The act fools everyone but the equally clever Palamêdês (an infamous 
“trickster” in his own right), and upon sniffing out the ruse, he decides that the most 
effective way to expose it is to toss Odysseus’s son, Telemachos, in front of the raging 
horse-ox cart. Not wishing to see his son trampled to death, Odysseus is thus compelled 
to halt his escapades, admit his sanity, and join the war party. 
Although nowhere mentioned in the Homeric epics, Odysseus apparently resented 
Palamêdês for exposing his cowardice “and further came to hate him for the glory of his 
inventions and other services to the Greek forces” (Phillips 269). Revenge comes at the 
Greek camp when Odysseus publically accuses Palamêdês of conspiring with Priam, the 
king of Troy, to commit an act of high treason. Various iterations of the conspiracy story 
exist, but the most popular explains that Odysseus enlisted a Phrygian prisoner to plant a 
specific sum of gold in Palamêdês’ tent. The prisoner then forged a letter in Priam’s hand 
verifying that, in exchange for some strategic intelligence, which could potentially bring 
down the Greek army, Palamêdês would receive exactly the sum of gold that was hidden 
in his tent. Supposedly, the letter was written in Phrygian script, and according to the 
Polyaenus recension, “the gold was βαρβαρικóν [barbarian]” (qtd. in Scodel 50). 
Odysseus then writes a reply to Priam in Palamêdês’ hand, and he tasks the Phrygian 
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prisoner with delivering the letter to the king. As the prisoner sets off on his mission, 
Odysseus orders one of his soldiers to kill the unsuspecting courier so that the letter can 
be discovered. When the Greek troops come across the dead prisoner, they read the letter 
written by Odysseus, search Palamêdês’ tent, find the original letter forged by the 
Phrygian prisoner, and finally dig up the barbarian gold.33 As a result of the evidence set 
against him, Palamêdês is found guilty as charged, and he is ultimately sentenced to death 
by stoning.3435  
While several authors and artisans in antiquity reference these events either 
directly or obliquely,36 only Gorgias and his pupil, Alcidamas, appear to have composed 
judicial speeches that concentrate exclusively on the trial itself (the latter taking the voice 
of the plaintiff, Odysseus, in Against the Treachery of Palamêdês). Of course, Gorgias is 
typically remembered for his skill in diplomacy, his extemporaneous oratory and his 
epideictic compositions, not for his interest in legal cases. In some regards, this 
distinguishes Gorgias from many of his contemporaries (e.g., Antiphon, Lysias, Isocrates, 
and Demosthenes) who were accomplished logographers and wrote speeches for actual 
cases, with real defendants, that were meant to be delivered in front of judges in a court 
of law. Still, because sophistic rhetorical training at this time often culminated in 
                                                
33 In The Trojan Trilogy of Euripides, Ruth Scodel provides an interesting analysis of how this sequence of 
events (and the actors involved) differs in the accounts of ps.-Apollodorus, Hyginus, Servius, Euripides, 
ps.-Alcidamas, and in other summaries and fragments related to the myth; see “Chapter Two: The 
Reconstruction of the Palamedes.” 
34 The Cypria claims Odysseus and Diomedes took Palamêdês fishing and drowned him; according to 
Dictys Cretensis, the two lured him into a well and stoned him from above. 
35 I am thankful to Scodel, Phillips and Susan Woodford for clarifying many of the details surrounding this 
myth. For Phillips’ summary, see especially pages 270-271. 
36 Woodford lists a number of these authors and artisans in “Palamedes Seeks Revenge,” though she does 
not mention Ovid’s reference in Book XIII of the Metamorphoses (ln. 33-59).  
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declamations on deliberative and judicial subjects, it would have been rather odd for 
Gorgias to have excluded these kinds of speeches from his own rhetorical pedagogy. As 
Jaroen Bons notes, like many of the sophists “[Gorgias’s] teaching probably was 
conducted in the form of demonstrations: he presented a model speech to his pupils for 
them to observe, memorize, study and imitate” (40).37 Taking this aspect of his pedagogy 
into account, it seems reasonable to imagine that Gorgias would have used his Palamêdês 
to teach strategies for composing arguments from probability (eikos) in the context of a 
legal defense (apologia). 
In fifth-century Athens, eikos was a relatively new form of argumentation to enter 
the democratic law courts, but it was not entirely unknown. Gagarin believes that “the 
earliest explicit example is in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes, where in a quasi-legal 
setting Hermes argues that he, a mere babe, is not like a cattle thief and thus did not steal 
Apollo’s cattle” (“Probability” 51). As evidenced by this example, eikos-arguments 
speculate on the veracity of particular actions by offering opinions about their likelihood. 
D. G. Spatharas explains, “the term argument from probabilities means an argument 
which is not based on definitive factual reality; it is an argument the acceptability of 
which depends on its potential to reproduce facts on the grounds of common experience 
shared by humans” (394).38 These sorts of arguments also reappear in Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric under the heading of artistic (or entechnic) proofs (pisteis), which Aristotle 
                                                
37 Cf. Aristotle’s On Sophistical Refutations (184b35). For more evidence of this pedagogical approach, 
see Thomas Cole’s Origins of Rhetoric. 
38 Cf. the fourth-century Rhetoric to Alexander, which defines a “probability” as “a statement supported by 
examples in the mind of the audience” (7). I am thankful to Jeffrey Walker for pointing out this helpful 
addition. 
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distinguishes from inartistic (or atechnic) proofs as follows: “I call atechnic those that are 
not provided by ‘us’ [i.e., the potential speaker] but are preexisting: for example, 
witnesses, testimony of slaves taken under torture, contracts, and such like; and artistic 
whatever can be prepared by method and by ‘us’; thus, one must use the former and 
invent the latter” (Kennedy 1355a2; his brackets). Aristotle also clarifies that inartistic 
pisteis “are specifics [idia] of judicial rhetoric,” and he later adds “laws” and “oaths” to 
the list of previously cited evidentiary materials that fit within the criteria (1375a1-2).  
Gagarin notes that modern scholars tend to read Plato’s Phaedrus as indicating 
that the sophists preferred probabilities (eikota) to inartistic pisteis,39 presumably because 
in the hands of a skilled rhetor, arguments from probabilities could be used in forensic 
settings to distort the truth demonstrated by direct evidence, making it possible to win 
cases using “weaker” and therefore “worse” arguments. Indeed, in the Phaedrus (267a-b) 
Plato’s Socrates takes great pains to distance himself philosophically from the sophists 
who practice eikos-arguments, rehashing the familiar criticism from the Gorgias that 
these arguments value appearances over truths: “We will let Tisias and Gorgias rest in 
peace, who saw that probabilities should be more honored than truths, and who make 
small things appear great and great things small by the power of speech” (Gagarin, 
“Probability” 49). Of course, in Gorgias’s Palamêdês the accused marshals a number of 
arguments from probabilities, and, so far as we know, he still does not win his case.40 
                                                
39 In “Probability and Persuasion,” he cites Guthrie’s The Sophists, Kennedy’s Art of Persuasion, and 
Vicker’s In Defense of Rhetoric to substantiate his claim that “modern scholars are essentially in agreement 
about the status of probability arguments in early Greek rhetoric” (49). 
40 This does not necessarily preclude the possibility that he did win his case; verdicts were not usually 
included in fifth-century speeches, so it is impossible to say one way or the other (see Gagarin’s 
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According to Gagarin, “Gorgias does not imply that probability arguments are a better 
guide to the truth than direct evidence; rather, he shows that probability arguments, 
though not always effective, are sometimes the only means available for supporting a true 
case” (“Probability” 54-55). But whether one is inclined to side with the typical view of 
modern scholars or with Gagarin, what appears to remain consistent is the general notion 
that, at least in the ancient democratic law courts, inartistic pisteis were valued over 
arguments from probabilities. 
Given the priority ascribed to inartistic pisteis, it seems reasonable to believe that 
Gorgias’s speech was probably not meant to convince a real jury to absolve Palamêdês 
but, again, to serve as a model for imitation by his students. In “Did the Sophists Aim to 
Persuade?” Gagarin suggests that Gorgias’s discourse stands as an exemplary model, 
since it displays “every possible argument for the defense in one speech” (287).41 Gagarin 
lists the arguments as follows:  
[First there is] a sample of common arguments, including a proem (1-
5)…then (6-12) a point-by point demonstration of the improbability of the 
accuser’s scenario of betrayal; next, (13-21) a catalogue of his possible 
motives with probability arguments refuting each possibility; then (22-27) 
a list of specific weaknesses in the prosecution’s case; then (28-32) a 
description of his own accomplishments and character; and finally an 
epilogue (33-37) with generalizations about justice and injustice. (287)   
                                                                                                                                            
introduction to Antiphon: The Speeches). But the fact that the circumstances of the case are derived from a 
mythological event with a known outcome suggests that Palamêdês always will be found guilty. Cf. 
Scodel’s conclusion in “The Reconstruction of the Palamedes.” 
41 Cf. Scodel: “Gorgias appears to have used virtually every imaginable argument” (91). 
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Bons concludes that the presence of these types of arguments, in conjunction with the 
setting in which they are delivered, renders the Palamêdês “an example of a judicial 
speech. All the elements present in it belong to the basic style of the genos dikanikon or 
judicial genre of later rhetoric” (41); however, given the unusual diversity of arguments 
that are presented, Gagarin ventures a different conclusion:  
A real forensic speech would concentrate on those few arguments that 
were most persuasive, but Palamêdês, despite its forensic setting, is in 
essence an epideictic speech. Its primary aim is not to persuade but to 
demonstrate Gorgias’s skill to the audience, who are not jurors in court at 
Palamêdês’ trial but intellectuals, students and others. (287) 
Although I differ with Gagarin’s conclusion in part—the scope of persuasion in epideictic 
speeches can, I think, be widened to include less obvious but still powerful discursive 
impacts, a point to which I will return shortly—it nevertheless places Gorgias’s 
Palamêdês within a fascinating rhetorical situation. As Susan Woodford explains in 
“Palamedes Seeks Revenge,” while the Troy legend positions the vengeful Odysseus as 
the principal agent in Palamêdês’ demise, starting with the tragedians, the story takes on a 
new twist: 
[I]n the fifth century BC a more complicated scenario, one which 
implicated all the Greeks in a judicial murder, was invented […and the] 
conclusion of the story was as inevitable as it was cruel: once the 
treasonable contents of the forged letter appeared to be confirmed by the 
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discovery of the planted gold, Palamêdês was found guilty by a majority 
of the Greeks and executed by stoning. (165; my emphasis)42 
With the invention of this scenario, which coincidentally signals a shift from dikē (or a 
citizen prosecution initiated by Odysseus) to graphē (which would be a public 
prosecution initiated by “all the Greeks” in the name of the polis), it seems likely that a 
contemporary audience for Gorgias’s Palamêdês would have known, in advance, that no 
matter how persuasive the arguments could be made in Palamêdês’ defense, given the 
lack of direct evidence supporting his innocence, even in a fifth-century trial where an 
audience of intellectuals, students and others presumably take on the role of the jury, 
Palamêdês still would not have been exonerated by a majority of the citizen population. 
While we are given to believe that the troops at the Greek camp were unaware of the 
conspiracy against Palamêdês, once they decide his fate, this much is as clear in the fifth 
century as it must have been in the eighth: though all Greeks know Palamêdês is 
innocent, he will be put to death . . . over and over again. The recurring outcome of 
Palamêdês’ judicial fate recalls a passage from Antiphon’s On The Chorus-Boy wherein 
the defendant in a murder trial admonishes the jury to correctly decide his verdict on the 
first pass, for once the verdict has been given, right or wrong, it cannot be set aside. “A 
case of this kind can be tried only once,” he warns, “and if it is wrongly decided against 
the defendant, justice and the facts cannot prevail against that decision” (Maidment 6.3; 
my emphasis). 
                                                
42 Cf. Scodel, who maintains “all the tragedians seem to have had Palamedes destroyed through a judicial 
process of some kind” (43).  
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The predicament faced by Palamêdês similarly recalls one of Burke’s remarks on 
the hierarchic motive in Kafka’s The Castle; he identifies K. as “‘out’ to the extent that 
an unnamed and even unnamable curse is upon him, a curse that keeps him permanently 
‘guilty’” (240). But if it is only for lack of direct evidence that Palamêdês is kept 
permanently guilty, then what does Gorgias hope to achieve by demonstrating to his 
students a number of arguments that will not work to accomplish a successful defense? 
Are these arguments simply a rhetor’s last resort when no other means of persuasion are 
available, as some scholars seem to believe?43 If so, why not choose a less dire case for a 
teaching exercise, one in which the circumstances are less prodigious and the outcome 
less certain? And if, as Gagarin suggests, this is not a forensic speech meant to persuade 
but an epideictic speech meant to demonstrate Gorgias’s skills to the audience, exactly 
what skills are being successfully demonstrated? In “Conversation versus Declamation as 
Models of Written Discourse,” Michael Halloran forwards what I consider to be an 
entirely reasonable but nevertheless unsatisfactory response to this line of questioning:  
The surviving speeches of Gorgias (“Defense in Behalf of Palamedes” and 
“Encomium of Helen”) appear to be declamations whose purpose was 
simply to demonstrate the great artistry of the orator and thus advertise his 
services as a teacher. What marks them as declamations is not their form 
but their detachment from any immediate rhetorical problem. Palamedes 
was not in fact on trial, and there was, so far as we know, no actual 
                                                
43 In addition to Gagarin, who articulates this belief in many of his works, see Christopher Tindale’s 
chapter on eikos-arguments in Reason’s Dark Champions. 
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ceremonial occasion calling for a speech in praise of Helen. They adopt 
the forms of what we might call, for want of a better term, “real” rhetorical 
discourse—the Helen of epideictic speech, the Palamedes of forensic—but 
the ceremonial and judicial forums are imaginary. Both speeches are 
utterly disinterested so far as the public life of the time is concerned. In 
this sense they are pure aesthetic objects, though they also bear some 
similarity to modern-day advertising. (158-159; my emphasis) 
Needless to say, I disagree with Halloran. It is not because his claims about declamations 
are false—they are, in fact, quite accurate—but because his conclusion that the 
Palamêdês is “utterly disinterested so far as the public life of the time is concerned” does 
not take into account the possibility that Gorgias’s solution to arguing this seemingly 
intractable case can be seen as a highly creative attempt to challenge a number of 
dominant ideological suppositions, suppositions that were indicative of the socio-political 
climate in Athens during the fifth century. As we know, this was a climate fecund enough 
to germinate a new set of legal institutions and progressive enough to tolerate certain 
critical attitudes about inherited dogmas, but it was also still beholden to a number of 
elitist traditions that were fairly conservative and recalcitrant. Importantly, the tension 
between agency and repression—or, more specifically, between the ability to freely 
experiment with novel speech, ideas, and practices and the inability to express them in 
certain discourses without violent social and political repercussions—seems to have 
given rise to a number of aesthetic innovations that were specifically geared towards 
engaging timely intellectual issues. One such innovation was the development of Attic 
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prose we find in the speeches of fifth-century rhetors like Antiphon and Thucydides. 
Gagarin tells us that Antiphon’s Tetralogies point to the “complex, sometimes 
experimental style . . . of an author who (like Thucydides) is creatively engaged in the 
intellectual issues of his day . . . [and] the arguments of the Tetralogies fit well with the 
intellectual interests of the sophistic age and the spirit of experimentation characteristic of 
the period” (Antiphon 9). Moreover, the eikos-arguments found in the First Tetralogy 
“can be paralleled in the work of Corax, Tisias and Gorgias, as well as in fifth-century 
tragedy and comedy” (Gagarin, Antiphon 9). By highlighting this set of historical 
continuities, Gagarin points us towards the beginnings of an explanation as to why 
Gorgias may have chosen Palamêdês as the subject of his speech. In light of the 
seemingly insurmountable obstacles that stand in the way of a favorable verdict, the 
accused requires a defense that is both intellectually creative (since there is no hard 
evidence to lean on) and cleverly delivered (since neither the author, Gorgias, nor his 
interlocutor, Palamêdês, can afford to appear overtly subversive of popular opinion). We 
know that Palamêdês had a reputation for cleverness, and as Dana Sutton contends in 
Two Lost Plays of Euripides, “in the dramatic and rhetorical literature of the fifth century 
BC Palamedes was firmly established as a mythological archetype of the creative 
intellectual” (qtd. in Woodford 164). These composite features of his character are thus 
ideally suited to an undertaking wherein a clever speaker takes the opportunity to 
creatively challenge the intellectual determinism that unjustly conditions the fate of an 
otherwise innocent person.   
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One can easily understand why Halloran reduces the Palamêdês to a “pure 
aesthetic object” and why he concludes that the main function of the speech is to 
advertise Gorgias’s services to potential students or clients. His arguments generally 
accord with what is known about the purpose of declamations44 and the monetary 
motives of sophists.45 I have no problem with this reading, and many respectable scholars 
share it. What I propose is that it only tells part of the story, or that the putative 
detachment and disinterestedness of the Palamêdês acts as a reasonable “cover story” 
under which other, more unsettling activities are covertly taking place. This proposal 
brings with it certain presuppositions that will not be amenable to all, but given the 
rhetorical situation at hand, little actually prevents us from entertaining the possibility 
that the Palamêdês may have been engaged in any number of intellectual issues 
concerning “the public life of the time.” The works of the great tragedians certainly were, 
so there is at least some precedent for this sort of engagement. It could even be claimed 
that there was a sort of underground tradition of rhetoricians and dramatists using 
fictitious narratives to engage politically sensitive issues. Halloran is of course correct 
that this kind of engagement was not characteristic of declamations, but rather than 
“utterly disinterested,” it might be more suggestive to say that, as a persuasive speech 
stressing primarily rhetorical considerations, the Palamêdês affords less practical use-
value than, for example, a typical logographer’s speech. This does not, however, simply 
                                                
44 Basically, these were practice exercises that used fictitious cases to teach students how to make 
speeches; the arguments learned from these exercises could then be applied, mutatis mutandis, to speeches 
delivered for actual cases. 
45 The sophists were said to have charged their students large sums of money for their services. Gorgias 
apparently earned so much that, near the end of his life, he was able to commission a gold statue in 
commemoration of himself. 
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render it a “pure aesthetic object.” Practical use-value alone does serve as the 
precondition for a speech that is engaged with public life, and based on the fact that 
Gorgias was a resident alien in Athens at a time when nationalist sentiments could turn 
on him and potentially many others at any moment (Lysias comes to mind), one could 
argue that his speech can also be seen as an example of creative thinking that is prompted 
by timely intellectual issues. Is it really only a trivial coincidence that both Gorgias and 
Palamêdês were foreigners to the Greeks of their respective times? Should we simply 
dismiss the fact that Helen, being a woman, would have been grouped along with them as 
a (barbarian) minority influence in the fifth century? These connections are worth 
considering, especially in light of the fact that by acknowledging them, Gorgias’s 
speeches become an affirmation of Halloran’s own thesis, which is that we should “strive 
to make the inherently declamatory writing of the classroom more conversational [i.e., 
more “public,” or “oriented to some specific rhetorical situation, and thus to a clearly 
defined audience” (163)] . . . [because] doing so can help us to see and exploit the 
socially disruptive potential of declamation” (165). 
Olympic Objections 
I am well aware that the preceding remarks will have caused some who are 
invested in the study of Gorgias to object that his speeches were in no way provoking any 
dangerous questions subversive of the anti-barbarian ideology. The elephant in the room 
is obviously his Olympic Speech, which I would like to briefly address. The speech is no 
longer available to us, but a fragment from Philostratus recalls that Gorgias’s purpose 
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was to quell civil strife among warring poleis by turning all Greek enmity towards the 
barbarians (82 A 1 4). Later in the passage, Philostratus recalls another speech, Gorgias’s 
Funeral Oration, which was “spoken over those who fell in the wars,” and he claims that 
it was “composed with surpassing cleverness . . . and contending for the same idea as in 
the Olympic Speech” (82 A 1 5). In the Funeral Oration, although the rhetor continues to 
praise Greek victories over the Medes, because he is addressing an exclusively Athenian 
audience that is hungry for empire, he says nothing about unification, but he rather shows 
the Athenians “that victories over the barbarians require hymns of celebration, [while] 
victories over the Greeks require laments” (Kennedy 82 A 1 5). Taken together, it is not 
difficult to understand how these speeches would reject the subversive thesis I have 
proposed. 
Fair enough. To deny that Gorgias shared in the kitsch of the anti-barbarian 
ideology would be overly presumptive. He very well may have done so. On the other 
hand, each speech imposes a different set of rhetorical constraints, and one must wonder 
whether these constraints, and not Gorgias’s personal beliefs, dictated the 
recommendations he could offer. When he calls for Greek unification in the Olympic 
Speech, he basically recommends going to war, but based on what Philostratus tells us, 
we are then given to believe that Gorgias does not mention unification in his Funeral 
Oration so as to subtly caution the Athenians against the extremism their exploits would 
require. We can imagine that when he calls for unification, the Persians and the Medes 
probably pose a real threat to democratic life in Hellas. We can similarly imagine that 
when he calls for the Athenians to slow their drive for empire, the Athenian democracy 
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potentially poses a real threat to life elsewhere. In this light, the barbarian moniker could 
be a general term applied equally to either group depending on the motives that compel 
them, and it would accord with Antiphon’s figuration of the trope in On Truth. Thus, 
while Gorgias’s political urgings may betray a preference for democratic life as opposed 
to the alternative (life under “barbarian” tyranny), there is nothing to prevent us from 
seeing in his “utterly detached” declamations a series of covertly expressed critiques on 
the “barbarian” tyrannies manifested by democratic life.  
If these sorts of critiques apply foremost to the imperialistic motives of 
nationalism, it stands to reason that Gorgias selected figures like Palamêdês and Helen 
because they were symbolic of the ongoing barbarian sacrifices that accompanied empire. 
Had Gorgias attempted to challenge the anti-barbarian ideology underlying the mystery 
of nationalism by way of a speech that was overtly political, we can assume that his 
efforts probably would have met with violent consequences, which also possibly explains 
why the dramatists chose to express their objections to the Hellene/barbarian polarity on 
the stages of theaters rather than at the Assembly, and why they all chose to write about 
Palamêdês rather than recognizable democratic figures. Doing so would have afforded 
them a way to covertly provoke the presuppositions of their audiences without signaling 
subversive intent.   
Without pressing the matter too far, there are other indications that the invention 
of the new scenario implicating all of the Greeks in a judicial murder was a collaborative 
effort dedicated to these covert provocations. Although Woodford writes that it was the 
tragedians who presumably gave rise to the new scenario, there is really no definitive 
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evidence to suggest that no one else had a hand in popularizing it, and several features of 
Gorgias’s speech betray his involvement. One of the more obvious markers is his affinity 
for Attic prose, which seems to have become the standard composing style for writers 
who were articulating the new scenario. In Greek Drama and the Invention of Rhetoric, 
David Sansone persuasively argues that Gorgias was an admirer of Aeschylus’s 
Palamêdês and that certain features of his apologia reveal Aeschylus’s influence. Though 
the initial performance of the Attic drama predates Gorgias’s arrival in Athens by several 
decades, Sansone believes it may have been restaged in Sicily when Gorgias was a young 
man living in the nearby city of Leontini (135). Moreover, Sansone proposes that 
“Aeschylus’ Persians is the likely inspiration for two of Gorgias’ bold expressions, the 
characterization of Xerxes as ‘the Persians’ Zeus’ and the reference to Helen as ‘foremost 
of the foremost,’ the latter expression repeated by Gorgias in a different form in referring 
to Palamedes’ jury of Greek warriors” (133). The former expression adds to the 
possibility that both Aeschylus and Gorgias were invested in disidentifying with the 
mystery of nationalism in terms of its mystical connection to the mystery of ancestor 
worship following the Persian Wars. The latter expression adds to the possibility that 
Gorgias was involved in modifying, adding to, or rearticulating the new scenario. In turn, 
Scodel believes the agôn in Euripides’ Palamêdês probably borrowed certain arguments 
from Gorgias’s speech. “I am convinced that Euripides used the Palamedes of Gorgias as 
a source,” she writes; “While it is not hard to imagine the dramatist as using a specimen 
of pure argument from eikos without evidence . . . it is harder to see the rhetorician as 
plucking argument from a dramatically confined situation. Euripides certainly allowed 
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contemporary philosophy to leave its mark in his work, and he was no doubt impressed 
by Gorgias’ triumph in Athens in 427” (90-91).  
If Gorgias was in fact involved in colluding on the new scenario, we might finally 
question what motivated him to take the risk of implicating all of the Greeks in a judicial 
murder. He was, after all, living a comfortable life as a resident alien, and the Athenians 
apparently revered his persuasive abilities to so great an extent that he seems to have 
achieved something akin to the status of a modern-day celebrity. Even Socrates says 
Gorgias was “perfectly capable of going into any city and actually persuading the young 
men to leave the company of their fellow citizens, with any of whom they can associate 
for nothing, and attach themselves to him and pay money for the privilege, and be 
grateful into the bargain” (Tredennick, Apology 19e-20a; my emphasis). Although 
Socrates paints Gorgias as somewhat of a Pied Piper in this account, his depiction only 
invites further criticism of the notion that Gorgias’s speeches were intentionally 
subversive: if Gorgias is really as good at his profession as Socrates claims, by promoting 
subversive ideas he chances being charged with corrupting the youth, so why would he 
risk his livelihood (and possibly his head) by agitating his hosts with potentially offensive 
discourses? One explanation is that he was motivated by what Burke refers to as “comic 
primness:” 
Comic primness, or “prim irony,” is an attitude characterizing a member 
of a privileged class who somewhat questions the state of affairs whereby 
he enjoys his privileges; but after all, he does enjoy them, and so in the 
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last analysis he resigns himself to the dubious conditions, in a state of 
ironic complexity that is apologetic, but not abnegatory. (126) 
The possibility that Gorgias did hold such an attitude would certainly help to explain why 
he would have wanted to ensure that his unsettling rhetorical activities remained covert. 
As a celebrity with privileged status, he can take advantage of the freedom to “speak on 
any subject,” and this freedom permits him to experiment with novel arguments in public 
venues. But it comes with a price. He cannot publically offer critique on the state of 
affairs whereby he enjoys his privileges. Thus, he presents the speech as an epideictic 
declamation exercise rather than a social or political critique of the anti-barbarian 
ideology and the democratic government. This approach enables his Palamêdês to tacitly 
enter into an agôn with discourses that are heavily guarded by ideological state 
apparatuses. Sansone argues that already in the early fifth century, tragedy demonstrated 
a “rhetorical sophistication,” or “a contemplation of argument and counterargument,” and 
for this “a new set of cognitive skills, analogous to those needed to process polyphonic 
music, was now required of audiences that were confronted with newly configured stories 
already familiar from narrative sources” (150). The analogue I wish to establish with 
Gorgias’s Palamêdês is that, yes, his discourse can be catalogued as a traditional 
declamation, and as such it can be seen as “utterly disinterested so far as the public life of 
the time is concerned.” The case of Palamêdês then becomes an ambiguous choice, since 
Gorgias could have selected any number of fictitious cases (the Hymn to Hermes, for 
example) to demonstrate eikos-arguments. But given the aesthetic innovations linked to 
the dramatists and rhetoricians, Gorgias’s Palamêdês might also be suggestive of 
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“another voice” for audiences to confront, a polyphonic voice indicative of rhetorical 
sophistication. This voice would not add to the number of voices we count in the 
discourse, for there is still only one speaker. It would instead change what can be heard, 
or what must be accounted for, when another voice, the illegitimate voice, speaks. 
Of course, to argue that all of Gorgias’s speeches were firmly invested in 
critiquing or commenting upon public life in Athens would be a difficult position to 
defend without more sustained research dedicated to the topic, and I am presently 
concerned only with accounting for Gorgias as one who cleverly engages with the 
mystery of nationalism by writing a speech in defense of Palamêdês. Students, 
intellectuals, and others may have taken from this speech whatever they were inclined to 
take from it. If they were interested in becoming logographers, perhaps they would have 
been thankful to learn about eikos-arguments so that they could later apply them to “real” 
rhetorical discourses for specific cases. Gorgias, so far as we know, neither promised his 
audiences that eikos-arguments would be successful nor that they would produce arête in 
the agônes of law courts. Plato’s Meno (95c) tells Socrates that he admires Gorgias for 
the fact that “one never heard him promising [to be a teacher of excellence], but he even 
laughs at others when he hears them so promising. Rather he thinks it is his duty to make 
clever speakers” (Kennedy 82 A 21). My suspicion is that there may have been 
something to learn from the Palamêdês beyond its litigious application; my interest is in 
the “duty” to which Meno refers. Therefore, to put the matter as briefly as possible, my 
contention is that Gorgias’s Palamêdês cleverly engages and creatively unsettles the anti-
barbarian ideology by covertly disidentifying with the mystery of nationalism on every 
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dominant point of social identification: concerning religion, he disidentifies with the 
Homeric mythos by speaking for the traitor, Palamêdês, rather than a canonical hero 
championed by the aristocratic warrior classes; concerning education, he disidentifies 
with the privilege ascribed to inartistic proof and reason by undertaking arguments from 
probabilities in an antilogy; and concerning organized politics, he disidentifies with the 
exclusionary practices of democratic institutions by demonstrating the irrelevance of law 
courts for non-citizens, foreigners, women, slaves, and all others who have been classed 
with the barbaroi. 
Ethos Barbaros 
Let us start with what is known about the defendant’s situated ethos. Wherever he 
may in fact be from, he is at least neither to be confused with one of Homer’s heroes in 
the eighth century nor with a native Athenian in the fifth century. That Palamêdês should 
not be confused with one of Homer’s heroes in the eighth century is fairly obvious 
considering he is entirely absent from Homer’s account of the Trojan War. Book IV of 
Philostratus’s The Life of Apollonius of Tyana concludes that this omission was a 
conscious choice on the part of Homer—he sacrificed the story of Palamêdês in order to 
embellish the heroism of Odysseus. At the outset of the story that leads to this 
conclusion, the intrusion of foreign practices into the Greek paradigm is palpable and, 
fittingly, sets the stage for Apollonius’s discussion of Palamêdês. Speaking to his 
disciple, Damis, and the rest of his company, Apollonius recalls conjuring up the 
deceased Achilles using a “prayer which the Indians say they use in approaching their 
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heroes” (Conybeare 4.16; my emphasis). When Apollonius interviews the reincarnation 
of Achilles, he asks, “Why was it that Homer knew nothing about Palamedes, or if he 
knew him, then kept him out of your story?” (4.16). Achilles answers, “if Palamedes . . . 
never came to Troy, then Troy never existed either. But since this wisest and most 
warlike hero fell in obedience to Odysseus’ whim, Homer does not introduce him into his 
poems, lest he should have to record the shame of Odysseus in his song” (4.16). 
Philostratus is obviously indulging in some hyperbole here, which makes sense because 
Apollonius was, after all, supposed to have been entertaining Damis and the rest of the 
company with this story. Still, that Homer does not include Palamêdês in his articulation 
of the Troy legend—in spite of the fact that the great warrior Achilles considers 
Palamêdês a “most warlike hero” (at least according to Philostratus’s narrative)—begins 
to trouble the place of Palamêdês within the cannon of traditional heroes championed by 
the aristocratic warrior classes of the eighth century.46  
About the defendant we also know that he is often credited with the invention of 
writing. Supposedly, the script he brought with him was foreign to the soldiers at the 
Greek camp, but he was able to employ it for organizational purposes with a high degree 
of success.47 Research undertaken by E. D. Phillips challenges the longstanding 
assumption that this language was derived from the Phoenician alphabet, arguing instead 
that it was probably a form of the ancient Minoan script known today as Linear B, which 
is “purely practical and administrative, not literary” (273). Phillips corroborates part of 
                                                
46 This also fits with Scodel’s analysis, at least insofar as the narrative by Philostratus is concerned. She 
writes, “[Philostratus’s] narrative is deliberately placed in opposition to the stories rendered popular by 
Homer” (48). 
47 See Phillips, 269-270. 
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his argument with reference to “a fragment of Euripides’ Palamedes, [wherein] 
Palamedes claims that by the use of writing, messages can be sent home from overseas, 
property distributed by a dying man to his children, who will then know the amounts, and 
disputes settled by reference to the tablet, which allows no lying” (273; my emphasis).48 
That the truth of Palamêdês’ case is obscured by written evidence which does lie seems at 
least noteworthy, if not ironic, especially since the letters that finger him for the crime are 
composed by Odysseus and, under duress, by a foreign prisoner of war.  
Phillips has an interesting take on the connection between social status and 
writing practices during the Mycenaean age, and the conclusions he draws from this 
connection hint at another possible explanation as to why Homer leaves the story of 
Palamêdês out of his Epic Cycle: 
From a historical point of view the question of late Mycenaean literacy is 
involved. It is likely that at any period in Mycenaean history writing was 
practiced mainly by clerks and officials of no very exalted station, and not 
by rulers and fighting men . . . [thus] the social status of any historical 
person who knew and regularly used writing late in the Mycenaean age 
would be low enough to make him disliked by military commanders who 
belonged to an aristocracy, in spite of his usefulness, if he shared at all in 
the direction of affairs. (277; my emphasis)  
                                                
48 Cf. Scodel, who writes that “the inventor of the art of writing, destroyed with a forged letter, claims that 
his creation οὐκ ἐᾷ ψευδῆ λέγειν [does not permit false speaking]” (61; my translation).  
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Based on the fact that Palamêdês is said to have used writing to share in the direction of 
affairs at the Greek camp, it seems reasonable to suggest that his standing among the 
Mycenaean warrior classes would have been poor, perhaps even putting him on par with 
others of the “scribe class,” such as the Phrygian prisoner, and certainly not placing him 
at the level of traditional heroes, like Odysseus.49 Moreover, if Odysseus had been 
recognized as having written the note from Palamêdês to Priam, demonstrating that he 
was literate, the potential exists that Odysseus would have been looked upon unfavorably 
by the aristocratic warrior classes of the Mycenaean age, thereby undermining his status 
as a legendary king and a heroic warrior. In other words, if Homer does not tell the story 
of Palamêdês, Odysseus does not write at Troy or anywhere else in the Epic Cycle, and 
his ethos remains intact. 
Whether this was really Homer’s motive is certainly disputable, but taking it into 
consideration does give some weight to the idea that literacy was a prominent (and 
potentially recurrent) site of class struggle in the ancient world. We do not know whether 
Homer himself actually wrote, but we do know that writing was only beginning to 
reemerge in the eighth century after a long period of disuse, and the question as to 
whether it would have been a socially acceptable practice among his aristocratic 
audiences therefore remains open. In the end, however, Palamêdês’ association with 
                                                
49 In Gorgias’s speech, after Palamêdês lists his contributions to humanity—one of which is the invention 
of letters—he says that he is “neither useless in council nor lazy in war, doing what is assigned to me, 
obeying those in command” (Kennedy 82 B 11a.32; my emphasis). If Phillip’s conclusion about the 
connection between writing and social status is taken seriously, it is possible that the proximity of writing 
to military affairs in Gorgias’s speech was similarly meant to undermine Palamêdês’ situated ethos and thus 
reveal the prejudice of the judges at the Greek camp. Doing so may have worked to covertly expose these 
same prejudices in fifth-century audience members who espoused Socratic sympathies.  
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writing at a time when the practice was disavowed by kings, chieftains, and military 
commanders saddles him with an undesirable situated ethos because it identifies him with 
and by different social principles. This identification, coupled with his absence from 
Homer’s Epic Cycle, indicates that Palamêdês should not be confused with the Greek 
heroes championed by the aristocratic warrior classes of the eighth century.           
By the time Gorgias wrote his speech (the exact date of composition is unknown), 
the ancient world had changed considerably, but one can readily make the case that 
Palamêdês’ situated ethos did not improve much, if at all, from the eighth century to the 
fifth. Philosophers like Socrates were once again denigrating writing and those who 
practiced it, and the Athenians were growing increasingly suspicious of stories wherein 
ancient gods and heroes were said to have been responsible for creating and controlling 
various aspects of the natural world, or for inventing certain human practices, such as 
writing, numbers, and games—all of which were inventions variously associated with 
Palamêdês. Perhaps it was in light of these suspicions that Gorgias chose to cast 
Palamêdês as a patriotic Greek in his speech, a blue-collar who would not have betrayed 
his homeland because, as he says, “in betraying Greece I was betraying myself, my 
parents, my friends, the dignity of my ancestors, the cults of my native land, the tombs of 
my family, and my great country of Greece” (82 B 11a19). But in spite of Palamêdês’ 
numerous references to himself as a Greek in Gorgias’s speech, his social standing should 
not be confused with that of a native Athenian in the fifth century, and since he is not an 
Athenian pleading to other Athenians, his minority status similarly undermines his 
situated ethos. On first view, this claim may seem untenable, for the obvious temptation 
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is to assume that a contemporary Athenian audience would have listened to Palamêdês’ 
appeals as though they were at least being issued by a fellow Greek who was somewhat 
worthy of Athenian respect. The ancient myth speaks of actors and events from a distant 
past, no doubt, but the arguments used by the defendant suggest he is on trial not at the 
Greek camp, but in a democratic law court where “Athenian jurors were probably 
reasonably competent to evaluate the speeches of both sides fairly and sensibly” 
(Gagarin, Antiphon 20);50 however, because the scene of the trial has changed, the fact 
that in Gorgias’s speech Palamêdês identifies himself only as a Greek, and not as an 
Athenian or even as a Hellene, is possibly more important than it first appears.  
Although there is little evidence for Palamêdês’ origins one way or another, 
should one care to assign him to one of his purportedly Greek homelands, it should be 
remembered that simply being born to a Greek polis did not automatically make one a 
member of Hellas. According to Book I of Thucydides’ History, the unification of Greek 
poleis under the appellation of Hellenes occurred piecemeal, likely because the various 
city-states were at war with one another so frequently. Moreover, Herodotus tells us that 
the sympathies of many fifth-century poleis were actually aligned with the Persians rather 
than the Greeks (7.139). Perhaps most importantly, by no stretch of the imagination could 
Palamêdês have been mistaken for an Athenian in Gorgias’s speech: he does not speak 
about sharing in the democratic government, he does not appeal to the Athenians as a 
fellow citizen but only as a fellow Greek, and even the root of his name, medes, 
                                                
50 Cf. John Poulakos’ “Kairos in Gorgias’ Rhetorical Compositions,” where Poulakos goes even further 
than Gagarin by suggesting “Gorgias has Palamedes acknowledge that he is trying to adapt his speech to an 
unusually outstanding jury, a distinguished panel of men of good reputation and impeccable integrity” (93).  
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establishes a homology with the barbarians. Thus, while on the one hand we can assume 
that because Palamêdês proclaims himself a Greek, most fifth-century audiences simply 
would have judged him as they would have judged a fellow Hellene or Athenian, that is, 
“fairly and sensibly,” on the other hand we can assume that because he only goes so far as 
to identify himself as Greek—not necessarily as Hellene, and certainly not as Athenian—
there is also reason to believe that an Athenian audience would have classed him as a 
foreigner, and perhaps even as a barbarian, in spite of the fact that he claims to have been 
“a great benefactor of you [judges] and the Greeks and all mankind, not only of those 
now alive but <also> of those to come” (Kennedy 82 B 11a30).  
Palamêdês’ claim of benefaction is spoken with reference to his military services 
and his many inventions, but it is principally his association with a foreign script that 
similarly contributes to the possibility that he would have been classed as a barbarian in 
the fifth century. Etymologically, we know that the word “barbarian” derives from the 
Greek barbaros, which signifies “a foreigner, one whose language and customs differ 
from the speaker’s” (OED A1). The word is also onomatopoeic—bar-bar is supposed to 
communicate a sound akin to the babbling, incomprehensible tongue of the barbarian. To 
be fair, there is no evidence to suggest that Palamêdês could not speak fluent Greek in the 
eighth-century myth, and there is evidence directly attesting to this capacity in Gorgias’s 
speech. In Palamêdês’ first argument from probabilities, he claims that he lacks “the 
capability of performing the action charged” precisely because he speaks Greek and does 
not understand the barbarian tongue:  
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There must have been some first beginning to the treason, and the 
beginning would have been speech, for before any future deeds it is 
necessary first for there to be discussions. But how could there be 
discussions unless there had been some meeting? And how could there 
have been a meeting unless the opponent sent to me or <someone> went 
from me to him? For no message arrives in writing without a bearer. But 
this can take place by speech. And suppose he is with me and I am with 
him—how does it take place? Who is with whom? Greek with barbarian. 
How do we listen and how talk to each other? By ourselves? But we do 
not know each other’s language. (Kennedy 82 B 11a6-7)  
Again, this passage tempts us to believe that because Palamêdês speaks Greek and not the 
barbarian language, the Athenian audience would not have grouped him alongside 
foreigners, slaves, Greek women and others who were classed as barbarians; however, 
linguistic identifications were not always a determinate factor in the Hellene/barbarian 
polarity. As Vincent Rosiveck points out, in the fifth century “the stereotype of the 
mentally deficient barbaros slave resisted refutation by the counter-evidence of 
intelligent slaves, even that of the children of slaves who were thought to be no less 
barbaroi than their parents even when they were born in Greece and spoke Greek from 
birth” (154). Rosiveck’s statement prompts an interesting question: when Palamêdês is 
“reborn” into a new context (that of a fifth-century law court), although he speaks Greek, 
do his non-Homeric origins subject him to a form of stereotyping similar to that 
experienced by the children of slaves? Given that the Athenians shared a strong cultural 
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heritage of hero worship vis-à-vis Homer, and that Palamêdês stood firmly outside of this 
heritage, it is at least worth considering.  
My purpose in recalling what is known about the defendant’s situated ethos is to 
suggest that Palamêdês has neither the social, ethnic, nor religious currency that the hero 
Odysseus carries with fifth-century audiences. Neither is he a hero championed by 
Homer nor is he a fellow Athenian, and as the bringer of a foreign script to the Greek 
world, he becomes identified with and by social principles that were characteristic of 
barbarian classes. Moreover, I would argue that these unavoidable “deficiencies” in 
Palamêdês’ situated ethos are a part of what interests Gorgias about this case. By 
consciously choosing a subject with so much ideological baggage, Gorgias can covertly 
provoke a dangerous question that invites critical reflection on the part of his Athenian 
audiences—namely, what is the democratic fate of non-citizens who are not identified 
with and by the same social principles as those who judge them? As an outsider, I suspect 
Gorgias may have had a personal stake in the answer. If a powerful Athenian were to 
falsely accuse him of betraying Athens to Leontini, would he not have shared in the same 
cruel fate as the protagonist of his speech? Again, it is at least worth considering. 
(Anti) Logos  
If we are willing to grant that before Palamêdês’ testimony even begins his 
situated ethos presents a number of inherent difficulties for persuading an Athenian 
audience to arrive at favorable verdict, we can further observe that these difficulties 
delimit the types of arguments he has at his disposal. The absence of inartistic proof is 
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commonly taken to be the most important factor circumscribing the available means of 
persuasion in this case, but it is not necessarily the only factor. As Gagarin points out, 
Solmsen’s thesis that “in early Greek law . . . non-artistic proofs operated automatically” 
has been largely rejected because it does not accord with Aristotle’s discussion of 
inartistic pisteis in the Rhetoric51 and, more importantly, because it is only weakly 
supported in the surviving legal cases of the fifth century (Antiphon 19). Thus, even if 
Palamêdês had ample inartistic proof at his disposal, it is doubtful that the outcome of his 
case would have been markedly different. Much of this doubt, I argue, again concerns the 
matter of Palamêdês’ situated ethos. Because his status as a non-citizen (barbarian) 
relegates him to an illegitimate speech position, it essentially renders useless any attempts 
to mount reasonable counterarguments;52 thus, he cannot use dialectical reasoning to 
uncover the truth of his case, with or without inartistic proof. 
Consider that even in Socrates’s own defense in the Apology, he is unable to 
establish the truth of his innocence using dialectic. Is this not because, much like 
Palamêdês, his situated ethos has been so thoroughly undermined before the trial even 
begins that no amount of reason will save him? Think about the accusations that were 
leveled against Socrates: “[he] is guilty of corrupting the minds of the young, and of 
believing in deities of his own invention instead of the gods recognized by the state,” and 
of making “the weaker argument defeat the stronger” (Tredennick 24b; 19b). These 
                                                
51 Gagarin clarifies, “despite [Aristotle’s] initial explanation that the speaker simply finds these [inartistic] 
proofs ‘outside’ his speech and inserts them without exercising any skill, [in section 1.15 he makes clear 
that] they do not work automatically but, just like artistic proofs, are material for the speaker to manipulate 
in accordance with the needs of his argument” (19).  
52 As Page DuBois reminds us, in fifth-century Athens only “citizens possess logos, reason” (52). 
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charges stem from Socrates’ practice of philosophy, which he believes is capable of 
approaching metaphysical truths through dialectic. In the end, however, it is precisely his 
dialectic that fails to deliver on the truth of his case. Before the matter of his verdict has 
even been settled, he acknowledges that, although all of his “statements are true,” his fate 
has already been sealed: “When I leave this court,” prophesizes Socrates, “I shall go 
away condemned by you to death” (Tredennick 24a; 39b). Possibly this is one of the 
reasons why Philostratus turns Palamêdês against philosophy when the sage Iarchas 
conjures his ghost for Apollodorus:  
[Palamêdês] in natural aptitude for philosophy excels everyone, and he 
enjoys good health as you see, and is furnished with an excellent 
constitution; moreover he can endure fire and all sorts of cutting and 
wounding, yet in spite of all these advantages he detests philosophy . . . 
[because] the wisdom with which he was endowed was [not] of any use to 
him. (3.22)  
Presumably, Philostratus meant that wisdom was not of any use to Palamêdês in his 
defense against charges of treason. The intimation here, I suspect, is that the superior 
reasoning skills afforded by philosophy fail to prove innocence when those who judge 
presuppose guilt. This accords with Scodel’s guess as to what the dramatic resolution of 
the tragedy might have been: “however the details were managed . . . the tragedy . . . 
must have been bleak indeed,” she writes; “the only true consolations are a certain 
dignity retained by the hero, and the hope of eternal fame: the world itself is without truth 
and without justice” (61). 
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Taking into consideration that both Gorgias and Palamêdês could be classed as 
foreigners in Athens, perhaps one thing Gorgias’s retelling of the myth points out is that 
even with the recent invention of this supposedly progressive democratic institution 
called the law court—which should, according to the logic of the genetic narrative, 
ensure a reasonably fair trial wherein the accused is afforded the opportunity to generate 
rhetorical activity that might accomplish a successful defense—we find that no kind of 
argument, however well-reasoned or furnished with proofs, would have been persuasive 
enough to have absolved Palamêdês.53 Had Palamêdês been portrayed as an Athenian 
citizen—or, better yet, a Greek of high birth, like Odysseus—perhaps his fate would have 
been otherwise.54 But the fact remains that a host of nationalist identifications seem to 
determine the outcome of his story ipso facto, and not only does this fact fundamentally 
complicate the logic that rhetoric flourishes because a democratic politics “recognize[s] 
the need to entertain opposing views when expressed with rhetorical effectiveness” 
(Kennedy, History 3), but it also suggests that what may be of particularly democratic 
value in Gorgias’s speech is the antilogy it professes.  
Consider that when Gorgias produces what appears to be “every possible 
argument for the defense,” because this speech issues from an illegitimate speech 
                                                
53 As Scodel concludes, in this agôn “Palamedes’ description of his ethos is accurate, and the eikos he 
presents is a true one . . . [but] the hero, depending on eikos, is trapped by the lack of full rationality in the 
world” (92-93). 
54 While focused on wealth rather than citizenship, Demosthenes describes a similar case of unequal 
treatment based on social identifications in Against Meidias: “All citizens alike should be stirred to anger, 
when they reflect and observe that it is exactly the poorest and weakest of you that run the greatest risk of 
being thus wantonly wronged, while it is the rich blackguards that find it easiest to oppress others and 
escape punishment, and even to hire agents to put obstacles in the path of justice . . . Perhaps I and one or 
two others may have managed to repel a false and calamitous charge and so have escaped destruction; but 
what will the vast majority of you do, if you do not by a public example make it a dangerous game for 
anyone to abuse his wealth for such a purpose” (Murray 123-125; my emphasis).   
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position (that of the foreigner who is not only forbidden from speaking in an Athenian 
court but who is also guilty of treason a priori), it exposes the fact that Palamêdês’ 
speech, even when the truth of the facts is known by fifth-century audiences, and even 
when the speech is expressed with Gorgias’s famed rhetorical effectiveness, simply will 
not count as a legitimate defense. The use of eikos-arguments does not help in this 
matter—it exposes the matter itself. Bons describes the general criteria for assessment of 
eikos-arguments in the absence of inartistic proof, and I think it is helpful to carefully 
consider what he says:  
If decisive proof is lacking, the question of fact or the interpretation of fact 
depends on criteria of comparison with what the person or persons called 
upon to judge take to be the case or the state of affairs generally. Their 
criteria are based on experience and commonly accepted knowledge about 
human behaviour, and the expectations they have on the basis of this. (41-
42)  
Based on these criteria, Gorgias’s use of eikos-arguments should probably absolve 
Palamêdês—he is noble warrior at Troy, his writing admits no lying, his inventions 
benefit all of mankind, and, as he emphatically argues, he has no motive for betraying the 
Greeks to the Trojans. Gorgias, however, leaves the verdict suspended in question. It is 
important to remember that since the new scenario implicates all the Greeks in a judicial 
murder, it presumably extends to the Athenian audiences who are now judging 
Palamêdês during his defense speech. And how would they find him, having themselves 
been accused of his murder? If Palamêdês were classed as an Athenian citizen, perhaps 
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audiences would have to face uncomfortable consequences for falsely accusing and then 
unjustly sentencing to death one of their own; however, if he were classed as a non-
citizen, what would an Athenian’s commonly accepted knowledge about barbarian 
behavior have led him to conclude?  
The risk involved in Gorgias’s speech is substantial indeed; it walks the razor thin 
line of pointing towards the ideological conclusion without pointing at it. The effect of 
walking this line is that audiences will have had no choice but to confront their 
presuppositions of inequality, but the only voices that will have compelled them to do so 
will have been their own.55 No one speaking in the speech will have said that the 
audience’s presuppositions are necessarily wrong. In fact, Gorgias will have said the 
opposite—he will have offered another way to account for the speaker’s arguments, 
another logos, an anti-logos. The novelty of his defense is that he presupposes that all of 
the individual logoi of the prosecution (kategoria) are equally available for figuration in 
an apologia. This presupposition is achieved by iterating the prosecution’s arguments 
exactly, without any pretense of sublation, and speaking them as though a Hellene, an 
Athenian, a citizen, or an Odysseus might have spoken them. In so doing, Palamêdês 
neither judges his logos inferior nor superior to the incumbent logos. Both are equally 
capable of speaking, of presupposing each other’s logoi, regardless of speech positions 
they occupy within the discourse. Tellingly, the only arguments that Palamêdês abstains 
                                                
55 Walker’s assessment of the function of epideictic generally accords with this reading. He writes, “in 
every case the function of the epideictic in its nonpragmatic setting is a suasive ‘demonstration,’ display, or 
showing-forth (epideixis) of things, leading its audience of theôroi to contemplation (theôria) and insight 
and ultimately to the formation of opinions and desires on matters of philosophical, social, ethical, and 
cultural concern” (9). 
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from iterating are the invectives spoken against him. “I do not want to introduce in reply 
the many enormities, both old and new, which you have committed,” he says, “though I 
could” (Kennedy 82 B 11a 27; my emphasis). That Palamêdês chooses not to take the 
opportunity to undermine his opponent’s ethos at this critical juncture in the speech 
seems entirely counter-productive, but it accords with presupposing the equality of 
intelligence between speaking beings when the legitimacy of speech is at issue. 
Ultimately, the antilogy in this speech points out that a speaker who is forbidden from 
participating in the institution of the law court nevertheless can generate legitimate 
apologia from an illegitimate speech position by presupposing equality with an opposing 
logos. This is important because, although Palamêdês will invariably be found guilty as a 
result of his illegitimate speech position, the agôn does not begin and end with his guilt. 
It begins and ends with his speech. Once this speech occurs, it is no longer possible for 
audiences to deny their refusals to account for non-citizens as able speakers in law courts 
or anywhere else, no longer possible to deny their spontaneous prejudices towards those 
who are not identified with and by the same social principles, no longer possible to deny 
their continued complicity in Palamêdês’ demise.   
In other words, we might say that Gorgias’s Palamêdês risks presupposing 
equality between non-citizen and citizen, between accused and accuser, or between 
apologia and kategoria, and while the apologia itself almost certainly would have failed 
to persuade a Dikastic court to exonerate Palamêdês given the socio-political atmosphere 
in fifth-century Athens, once the event of Gorgias’s discourse occurs, it is no longer 
possible to ignore that speakers are capable of generating rhetorical activity, predicated 
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on equality, without the sanction of an official politics. Furthermore, it is no longer 
possible to ignore that speakers are capable of doing so with as much (or more) rhetorical 
skill than citizens who are granted the right to speak based solely upon membership with 
the state. We can read this speech as a moment wherein democracy occurs, as an 
insurgency that heralds a breakdown in the official counting practices of a dominant 
discourse. Events of democracy, however, voice no expectations that political institutions 
will necessarily attend to their failed accountings as a result. They simply affirm the 
following: rhetorical activity can be generated from speech positions that are not 
accounted for according to the counting practices of democratic politics. Similarly, there 
is no guarantee that the Athenian audiences will necessarily feel compelled to change 
their longstanding attitudes or beliefs after hearing Gorgias’s speech. Perhaps some will 
simply learn their eikos-arguments and “be grateful into the bargain.” For others, the 
antilogy might provoke self-reflection on the identity politics governing “the public life 
of the time.” Either way, my position is that confronting the contingency of an 
established ideology is one of the less obvious but still powerful impacts that antilogy 
affords to epideictic discourse. Gagarin does not account for this impact in his reading of 
the sophists, but there is room for it. After all, the non-persuasive impact of antilogy is 
the main subject of his article. 
Whether Gorgias’s Palamêdês aims to persuade or aims at something else, as an 
example of rhetorical discourse in which an event of democracy occurs as a discursive 
insurgency, I see it as performing a two-fold operation: the illegitimate speaker enters a 
discourse that has been reified by the mystery of nationalism, and he then breaks the 
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metaphysical arrangement of signifiers sustaining the anti-barbarian ideology. 
Paradoxically, of course, it becomes possible to read the Palamêdês in this way precisely 
to the extent that its rhetorical patterns will have challenged and unsettled the counting 
practices of Athenian democracy. Entering and breaking points out an inequality 
legitimated by the mystery of nationalism, and democracy occurs in the Palamêdês 
precisely because Gorgias’s rhetorical pattern presupposes equality with an institutional 
discourse that a priori disavows the legitimacy of foreign speech, because it risks 
confronting the contingency of an essentialized ideology by speaking in the genera of 
apologia reserved exclusively for Athenian citizens with “full rights,” and because it 
challenges the counting practices of a politics built on nationalist identifications.  
If these claims strike the reader as being overly-speculative, I would only recall a 
fragment from Gorgias’s own Olympic Speech: “A contest such as we have requires two 
kinds of excellence, daring and skill; daring is needed to withstand danger, and skill to 
understand how to trip the opponent. For surely speech, like the summons at the Olympic 
games, calls him who will, but crowns him who can” (Kennedy B 8). The victor of such 
an agôn as we have here is not crowned when the judges of the contest pass a favorable 
verdict. The victor is crowned when we hear another voice in the Palamêdês speak, and 




Chapter Three: Making Shoes 
 
In Chapter Two, I conducted an experiment designed to test the logos of the 
counter-narrative. My working hypothesis was that rhetorical patterns in Gorgias’s 
Palamêdês presuppose equality with the incumbent logos advanced by Odysseus, making 
it possible for a foreigner to enter a legal discourse where non-citizen speech positions 
had been foreclosed by an established ideology. In one register, the audience hears the 
speech as a forensic declamation—or a fictitious case divorced from any practical 
concerns—the purpose of which is to demonstrate how to compose arguments from 
probabilities in the context of an apologia. In another register, the audience hears skillful 
rhetorical activity, generated by a famous sophist, but the selection of arguments renders 
the speech an example of epideictic rhetoric. As such, the speech is not intended to 
persuade the audience that Palamêdês is innocent but to advertise the rhetor’s skill to 
students, intellectuals and others. Between these two registers, a third emerges. Gorgias 
presupposes the logoi of the kategoria in his apologia, whereupon another logos comes to 
the fore, challenging the reasonable, democratic audience to confront their own opinions 
of Palamêdês, and of foreigners more generally. When the polyphony generated by this 
third register persuades the audience to account for the marginalized voice of a non-
citizen, a breakdown in official counting practices ensues, producing a momentary event 
of democracy.   
Chapter Three will again test the logos of the counter-narrative, this time with 
recourse to an ideology that gives rise to the mystery of mastery in nineteenth-century 
 117 
educational discourse. In this instance, the conditions for mystery are set by the 
pronounced social distinctions between the ignorant student and the expert master. 
Accordingly, my claim will be that the Enlightenment pedagogue, Joseph Jacotot, 
covertly engages this mystery, and his educational method creatively unsettles an anti-
intellectual ideology by presupposing equality with a dominant pedagogical tradition. I 
will also claim that Jacotot’s pedagogy finds precedent in the rhetorical pedagogy of the 
early sophists, and I will suggest that an emphasis on presupposing equality links the two 
pedagogies to a forgotten pedagogical tradition.  
OPENINGS 
In the previous chapter, a question was raised that now merits some additional 
consideration: if the Palamêdês is a speech meant to display Gorgias’s skills to the 
audience, exactly what skills are being successfully demonstrated? Once again, if we take 
the standard view, Gorgias’s speech becomes an example of forensic rhetoric meant to 
serve as a model for imitation by his students, many of whom were practicing 
declamation in order to prepare for careers in the public sphere and who were therefore 
on the cusp of graduating into manhood and becoming citizens in the full sense. If we 
take Gagarin’s view, the speech becomes an example of epideictic rhetoric, the purpose 
of which is not to persuade the audience that Palamêdês is innocent but to demonstrate 
novel possibilities of response; for this reason, Gorgias utilizes every argument at his 
disposal rather than concentrating on the two or three that would be the most persuasive. 
My view is that Gorgias’s audiences may have taken any number of things from his 
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speech, but a particular reading of the speech suggests that it was articulating a novel 
argument by challenging an anti-barbarian ideology and creatively unsettling the mystery 
of nationalism on every dominant point of identification. This reading generally aligns 
with the purpose of sophistic rhetoric as it is conceived by John Poulakos, who explains 
that in discourse “any established belief, be it scientific, logical, or philosophical, 
constitutes an opportunity for rhetorical action . . . [and] depending on the orator’s 
ingenuity, artistry, and swiftness of thought, rhetorical action ought to aim at the 
production of new arguments” (“Kairos” 13-14). In both the Palamêdês and in the Helen, 
says Poulakos, Gorgias achieves this aim by “employing, although indirectly, the very 
same technique attributed to Prodicus by Aristotle: ‘I will tell you such a thing as you 
have never yet heard of . . . ’ (Rhetoric 3.14, 9)” (94). In other words, for the early 
sophists, discourses were never completely settled or closed—it was always possible to 
bring another logos to the fore.  
If Gorgias’s Palamêdês was likely demonstrating a number of skills to his 
students, perhaps one of the most instructive has become one of the least obvious to us 
now. By discovering an opening in a text with a known outcome, Gorgias demonstrates 
that even when marginalized speakers and speech positions have been foreclosed by an 
established ideology, it is still possible to generate skillful rhetorical activity by 
discovering opposing arguments. Put differently, the rhetoricity of logos indicates that 
antilogy is always a discursive possibility. Gorgias’s Palamêdês and Helen are but two 
representative cases of antilogies that provide novel responses to opposing arguments, but 
I will argue that one of the main purposes of early-sophistic rhetorical pedagogy seems to 
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have been to train speakers and writers to discover openings in any text. More incredibly, 
evidence from the nineteen-century pedagogue Joseph Jacotot appears to confirm that 
humans of all walks who undertake this form of training are capable of generating 
persuasive rhetorical activity, completely off-the-cuff, on any given subject. 
EARLY-SOPHISTIC PEDAGOGY    
 
Although the study of extempore discourse does not command a great deal of 
attention in contemporary rhetoric and composition pedagogies, for centuries it was 
common practice in rhetorical education, and many considered it to be a highly valuable 
undertaking. In antiquity, those training with sophists to become skilled orators, 
politicians or lawyers were almost certainly familiar with the practice, in part because 
contests of extempore speaking were a popular way for teachers of rhetoric to attract and 
retain students. Interestingly, there is little consensus as to who the originator of the 
practice actually was, but in his Lives of the Sophists, Philostratus reviews a handful of 
generally accepted forerunners from the late-sixth and early-fifth centuries B.C.E.56 Some 
claim, he tells us, “the fountains of extempore eloquence flowed . . . from Pericles their 
source,” and above all else, it was this facility to discourse off-the-cuff that gained 
Pericles his famed reputation among the Athenians (Wright 1.482). Others trace the 
practice to Python of Byzantium, a student of Isocrates and trusted advisor to Philip of 
                                                
56 Although extempore speaking seems to have become an object of formal study at about this time, 
examples of the practice date back at least as far as Homer. Speaking of the sophist Hippodromus, who 
held the chair of rhetoric at Athens and was an able extempore orator, Philostratus recalls, “in his easy flow 
of words he resembled one who reads aloud, without effort, a work with which he is perfectly familiar. 
Once when Nicagoras had called tragedy ‘the mother of sophists,’ Hippodromus improved on this remark, 
and said: ‘But I should rather call Homer their father’” (Lives 1.620). Cf. the connection Debra Hawhee 
draws between the epimeleias (training regimens) of professional rhapsodes and sophists (Bodily Arts 144). 
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Macedon, “of whom Demosthenes says that he alone of the Athenians was able to check 
Python’s insolent and overpowering flow of words;” and still others say that it was the 
invention of Aeschines, whom Philostratus admits “did indeed improvise more often than 
any other speaker, when he went on embassies and gave reports of these missions, and 
when he defended clients in the courts and delivered political harangues” (Wright 1.482). 
Ultimately, Philostratus does not object to any of these possibilities but, in a somewhat 
unexpected move, designates Gorgias as the progenitor of σχέδιος57 (1.482), since it was 
he who entered into the theater of the Athenians and “had the boldness to say, ‘suggest a 
subject,’ and he was the first to proclaim himself willing to take this chance, showing 
apparently that he knew everything and would trust to the moment to speak on any 
subject” (Kennedy 82 A 1a).  
As an extreme and even hyperbolic display of agonism, this performance and 
others like it probably offered great entertainment value for Athenian audiences hungry to 
witness repeated productions of arête (excellence). Of equally dramatic consequence, 
however, is that the performative dimension of the utterance itself seems to have 
instituted an important epistemological distinction concerning early-sophistic rhetoric. 
Writing shortly after the Peloponnesian War, the author of the Dissoi Logoi affirms, “the 
man who knows the art of rhetoric will also know how to speak correctly on every 
subject,” and more, “because it is necessary for the man who intends to speak correctly to 
speak about the things which he knows, it follows that he will know everything” 
                                                
57 Given the context in which Philostratus uses the term, it probably would have signified a “temporary” 
(as in improvised) and “unprepared” or “impromptu” discourse. 
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(Sprague 90 VIII 3-4). Even three centuries later, in a passage from De Inventione, 
Cicero recalls that “Gorgias of Leontini, almost the earliest rhetorician, thought that an 
orator ought to be able to speak best on all subjects” (Kennedy 82 A 26), and in De 
Oratore, he often shows allegiance to the rhetor Crassus, whose ideal orator is ever at the 
ready to speak on “whatever topic that crops up to be unfolded in discourse” (Bizzell and 
Herzberg 298).  
 It is no secret that on historical occasion certain human beings have displayed a 
dazzling capacity to master a wide range of subjects, sometimes earning them the rare 
distinction of being called polymaths. The title, from the Greek πολυµαθής, is commonly 
translated as “having learned much.” In antiquity, notable examples of the intellectual 
phenomenon included Hippias of Elis, Pythagoras, and Aristotle, among others, but 
Gorgias is rarely (if ever) mentioned in the same breath, and given the seemingly 
indefinite reach of his knowledge,58 his absence is somewhat understandable. Sufficient 
evidence confirms that the aforementioned polymaths were well versed in a number of 
subjects and were capable of discoursing on these subjects at length,59 but none claimed 
to have acquired a breadth of knowledge so vast as to allow them to genuinely discourse 
on any subject, completely off-the-cuff, to the general satisfaction of a given audience.60 
                                                
58 Cf. the analogy Philostratus makes in his Lives: “the sophistic method resembles the prophetic art of 
soothsayers and oracles. For indeed one may hear the Pythian oracle say: I know the number of the sands of 
the sea and the measure thereof” (1.481). 
59 For Hippias, see especially Plato’s Hippias Minor and Major; for Pythagoras, one of the first great 
extempore preachers, see Diogenes Laërtius’s Lives; Aristotle wrote extensive treatises on roughly 50 
subjects (perhaps more, though some documents attributed to him may have been written by his students), 
and he presumably lectured on many of these at the Lyceum. 
60 Hippias comes the closest to doing so (or so we are told in the Platonic dialogues bearing his name); 
however, despite what Susan Jarratt writes in Rereading the Sophists (2), a close examination of the 
passage in Hippias Minor reveals that Hippias attenuates the practice by reducing the number of 
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As Philostratus reminds us, Gorgias was the first to openly engage this challenge, the first 
to chance a bold proclamation of such an unlikely aptitude, and because he was 
apparently able to “deliver the goods” for public verification, his epistemological reach 
ostensibly extends far beyond that of the polymath who has simply “learned much.” It 
implies the sort of omniscience traditionally reserved for the divine, rendering the 
imputation at once both ostentatious and, of course, highly suspect.  
 Unfortunately, based on the sparse examples of Gorgias’s work that have 
survived, we know almost nothing about how he may have acquired the ability to 
discourse on any subject, what these discourses might have looked like, and whether they 
were actually persuasive. Adding to the mystery, some evidence suggests that Gorgias 
could teach others to do what he did,61 but the existing fragments neither offer a clear 
exposition of his method nor any detailed descriptions of the training exercises he may 
have used, and the few summaries penned by his contemporaries are regrettably brief.  
In the absence of any overwhelming evidence to the contrary, it may in fact be 
reasonable to suggests that Gorgias could not really produce persuasive extempore 
discourse on any subject, particularly if by the term “extempore” what is meant is 
completely unpremeditated, unformed, or impromptu discourse, and if by “subject” what 
is meant is a determinate or circumscribed body of knowledge. But it is first worth taking 
into consideration that “extempore” is a Latin phrasal which subsumes two Greek words 
                                                                                                                                            
permissible subjects, only offering, as he says, “to speak on whatever subject anyone may choose from 
those I have prepared for a display” (Gallop 86 A 8; emphasis added). 
61 For example, at the beginning of the Meno Socrates credits Gorgias with teaching the Thessalians to 
“[answer] fearlessly and haughtily if someone asks something, as is right for those who know . . . ” 
(Kennedy 82 A 19; emphasis added). 
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in translation; along with σχεδίους (impromptu discourse), it can also refer to µελέτη 
(prepared or premeditated discourse). John Walden clarifies: “µελέτη, of course, referred 
primarily to a prepared speech or exercise, and it is sometimes contrasted with extempore 
speech [as σχεδίους], but it is also sometimes used to include extempore speech, and it 
was the common word used for the deliberative or the controversial speech, extempore or 
prepared, delivered on the occasion of a display” (222; emphasis added). Writing in the 
early part of the twentieth century, Edwin Du Bois Shurter argues for the following 
revision: 
The better usage now is to apply the term [extempore] to that which is 
unprepared only in form. In this sense, extempore speaking is carefully 
prepared in thought, arrangement, etc., only the choice of words and 
phraseology being left to the inspiration of the moment. It regards the 
mode, not the matter, of the discourse. Although the speaker may have 
prepared everything by language and form, if the speech be neither read 
nor recited, it is classed as extempore. (19)  
One might question the accuracy of Shurter’s revision relative to the idea of kairotic 
improvisation, for as James Murphy notes, Quintilian says that to achieve a certain 
facilitas which would allow a person to improvise on any given subject, the good orator 
had to be able to respond to unforeseen arguments.62 Moreover, as one finds in the 
Wright translation of Philostratus’s Lives, “subjects” can also be translated as “themes,” 
or generalizations about life derived from certain issues or cases, rather than determinate 
                                                
62 See James Murphy’s introduction to Quintilian on the Teaching of Speaking and Writing. 
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bodies of knowledge. For example, Philostratus observes, “ancient sophistic, even when 
it propounded philosophical themes, used to discuss them diffusely and at length; for it 
discoursed on courage, it discoursed on justice, on the heroes and gods, and how the 
universe has been fashioned into its present shape” (1.481). Themes, in this case, do not 
seem to deal heavily in the kinds of discourse-specific knowledge that experts of 
particular subjects might have been expected to possess. Thus, if it appeared as though 
Gorgias could generate persuasive discourse about anything on the wings of occasion, in 
all likelihood this ability was not due to omniscience but was instead the natural 
consequence of thematic erudition combined with an exceptional capacity for 
memorization. By this logic, superior retention of what had been rigorously studied 
would have enabled Gorgias to readily extrapolate from a stockpile of general arguments 
and commonly-held attitudes, values, customs, and beliefs particular statements that were 
persuasive insofar as they identified with cultural conventions and could be 
tropologically figured to suit virtually any context. Indeed, this explanation generally 
accords with Scott Consigny’s reading of Gorgianic pedagogy:  
[Gorgias] trains his students to acquire a repertoire of strategies, tactics, 
rules of thumb, and diverse tools for dealing with a variety of 
unpredictable confrontations. Memorization plays an important role in this 
process, for it enables a student to become embedded in various 
“traditions” of the culture, families of texts that various authors have 
composed. The texts are exemplary models or paradigms that show which 
tools have worked in other situations and suggest ways of thinking and 
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speaking that may enable the rhetor to address a new situation. 
Memorizing these texts enables a student to become familiar with the 
ongoing agons and issues of the culture; and it provides a repertoire of 
resources for inventing new arguments . . . [thus,] it is by being embedded 
in a tradition that Gorgias is able to improvise freely, drawing on what is 
“at hand” and trusting to the moment but not being completely at the 
mercy of chance or contingency. (Gorgias 199)  
In other words, for early-sophistic trainers like Gorgias, rhetorical education culminated 
in the study of dominant cultural attitudes, customs, and beliefs, which provided the 
aspiring rhetor with a working knowledge of general themes, principles, contemporary 
issues, ideologies, topics for investigation, forms of discourse, and suasive tactics that 
could then be applied, mutatis mutandis, to specific cases. From these studies, the rhetor 
amassed a storehouse of useful materials, and when timed appropriately and applied with 
proper measure—that is, when attuned to the kairos of a given situation—what had been 
committed to memory could be recalled and inserted into a new context on the spot, 
allowing rhetors in antiquity to discourse extempore (though not necessarily 
impromptu63) in courtrooms, at the Assembly, or during public or private performances, 
while simultaneously increasing the likelihood of successful persuasion. 
                                                
63 See D.A. Russell, who writes in Greek Declamation that some orators spoke impromptu, but most would 




Though not shared by all, this vision of early-sophistic pedagogy has by now 
become a fairly standard take,64 and one of the interesting questions it has opened to the 
field is whether the ancient method simply validates what we now do in rhetoric and 
composition pedagogies or suggests something altogether different, perhaps something 
from which contemporary practices might benefit. This is not a question that can be 
easily settled, but, by and large, one could argue that validation seems unlikely for a 
number of reasons. An obvious one is that we are continuing to move away from the 
study of paradigmatic or model texts—sometimes because they seem out of touch with 
our rapidly changing techno-culture, sometimes because they exhibit an unwanted degree 
of ideological influence—usually because the academy favors the use of multiple texts 
(for diversity of perspective) or the use textbooks where the basic principles or rules of a 
subject have been extrapolated for students in advance. Of course, many textbooks do 
include “paradigmatic” texts to help contextualize the rules and principles of a subject, in 
the manner of the ancient handbook tradition, but it is less common to find one that 
begins with the close study of a text and then moves to the abstractions, and it is even 
rarer still to encounter a textbook that does not articulate any principles whatsoever. One 
could also argue that with the wholesale turn to the German model of education, most 
academics have become specialists rather than generalists, and the basic pedagogical 
focus has therefore shifted from the broad, liberal education we find in antiquity to the 
                                                
64 For example, one finds articulations of this view in Susan Jarrett’s Rereading the Sophists (83), in 
Jeffrey Walker’s The Genuine Teachers of this Art (Prologue), in Debra Hawhee’s Bodily Arts, Russell’s 
Greek Declamation (Chapter 4), and in the works of many other prominent scholars. 
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teaching of discourse-specific skills required to execute discipline-specific tasks.65 And 
finally, if memorization once played an important role in the ancient training process, it is 
hardly a matter of great emphasis in modern rhetoric and composition classrooms. On 
this point, I am reminded of an occasion on which Lester Faigley charmingly referred to 
memory as “the forgotten canon of rhetoric.” Generally speaking, I think most would 
agree that his statement continues to prove true.  
As for the possibility that we might benefit from a return to these aspects of early-
sophistic pedagogy, if the endgame is wholly centered on learning to persuasively 
discourse extempore (according to Shurter’s definition) on a given theme (Philostratus), 
there is really no great exigency. Departments of Communication Studies have been 
teaching extempore speaking in the United States for well over a century. Courses in 
thematic music improvisation, once available only at institutions like the Berkley College 
of Music and the Lawrence Conservatory, are now a staple of many university curricula. 
The same goes for acting, painting, sculpture, and so on. In fact, one will find courses in 
nearly all of the liberal arts that require some degree of extempore discourse on a given 
theme—really, what else are timed oral, written, and performance examinations? It is true 
that outside of occasionally being used to generate ideas for future compositions, the 
teaching of extempore writing is fairly uncommon in university rhetoric and composition 
classrooms today, but teachers who wish to incorporate the practice into their curricula 
can readily do so by slightly modifying the methods for learning extemporaneous 
                                                
65 N.B. A relevant objection here would be the efforts of the WAC/WID movement to make writing more 
ubiquitous in all discourses; however, even in WAC/WID courses, the principle focus is still on writing 
across/in recognizable curricula/disciplines. Consequently, types of writing that are not considered 
practically useful for a particular field are generally eschewed.  
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speaking, since these generally ask students to research and write something in advance, 
commit at least some of it to memory, and then discourse extempore on a given theme 
during class. 
On the other hand, if a return to early-sophistic pedagogy means learning to write 
impromptu themes on any subject, in my view there are at least three problems that might 
reasonably prevent the practice from fitting with contemporary rhetoric and composition 
studies, especially at the university level. The first problem has to do with the issue of 
measurable results. If no evidence exists that Gorgias and others under the sway of 
similar pedagogies were indeed able to discourse impromptu on any subject to the 
satisfaction of their audiences—which necessarily includes discoursing on subjects of 
which these speakers seem to have had no expert knowledge—there would be little 
reason to take the practice seriously at academic institutions where the value a practice is 
typically measured by the results it produces. The second problem concerns the issue of 
method. Even if rhetors like Gorgias were indeed able to teach others to discourse 
impromptu on any subject in the fifth century, in an era of increasingly rigid institutional 
mandates that demand a fairly strict codification of knowledge, without a clearly 
articulated pedagogical route or a discernable methodology it would be difficult (if not 
impossible) to secure administrative support for the practice. Finally, the last problem, 
which is perhaps the most contentious of the three, relates to purpose. In the ancient 
world, winning the approbations of an audience, whether at a festival, in a law court, or 
during a deliberative assembly, was considered one of the most important reasons for 
training in the practice. To say that contemporary rhetoric and composition pedagogies 
 129 
are not concerned with persuasion as such would be reductive. Some certainly are, but 
many have attempted to move away from this concern since it often emphasizes winning 
at any cost over rational argumentation and therefore taints the practice of rhetoric with 
connotations of violence and manipulation. Thus, if winning over an audience is the 
exclusive aim of discoursing impromptu on any subject, we chance a return to the 
pejorative definition. Moreover, teaching this practice could potentially detract from 
learning to discourse on specific subjects with greater degrees of expertise. In other 
words, we might end up sacrificing ethical argumentation for an amoral sophistry and, 
with it, genuine depth for an artificial breadth. And in the end, even if there are 
measurable results, even if there is a discernable method, and even if there is a purpose 
beyond winning audience approval that comes with this practice, it still may not be worth 
pursuing in the academy today. After all, it fell out of favor in antiquity and, indeed, in 
other periods as well . . . perhaps there was a good reason that it did.  
The purpose of the remaining pages is to address these three issues and to affirm 
the value of composing impromptu themes on any subject as a rhetorical practice—
without necessarily recommending it for widespread institutional adoption. The general 
thrust of my argument is that the ability to compose impromptu discourse on any subject 
is the effect of a rhetorical technê wherein people train themselves to link what is 
unknown to what is known already. The value of this technê, on the one hand, is that it 
inspires the confidence to generate links in agônes, even when no linkages seem to be 
available (for example, when confronted with unfamiliar subjects, or in response to what 
seem like intractable problems). On the other hand, the technê also demands that one 
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answers for and justifies the linkages one makes, and this demand acts as a kind of 
safeguard against the rhetor who would discourse impromptu without recourse to a 
knowledge of the subject on which the discourse is being made. Ultimately, by 
conditioning one’s intelligence to search for relationships between the unknown and the 
known, one forms a habit (hexis) of linking metonymic chains of associations, but in the 
end, because this technê offers no prescriptions or imperatives that stipulate how one is to 
link what is unknown to what is known already, the standard methods of evaluation that 
are so fashionable among institutions of higher learning (e.g., giving students numerical 
and alphabetical grades, subjecting students to teacher and peer critiques, making 
corrections on their assignments, etcetera) can no longer be applied. Already Victor 
Vitanza has written about this issue in “Some Meditations-Ruminations on Cheryl 
Glenn's ‘Unspoken: A Rhetoric of Silence.’” “While I feel it is necessary to link,” he tells 
us, “I, having been incited by Lyotard, do not feel it is necessary how to link” (798). The 
academy, however, necessarily authorizes certain links and ways of linking at the 
expense of others, and Vitanza offers his opinion as to why this might be: 
I have always felt that in the academy what wants to be said remains 
mostly in silence. Wittingly and unwittingly. As if both desire and silence 
would rather be under the sign of the negative. Can you believe it! But 
especially in the academy! Why? Well, perhaps, it’s because the academy 
(formal education), beginning with Plato and Aristotle, is founded on what 
has to remain silent—on remainders, remnants—for if What wants to be 
 131 
spoken were to be spoken and thereby linked (or mis-linked) with what has 
been spoken, there would be no academy. (798; 804) 
Although Vitanza never does so explicitly, it is possible to understand these reflections as 
extending to all forms of discourse, for if What wants to be spoken, written, painted, 
played, thought, and so on (these being unknown to the discourser) were to be 
spoken/written/painted/played/thought and thereby linked (or mis-linked) with what has 
been spoken/written/painted/played/thought (these being known to the discourser), the 
academy would be emptied of its power to dictate how one links the unknown discourse 
to the known. What wants to be discoursed remains mostly in silence for precisely this 
reason, since what logos wants cannot be known in advance by academics (or anyone 
else, for that matter), and the academic can therefore attain a privileged speech position 
by parsing, in advance, the legitimate from the illegitimate in disciplinary knowledge 
production. This does not mean the academy and its academics are worthless—far from 
it. One of the enduring problems with the early-sophistic technê, as I hope to make clear, 
is that it resists formalization (something that the academy undoubtedly realized long 
ago), and this is part of the reason why the academy and its academics will always have 
an important role in the formal education of society (i.e., education for the purpose of 
developing the mental faculties). What it may suggest, however, is that the official 
politics of education have consistently failed to account, in any serious way, for a 
powerfully generative technê, one that is equally worthy of our attention—even if it will 
never take in the academy—as material education (i.e., education for the acquisition of 
acts). Of course, to argue that this failed accounting is a matter of any real pedagogical 
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significance depends, in the first place, on finding evidence that would confirm it is 
actually possible to do what Gorgias supposedly did.  
MEASURABLE RESULTS 
Ultimately, there is no real proof that Gorgias was indeed always able to generate 
impromptu discourse on any subject to the general satisfaction of his audiences, and there 
are a few second-hand accounts of his performances that serve to problematize the myth. 
Aristotle, for example, recounts in the Politics that when called upon to define what 
makes a citizen, “Gorgias of Leontini, partly at a loss what to say, partly in irony, said 
that just as things made by mortar-makers are mortars, so also Larisians are those made 
by public servants, for they are a group of Larisofiers” (Kennedy A 82 19). But even 
here, “partly at a loss what to say,” Gorgias does speak, and in point of fact, Aristotle is 
persuaded by this connection; as we saw in Chapter Two, he sharpens it by arguing that 
sharing in government must be what makes one a citizen, for the words “born of a father 
or mother” cannot apply to those who are the first to found a state (Jowett 1275b22).  
 Philostratus also speaks of a challenger named Chaerephon—a man with “insolent 
manners” who was known to make “scurrilous jokes”—:  
[He] rallied Gorgias for his ambitious efforts, and said: “Gorgias, why is it 
that beans blow out my stomach, but do not blow out the fire?” But 
[Gorgias] was not at all disconcerted by the question and replied: “This I 
leave for you to investigate; but here is a fact which I have long known, 
that the earth grows canes for such as you.” (Kennedy 82 A 24) 
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There is no record of Chaerephon’s reaction to the quip, and we might conjecture that by 
placing the onus of response back on the audience, Gorgias in fact cannot speak to the 
science that animates this bodily reaction and therefore simply dodges the question put to 
him. Still, he does speak, apparently “not at all disconcerted,” and if one takes seriously 
Consigny’s interpretation of the pun on “cane” (narthekas),66 there is some reason to 
believe that Gorgias’s speech was at least persuasive enough to put certain political 
officials, like Chaerephon, on notice. After all, Philostratus reminds us that most 
Athenian officials during this period were extremely suspicious of the metis (cleverness) 
of sophists who could “defeat a just argument by an unjust and . . . [who] used their 
power to warp men’s judgment” (Lives 1.483). Sophists “skilled in tricking out a speech” 
(82 A 30) were probably intimidating to political officials for this very reason, and it 
would not be surprising in the least if Chaerephon were involved in the government’s 
decision to ban sophists from the Assembly and the law courts based on his encounters 
with Gorgias and other rhetors of the sophistic stripe. Adding credence to this possibility, 
there is also the well-documented friendship between Chaerephon and Socrates, a 
notoriously ruthless critic of the sophists’ persuasive abilities.67  
 Oddly, a similar fear of persuasive speech seems to have motivated the Athenians 
to bring Socrates himself before the courts for crimes against the State. In the Apology we 
                                                
66 Consigny believes that the cane (“reed,” in his translation) alludes to a familiar myth: “narthekas is the 
reed that the titan Prometheus used to carry fire to mankind, both providing them with the source of many 
crafts and rebelling against Zeus. Thus, in his pun Gorgias suggests that the source of crafts, and hence 
invention, is intimately related to the chastisement of insolent men who taunt or ridicule the master 
craftsman” (Gorgias 178). 
67 Cf. Plato’s Apology (21a). Also, NB that the Chaerephon who challenged Gorgias, the Chaerephon who 
was a member of the deme, and the Chaerephon who was Socrates’ friend may not have been one and the 
same. 
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learn that Socrates has been charged with manipulating discourse so as to “make the 
weaker argument defeat the stronger” (18b), which was a fairly typical criticism to mount 
against sophistic rhetoric in general.68 It therefore comes as a strange irony, perhaps, that 
concerning Gorgias’s ability to generate impromptu discourse on any subject, the most 
persuasive charges leveled against him might have been those so forcefully articulated by 
Socrates in Plato’s Gorgias.  
A common reading of the dialogue essentially finds that while Gorgias may have 
been able to discourse on any subject that an audience suggested, the issue of “being 
able” notwithstanding, since Gorgias’s use of logos does not hold to any universal 
standard of truth, his rhetoric circulates only opinion (doxa) and does not produce 
knowledge (epistêmê). In other words, with regard to the subjects of his discourse, 
Gorgias can only produce discourse that brings forth the appearance of knowledge, 
dissembling imitations of reality, perversions of the Forms, deceptions that do not have 
the power to reveal the first principles which condition Truth. Socrates thus finds 
Gorgias’s rhetoric to be irrational (alogon) since it undertakes persuasion without regard 
for the Good, and he relegates it to the status of a knack (tribe) as opposed to an art 
(technê) since it lacks clearly defined methods for achieving its ends (464e-465a). When 
Socrates pushes Gorgias to admit that the orator would be more convincing to an ignorant 
audience than would the expert, Socrates appears to land a crushing blow:  
Socrates:  So when the orator is more convincing than the doctor, what 
happens is that an ignorant person is more convincing than the 
                                                
68 Cf. Aristotle’s censure of Protagoras in the Rhetoric (1402a23-5). 
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expert before an equally ignorant audience. Is this what 
happens? 
Gorgias:  This is what happens in that case, no doubt. 
Socrates:  And the same will be true of the orator and oratory in relation to 
all other arts. The orator need have no knowledge of the truth 
about things; it is enough for him to have discovered a knack of 
persuading the ignorant that he seems to know more than the 
experts. 
Gorgias:  And isn’t it a great comfort, Socrates, never to be beaten by 
specialists in all the other arts without going to the trouble of 
acquiring more than this single one? (Hamilton 459b) 
Although scholars have pointed to this agôn as the moment when Gorgias and his 
rhetoric are exposed as predatory shams, Athenaeus remembers “that also Gorgias 
himself, having read the dialogue which bears his name, said to his friends, ‘How well 
Plato knows how to satirize!’” (Kennedy 82 A 15a). At the very least, this passage gives 
us reason to question the accuracy of Plato’s characterization of Gorgias—on the other 
hand, Plato also writes of something that we know to have been characteristic of Gorgias: 
notably, he “urged those inside the house to ask what anyone wanted and said he would 
answer all questions” (Kennedy 82 A 20). Since Plato and Gorgias were contemporaries, 
Plato must have known that Gorgias might one day read the dialogue bearing his name, 
and at least concerning the ability to generate impromptu discourse on any subject and 
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answer any questions, there seems to have been no effort on Plato’s part to deny that 
Gorgias was capable of doing so.   
 From this attempt to target passages in Aristotle, Philostratus, and Plato that serve 
to problematize the myth of a Gorgias who can discourse impromptu on any subject and 
who knows everything, we might take away the following: that on at least one occasion, 
Gorgias was “partly at a loss what to say;” that his metis may have allowed him to dodge 
difficult questions, such as those posed by Chaerephon; and that, if he was able to 
discourse on any subject and effectively persuade an audience, perhaps it was only the 
general ignorance of those in attendance that allowed him to do so. Whether Gorgias was 
able to persuade audiences of experts outside of political venues is not an issue treated by 
any existing fragments available to us today.69 More problematic still, there is no clear 
indication that any of his pupils were able to emulate what he did after studying with him. 
In short, while there is some evidence to suggest that Gorgias was able to generate 
impromptu discourse on any subject and that he was able to teach others to do so as well, 
without seeing more examples of the practice and without knowing more information 
about how it may have been learned, the case for bringing this aspect of early-sophistic 
pedagogy back into the fold remains tenuous, at best.  
Fortunately, something resembling Gorgias’s practice resurfaces early in the 
nineteenth century, and the schoolmaster responsible for popularizing it wrote a lengthy 
account of his classroom experiences, which includes a number of sample exercises and 
                                                
69 Although no evidence directly attests to this capacity, Aristotle’s discussion of On the Nonexistent in On 
Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias suggests that many experts took Gorgias’s philosophical inquiries 
seriously, even if engaging in critique while they did so. (I am thankful to Jeffrey Walker for pointing me to 
this passage in Aristotle’s text, which I had long ago forgotten.) 
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several compositions written by his students. Jean-Joseph Jacotot, in the manner of a 
Gorgias, famously claimed that he could teach his students to generate impromptu 
discourse on any subject, even subjects of which he himself was entirely ignorant. Owing 
to the contentious nature of this claim, several outside experts were invited to observe the 
improbable results of Jacotot’s method, and some even took it upon themselves to test his 
pedagogy. In the end, not all were convinced that Jacotot’s opinions about the nature of 
human intelligence were correct, but the results he was able to achieve with his students 
left little room for argument: by and large, the method worked.70 
 Our main source of knowledge about Jacotot comes from Rancière’s The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster. First published in 1981, the book was translated into English by Kristen 
Ross ten years later, and it continues to receive considerable attention from multiple 
disciplinary fields, though perhaps nowhere more so than in education and political 
philosophy, where a recent explosion in scholarship has occurred.71 While I will 
occasionally cite Ross’s translations of Rancière’s archival work, the argument I am 
advancing also will rely on Jacotot’s major work, Enseignement Universal: Langue 
Maternelle, and other expositions of his method, most of which were published during 
the nineteenth century.72 
                                                
70 See Hoffman (459), Payne (27; 46), Greene (201), Caboche (6). 
71 For example, the book is a lodestar for Bingham’s “Under the Name of Method,” Pelletier’s 
“Emancipation, Equality, and Education,” Ross’s “Rancière and the Practice of Equality,” and Bingham 
and Biesta’s Jacques Rancière: Education, Truth, Emancipation.  
72 Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Jacotot’s Langue and Louis Caboche’s “Discours” are 
original. I am extremely grateful to my father and grandmother for helping me with many of them. In the 
spirit of full disclosure, my father is a first-generation speaker, my grandmother a native and former teacher 
of the language—they both agreed, “Jacotot is not a very good writer.” As evidenced by the Forward to the 
first edition of Langue, Jacotot is aware that French speakers often take issue with his style: some who 
came to Leuven, he writes, “were surprised at my careless writing, and I don’t doubt that one could 
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The story of how Jacotot came to practice his pedagogy is nearly as compelling as 
the results it produced. Born in France late in the eighteenth century, Jacotot began his 
career as a professor of rhetoric at the University of Dijon and later went on to pursue a 
degree in law before he was called to serve as an artilleryman in the Republican Armies. 
Soon after his service, he became an instructor for the Bureau of Gunpowder, then was 
promoted to Secretary to the Minister of War, and finally was made Deputy Director of 
the Ecole Polytechnique. Upon his return to Dijon, Jacotot taught a variety of subjects, 
beginning with logic and the analysis of sensations and ideas (1795), then ancient 
languages (1796), transcendent mathematics (1803), law (1806), and finally pure 
mathematics (1809) (Perez, Jacotot).73  
Although he had been an esteemed lecturer for over thirty years, Jacotot was 
eventually forced to immigrate to the Netherlands, shortly after the Second Bourbon 
Restoration, as a consequence of his outspoken support for certain liberal ideas tied to the 
Napoleonic regime (Cornelius, An Account 25; Chisholm, “Jacotot”). Although he feared 
the worst of his new circumstances, he was humbled by the warm reception he received 
from the Flemings. “When I arrived in Belgium,” he writes, “I was touched” (Langue 
87); the government welcomed him as something of an intellectual refugee, offered him a 
place to stay, and gave him the chance to resume his profession. He soon began teaching 
                                                                                                                                            
improve on the slang that sometimes slips out. One might glean from this remark proof of the fallacy of the 
Method, wondering how a man who writes with so little elegance could give quality lessons. I won’t reply 
to this comment any more than to any other. If I ever work on the history of Universal Education, then I’ll 
try to improve my style. It’s a nice story, as are all stories where little passions are in play” (xi-xii). Cf. 
Plutarch’s Lives of the Ten Orators: “And being once asked how he [Isocrates], who was not very eloquent 
himself, could make others so, he answered, Just as a whetstone cannot cut, yet it will sharpen knives for 
that purpose” (IV 838).  
73 Cf. L’Huillier’s Omnibus de la Methode Jacotot (308). 
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privately at Mons and Brussels, whereupon he was able to start experimenting with a new 
pedagogical approach he had been developing in France before he was forced to emigrate 
(Catholic Encyclopedia). He worked for free, mostly with the poor, and the results he 
was able to achieve with both children and adults eventually drew the attention of the 
king, who granted him a lectureship to teach French language and literature courses at the 
University of Leuven in 1818 (Cornelius 25).  
 Although Jacotot spoke no Flemish and most of his students did not speak a word 
of French, according to multiple sources, in only a few short months Jacotot’s students at 
the university not only learned to read and write the language, but they were able to 
improvise discourses, completely off-the-cuff, on any subjects he suggested.74 These 
initial results prompted Jacotot to try other iterations of his intellectual experiment by 
offering courses on subjects about which he knew absolutely nothing: notably, on 
painting, piano and design (Langue 87). Within a few years, his complete method, which 
he named “Universal Education,” was adopted by institutions in “Brussels, Antwerp, 
Louvain, and other cities” in Belgium (Barnard 263). By 1826, writes Benjamin Franklin, 
Jr., Jacotot had become the subject of international attention, and “in 1828 his method 
was spread through France” (Principles of Jacotot 123). Jacotot’s method was also 
proposed, modified to include religious instruction,75 and ultimately adopted by schools 
in Italy and England (Payne viii). Throughout the 1830s, its merits were debated across 
                                                
74 Cornelius (36-37), Payne (42; 45), Tourrier (65). 
75 The addition of moral training to Jacotot’s pedagogy basically amounted to what became known as the 
Pestalozzi method, which enjoyed enormous popularity throughout the nineteenth century. For more on 
Pestalozzi’s method, see the introduction in Cornelius. 
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Ireland, Germany, and Russia.76 Incredibly, at one point Universal Education even 
managed to find its way across the pond. In 1837, Louis Caboche, director of the Jacotot 
Institution for young men in New Orleans, delivered a speech at the Bellanger Institution 
in praise of the rapid progress his students had made by following Jacotot’s method 
(“Discours” 23). Even as late as 1897, “the educational doctrines and practices of Jacotot 
were [being] discussed . . . at [an] institute of the Houston city teachers,” (Texas School 
Journal 154). Eleven topics of conversation were proposed at this institute, one of which 
asked teachers to “state what ideas of Jacotot should be emphasized in the Houston 
schools,” another of which was asked them to propose “the most vital and commendable 
principle of Jacotot’s system” and to then “give a concrete illustration from your own 
schoolroom, showing that you yourself believe this principle is true, and that you 
manifest your theory by your practice” (154). 
As to whether outside experts were actually persuaded by the results of Universal 
Education, reports made to the British government, to British academics and the wider 
public, to Prince Frederick of Orange, to the American Institute of Instruction, and in fact 
the bulk of all reports made by those who visited Jacotot’s classes at Leuven were in full 
agreement: the discourses composed by these students were first-rate compositions, often 
rivaling those produced by the best scholars of their respective fields.77 Not surprisingly, 
many of these experts admitted that had they not witnessed these provocative displays for 
                                                
76 For evidence of the debate in Ireland, see L’Huillier’s Omnibus de la Methode Jacotot. For Germany and 
Russia, see Chisholm. 
77 Reports to the British government were made by John Tourrier, celebrated author of numerous works on 
education, to British academics and the wider public by B. Cornelius, Principal of the Pestalozzian School 
at Epsom, to Prince Frederick of Orange by his educational commissioner, and to the American Institute of 
Instruction by George Washington Greene. 
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themselves, they would hardly have believed them possible. One particularly vivid 
example will, I think, suffice to capture the general impressions they left: in Lettre à ses 
amis au sujet de la methode de M. Jacotot, Baptiste Froussard, a French school director 
and member of the Society of Teaching Methods, describes his experience visiting one of 
Jacotot’s classes. He watched as students wrote impromptu themes on “morals and 
metaphysics” and improvised musical themes around fragments of French poetry. It is 
worth noting that both the activities of writing and playing music as well as the subjects 
discoursed upon were selected by Froussard himself, and in his estimation, “all were 
performed with admirable facility and talent;” however, he was most impressed when 
Jacotot said to his students “you will now write me a composition on art in general, 
connecting your words, your expressions, your thoughts, to such and such passages from 
the assigned authors in a way that lets you justify or verify everything” (Rancière 42). 
“After a half hour, a new astonishment came over [Froussard] when he heard the quality 
of the compositions just written beneath his nose, and the improvised commentaries that 
justified them,” one of which “was comparable, in his opinion, to the most brilliant 
literary lesson he had ever heard” (Rancière 43).78  
Word of Jacotot’s results spread quickly throughout Leuven, and students from all 
walks were soon abandoning their regular courses to attend those taught by the self-
proclaimed Founder of Universal Education. As one might imagine, this mass exodus 
eventually provoked the ire of university officials. Why, they must have been asking 
                                                
78 There is, obviously, some French hyperbole at play here, but actual examples of discourses composed by 
Jacotot’s students, written in several different languages, can be found throughout Langue. Readers are thus 
at liberty to make their own evaluations. See also the compositions written by Cornelius’s students (61-66) 
and Tourrier’s students (34-60).  
 142 
themselves, were these students deserting the experts “in favor of coming, evenings, to 
crowd into a much too small room, lit by only two candles, in order to hear: ‘I must teach 
you that I have nothing to teach you’” (Rancière 15)? Making matters worse (or better, 
depending on one’s perspective), Jacotot repeatedly says that he “will not respond to any 
criticisms” about his method; instead, he implores “those who try the Universal 
Education Method to enrich their pedagogy with what they find valuable. You will have a 
set of experiences whose merit is justified by the results. As for myself,” he insists, “I can 
only guaranty the process that I am going to describe” (Langue vii; emphasis added).  
METHOD 
On the one hand, writes Cornelius, there is nothing particularly novel about 
Jacotot’s method or it guiding principles “but the garb in which they are presented to our 
notice” (42). Scholars of the period seem to have been in agreement that Universal 
Education was essentially a pastiche of well-known exercises related to repetition and the 
association of ideas. The former, for example, had been emphasized by both ancients and 
moderns, as evidenced by the fact that “Demosthenes wrote out the Greek History of 
Thucydides eight times,—that Racine committed to memory, and repeated very often, the 
entire works of Euripides . . . [that] Porson, in early life, was accustomed to repeat the 
same Greek verses over and over again a great many times, and he attributed to this 
practice the wonderful facility of reference which he ever afterwards possessed” (Payne 
48; 25-26). Likewise, the association of ideas has roots in Aristotle’s On Memory and 
Reminiscence, which of course later became an epistemological emphasis for British 
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empiricists like Hume, Hobbes, and Locke. Still, proponents of Jacotot’s method insist 
that it is anything but a pedestrian regurgitation: “M. Jacotot is an inventor,” explains 
Joseph Ray, “for though each of his particular principles has been recommended and 
applied by others before him, no person has done it with so much rigour and sagacity—
no person, especially, has grouped them all so skillfully and so rationally” (qtd. in 
Cornelius 43).79  
On the other hand, owing to the manner in which Universal Education trains 
people (i.e., by not teaching them anything), it is difficult to conceive of Jacotot’s method 
as pedagogy, at least according to the commonly understood meaning of the word today. 
If we say that Jacotot “teaches” according to his “method,” writes Dr. J. A. G. Hoffman, 
“the expression must be taken in a different sense, since Jacotot strictly speaking does not 
teach, but rouses the faculties of the pupil, sets them in motion, so as to enable the pupil 
to teach himself” (The Monthly Review 456). And in fact the same problem arises when 
one attempts to conceive of Jacotot’s method as a method. Since everything depends on 
how students teach themselves, it is neither possible to discern a necessary progression of 
activities nor to locate a generally agreed upon criteria for evaluation. Jacotot’s son, who 
helped found a journal in appreciation of his father’s work, takes an extreme position on 
the matter: “All eyes were struck by [the initial] results,” he writes, “and even many of 
                                                
79 Cf. Payne, who writes, “Jacotot does, not assume the novelty of any one of the principles which operate 
in his system; he merely contends, that he has shown the conformity of them to the system of nature, and 
brought them together, so as to form a united whole” (19 note). Caboche similarly admits, “These 
principles, as we have commented on them, are not new; they have been declared by all those who have 
studied man and nature. Do you have to conclude that M. Jacotot doesn’t get credit for the method’s 
discovery? That would be like denying Newton the glory of having discovered gravity, because the ancient 
philosophers had a suspicion. A theory belongs to he who demonstrates it; it’s the application that gives a 
discovery merit” (18). 
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the savans condescended to admire them; but no one comprehended the method, no 
person saw, in fact, that there was no method at all” (qtd. in Cornelius 26). To be fair, the 
principles and exercises that appear throughout Langue seem to suggest otherwise, as 
does the fact that Jacotot continually refers to Universal Education as a method. But in 
truth, his son’s enigmatic statement amounts to this: everyone knows that Jacotot uses 
exercises predicated upon certain principles to train his students, but he does not tell them 
how to produce the links they make between what is unknown and what is known 
already, precisely because each can do so without recourse to his explications. In other 
words, while it is necessary to link, it would be foolish to privilege Jacotot’s way of 
making links at the expense of other ways of making them, since no method can finally 
account for all of the possible links that will have been made.  
If we compare these reflections on Jacotot’s method (or the apparent lack thereof) 
to Consigny’s reflections on Gorgianic pedagogy, the parallels are striking: “Gorgias’ art 
of rhetoric is not a ‘method,’ a meta-hodos, a procedure that involves following a set of 
rules that enables a rhetor to grasp a previously existing truth,” he explains; moreover, 
“Gorgias does not attempt to provide his students with a systematic method, or fixed set 
of rules for pursuing objective truth. For in Gorgias’ conception of inquiry, any such 
system would be misguided and counterproductive” (86; 198; emphasis added). Since 
Consigny endeavors to read Gorgias as an anti-foundationalist, he basically argues that in 
Gorgias’s panhellenic conception of inquiry, there is no objective, previously existing 
truth to which any method has privileged access. Instead, contingent truths are produced 
by way of communally sanctioned agônes, and any contingent truth is liable to be 
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unseated by another contingent truth should the acknowledged judges of an agôn find the 
challenging truth to be more persuasive than the incumbent. Thus, there is no “method,” 
strictly speaking, because contingent truths cannot be known in advance of their actual 
production, that is, separate from the contexts in which they are produced, and since 
contexts do not remain static, no method can systematically account for all of the 
unforeseen contingencies that inevitably contribute to the production of a truth.  
Whether one cares to read Gorgias as Consigny does, his reflections generally 
accord with what little we do know of Gorgias’s teaching, most of which is based on the 
account given by Aristotle in his Sophistical Refutations (184b35). At bottom, there were 
apparently only a few key procedures involved. Like many of the sophists, notes Jaroen 
Bons, “[Gorgias’s] teaching probably was conducted in the form of demonstrations: he 
presented a model speech to his pupils for them to observe, memorize, study and imitate” 
(40).80 Aristotle, picking up on Plato’s critique in the Gorgias, argues that this kind of 
teaching “was quick but unscientific. For [these teachers] thought they were teaching, 
although presenting, not art, but the results of art, just as if someone claimed to present a 
science to prevent feet from hurting and then did not teach shoemaking, nor where it was 
possible to get such things, but offered many kinds of shoes of all sorts” (183b36). As 
will become clear shortly, Aristotle’s analogy is fitting; however, according to the Jacotot 
method, if Gorgias did not explain the principles behind “shoe-making,” the absence of 
these explications does not necessarily diminish the educational value of offering 
students shoes for study. Shoes too can be models to observe, memorize, study, and 
                                                
80 Cf. Guthrie (192). 
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imitate. In fact, anything can, and it was this very insight into learning that enabled 
Jacotot to overcome the seemingly intractable problem he faced when he first arrived in 
Belgium; namely, he and his students did not share a common language.  
Understandably, Jacotot felt that without the ability to explicate French literature 
using his own language, he would be unable to communicate to these students his expert 
knowledge of the subject—neither could anything of value be taught, he believed, nor 
could anything of value be learned. In light of these circumstances, he was left with no 
choice but to forego explaining anything. Still, because something had to be learned, it 
occurred to Jacotot to begin with something he and his students could link to, a model 
text, or, as he would later call it, an epitome capable of entertaining any number of 
possible links. Incidentally, this “beginning” spawned a principle of Universal Education: 
“YOU HAVE TO LEARN SOMETHING” (Caboche 8). Since the thing to be learned was 
French, Jacotot selected an edition of François Fénelon’s The Adventures of Telemachus 
with interlinear translations. He then asked his students to learn the language (as well as 
the literature, though this was not his initial aim) by paying close attention to him as he 
slowly recited from the book, by repeating what had been said until it was burned into 
memory, and by comparing the French signs and sounds with their Flemish translations, 
carefully noting any differences and similarities they might observe. He began with only 
a word, “Calypso.” When he was sure his students knew that single word—what it looked 
like, how it sounded, where it could be found on the page, what it was composed of and 
how it differed from or was similar to other words—he added a phrase, “Calypso could 
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not,” then a sentence, “Calypso not console herself at the departure of Ulysses,” a 
paragraph, a page, and so on.  
From these initial activities were derived two additional principles of the method: 
“YOU HAVE TO REPEAT . . . [and] YOU HAVE TO COMPARE” (Caboche 11; 12). According 
to Jacotot, the purpose of repetition is to ensure retention, for in his view, “one isn’t 
knowledgeable because one learns; one is knowledgeable only when one retains” (xi). 
Payne extends this view, going so far as to say “to forget, is the same as never to have 
learned” (25), a statement with which Jacotot would undoubtedly have agreed. “The old 
method,” he writes, “errs above all by the failure of repetition. There, as for us, you 
exercise memory, but only repeating by coincidence; repetition happens without the 
student being aware; if the books change, he would see from time to time what he saw 
before, but he wouldn’t recognize it in the long run” (qtd. in Caboche 11). Coboche 
plainly explains, “[repetition is] not just for the purpose of keeping you from forgetting, 
but more so to help see better and more; because in a work, whatever it may be, one has 
never seen everything” (12). In effect, each time students go back to their epitome they 
are able to observe new things in the same text. Whatever the “text” happens to be, 
Jacotot’s method emphasizes repeating what has been seen so that it can be compared 
with what will have been seen. Following these repetitions, to verify that his students had 
retained what they claimed to have learned, on occasion Jacotot would open the epitome 
and select a sentence at random. After he uttered the first few words, his pupils were 
expected to complete the rest of the sentence, paragraph, or page.  
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Jacotot admits that the task of memorizing an entire epitome can be exceptionally 
grueling, but in the service of confidently knowing something, he insists upon it. “The 
difficulty of the language, the lack of expressions, the deceptive recollections of memory: 
these are the obstacles to be overcome,” he writes (45).81 After his own experiments with 
Jacotot’s method, Payne remarks, “It is confessed that the [exercise of memorizing] is 
tedious and wearisome, and great care is required on the part of the teacher to prevent it 
from becoming repulsive and disgusting to the pupil;” however, he continues, “when the 
pupil has riveted it firmly in his mind, the most irksome part of his task is accomplished; 
he will view the rest as a mere pastime” (26; 64).82 Presumably, “the rest” Payne is 
referring to deals with the act of comparing, where the purpose is “to discover 
resemblances and differences” that contribute to an accounting or work to generate 
discourse (12). As a child of the Enlightenment, Jacotot was of opinion that “man is a 
reasoning creature, skilled because of his ability to grasp relationships,” which is why, 
throughout Langue, he advises students to “Learn a book, and link all the others to it;” if 
you do that, he says, “you are following the Method of Universal Education” (Langue vii; 
x; emphasis added). Tourrier remarks on the unconscious application of this method by 
artists:  
                                                
81 Regarding the difficulty involved in training memory, Philostratus recalls a rather humorous scene 
involving the sophist Polemo; “when the consul was putting to the torture a bandit who had been convicted 
on several charges, and declared that he could not think of any penalty for him that would match his crimes, 
Polemo who was present said: ‘Order him to learn by heart some antiquated stuff.’ For though this sophist 
had learned by heart a great number of passages, he nevertheless considered that this is the most wearisome 
of all exercises” (1.541). 
82 The idea of generating discourse as a “pastime” can be compared to the ending of Gorgias’s Encomium 
of Helen: “I wished to write a speech which would be a praise of Helen,” says Gorgias, “and a diversion to 
myself” (Kennedy 82 B 11 21; emphasis added). Cf. Hoffman (462). 
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The better sort have learned something well, and referred everything to it. 
They observed, compared, imitated, rectified, and imitated again; for such 
is the method of Jacotot—a method which has existed ever since the world 
began, and which alone has made great men. Homer, Æsop, Phidias, 
Apelles, Virgil, Plutarch, Tacitus, Shakespeare, Fenelon, La Fontaine, 
Pascal, Labruyere, Voltaire, Rousseau—all who are great in literature, 
arts, and sciences, followed Jacotot’s method unaware. Kant, Locke, and 
others, recommended this method long before Jacotot existed; but Jacotot 
gave it a fair trial, and brought it within the reach of all capacities. (81-82) 
Jacotot believes that learning something and referring everything else to it is the “natural 
method” by which all people are able to acquire a mother tongue (hence, the sub-title of 
his book), and as Cornelius explains, Jacotot considers this method of learning to be 
“universal” because he feels “the same principles are applicable to the acquirement of 
every other language and division of knowledge” (45). So, learn something by paying 
close attention, repeat what you have learned, and refer everything unknown to what is 
known already by making comparisons—that’s the whole method. 
Strangely, while parts of Jacotot’s method have been linked to previous methods 
of education, famous names and well-known theoretical concepts, no one has thought to 
identify its closest pedagogical analogue in early-sophistic rhetorical training. In all 
likelihood, this is because anyone who reads Jacotot will have seen that he basically 
rejects the possibility of any relationship between his method and rhetoric, repeating, on 
multiple occasions, “rhetoric and reason have nothing in common.” Admittedly, this can 
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be true of rhetoric when it is misrecognized as that which produces sense; nevertheless, 
as I have found, the principles of Universal Education appear, almost verbatim, in the 
sophistic rhetorical pedagogy of the Dissoi Logoi: 
This is the first step: if you focus your attention, your mind, making 
progress by this means, will perceive more. The second step is to practice 
whatever you hear: If you hear the same things many times and repeat 
them, what you have learned presents itself to your memory as a connected 
whole. The third step is: whenever you hear something, connect it with 
what you know already. (Sprague 90 IX, 2-4; my emphasis) 
Caboche also remarks on the importance of this “third step” in Condillac’s theory, further 
clarifying the relationship between “comparing” in the Jacotot method and “connecting” 
in the Dissoi Logoi:  
In every type of study, you have to go, says Condillac, from the known to 
the unknown. This axiom, which is on everyone’s lips, and which maybe 
isn’t more understood because of that, either is meaningless, or it means 
one must compare; which is to say, one must search to see, to recall what 
one knows within what one wants to learn; in other words, it’s by this 
means of looking at the known, that one makes his way into that which is 
unknown” (13).  
But why, one might ask, should students have to “[make their] way into that which is 
unknown” by first repeating the thing to be learned until it has been committed to 
memory? Why not first study the basic rules and foundational principles of a subject and 
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then put these into practice, as is more commonly done when we are learning something 
new? In other words, why begin with shoes?  
Perhaps more so than any other, this question is of serious philosophical import 
for Jacotot. In the following passages, Caboche aptly characterizes the general 
conclusions reiterated throughout Langue Maternelle:  
[You have to learn something.] Since man knows nothing at birth, 
and since he can’t know anything he hasn’t learned, this principle is 
irrefutable, and no one challenges it. 
But, what do you have to learn first? Is it necessary, like in the 
ancient methods, to begin with axioms, doctrines, definitions, such that 
you can recite the principles? But these axioms, doctrines, definitions 
being only the consequence and the general result of scientific 
observation, begun by studying the observations of others, are clearly from 
a different approach than theirs, it’s beginning from where they finished, 
it’s walking backwards and against what is natural. 
And because it follows, and rightly so, that one can’t understand 
these kinds of thoughts without understanding the fundamental facts at 
their base, M. Jacotot requires that a student first see these facts, to break 
them down, such that he can scrutinize them and become aware of them 
himself. 
It is thus that nature teaches us to speak without studying syntax 
and grammatical structure; it’s thus that she trains our thinking, without 
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explaining how one thinks; it’s thus that she teaches us to make 
calculations without studying obscure theorems. (8-9; emphasis added)   
In other words, Jacotot’s method operates on the presupposition that all intelligences are 
equally capable of learning facts—for example, according to Jacotot, “Calypso could not 
console herself at the departure of Ulysses” is a fact of the epitome—and having learned 
some facts, intelligences are able to know other things by referring to facts that are 
known already. Because Jacotot was limited to only the observable facts that were 
present in the epitome, instead of explaining the text to his students, drawing out the 
important connections for them, all he could do was verify that they were exercising their 
intelligences, that they were learning something, repeating it, and making comparisons.83 
Payne offers an example of how an introductory verification, based on the first sentence 
of the Telemachus,84 might be carried out: 
Taking then the first sentence— 
The grief of Calypso for the departure of Ulysses would admit of no 
comfort— 
The teacher asks—Who was gone? 
The pupil answers—Ulysses. 
Q. Who was grieved? 
A. Calypso. 
Q. Who were Calypso and Ulysses? 
A. I do not know. (The pupil is supposed to know nothing of the 
characters, but what he can obtain from an attentive examination of every 
word which relates to them in his book.) 
                                                
83 Walker suggests an analog with the ancient Greek paidagogos—not a “teacher” but a supervisor of a 
student’s learning.  
84 N.B. Payne has slightly altered the popular Hawkesworth translation of the Telemachus, which he claims 
is “too diffuse” (29). As the more literal translation of the French text would be “Calypso could not console 
herself at the departure of Ulysses,” one might question to what degree the facts of the epitome are affected 
by an ornamented translation. Following Jacotot’s lead, we might conclude that since one always sees 
something different in the repetition, the precise nature of the content is of less importance than learning it, 
repeating it, and referring everything else to it.    
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Q. What was the cause of Calypso’s grief? 
A. The departure of Ulysses. 
Q. Did Calypso love Ulysses? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How do you know that? 
A. Because her grief for his departure would admit of no comfort. (29-30) 
Upon verification, if students did not know the facts they said they knew, if they were 
unable to answer for their responses or justify them by referring to the facts contained in 
the epitome, Jacotot believed this inability was not due to a deficiency in intellect but to 
inattention, that it was a matter of being distracted.85 In other words, attention, the first 
step in the Dissoi Logoi and in Jacotot’s method as well, becomes the precondition for all 
learning—if teachers are to be of any value to their students, believes Jacotot, their only 
purpose is to verify that each intelligence is operating with as much attention as possible.   
Jacotot thus recommends that all students of his method should be made to speak 
from the first day of training and answer all questions about the facts they say they have 
learned. During these verifications, writes Payne, “The pupil is never to be assisted, 
except in what is introduced to his notice for the first time.86 That which he has already 
learned, he is expected to recognise wherever he may meet with it. It is he, and not the 
master, who is to make remarks, and discover relations of difference and similarity” (12). 
By foregoing explications and putting the onus of discovering links on the student, Payne 
continues, whether a pupil is “given an ode, a sonnet, an oration, &. &. . . . he is required 
to determine from the production itself the rules of art according to which it is 
                                                
85 Cf. Tourrier (33) 
86 Cornelius clarifies, the pupil “is requested by the teacher to observe and listen attentively while he points 
out the conventional signs, which being arbitrary could not be discovered by the pupil himself” (59).  
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constructed, and whatever be the subject, he learns to describe it in the common language 
with which he is acquainted by his previous training” (45).87 According to the method, 
the supreme benefit of this process is that once students become actively engaged in 
discovering relationships on their own, they will have acquired the ability to generate 
observations, or make links, that they can stand behind, since people are always more 
likely to value an observation if they actually undergo the experience of having made it 
for themselves. This also helps us to understand why, as Cornelius remarks in the 
introduction to his book, Jacotot does not “[furnish] us with a scientific exposition” of his 
method (1).88 Instead, Universal Education advises us to make the experiment, so that we 
are in a position to verify the results for ourselves.    
Although Jacotot does not make the following link because it offends his rather 
militant position on rhetoric, it is possible to conceive of verification as a test of 
persuasion. One is persuaded that a person knows something when one is able to ask any 
question about a discourse that has been made and is satisfied with the justifications that 
are provided in support of it, the better sort being based on observations that refer to 
known facts more and received doxa less. In many ways, this would explain why Gorgias 
both “urged those inside the house to ask what anyone wanted and said he would answer 
                                                
87 Cf. Jacotot’s explanation in Langue, which is more obscure but basically accords with Payne: “Art is just 
a copy of nature,” he writes, “and a single fact, even though it’s never a question of having done what we 
did, what everyone does, you still have to learn by repeated exercise and focused attention so as to break 
down and burn each piece in our memory, the model of which is the thought that the simplest of men 
luckily provides” (25).  
88 Cf. Caboche: “Jacotot’s writings aren’t so much designed to convince the reader—he doesn’t have a 
methodic outline, divided into sections, with chapters and paragraphs, with interspersed exercises and their 
answers” (5; emphasis added). Caboche’s take is probably accurate, considering Jacotot’s introductory 
remarks in Langue include the following statement: “Almost all . . . who have come to Leuven to confer 
with me seemed surprised at my Method. I don’t dare flatter myself that I convinced a one of them, but I 
might have persuaded several” (xi; emphasis added). 
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all questions” (Kennedy 82 A 20; emphasis added). We can imagine that each time 
Gorgias or any of the early sophists endeavored to “make the weaker argument defeat the 
stronger,” a good deal of the persuasive legwork would have involved justifying the 
reasoning, the logic, the logos for making such an argument. Since the new line of 
argument would have been somewhat novel and therefore unfamiliar to the audience, the 
more Gorgias could answer questions by presupposing known facts, facts the anyone was 
capable of observing (even if they did not), the more persuasive his arguments would 
have become. This, according to Condillac, is how one skillfully moves from the known 
to the unknown: “If you want to make me conceive ideas which I have not, you must 
teach me by the ideas which I have. What I know is the beginning of every thing I do not 
know, and of every thing which it is possible to learn; and if there is a method of giving 
me new knowledge, it can only be that method which has already given me some” (Logic 
23).  
As previously stated, Jacotot attempts to apply this “natural” method of teaching 
to a number of training exercises. According to his disciples, some are more successful 
than others, but the purpose is always the same: move from the known to the unknown by 
going back again. Interestingly, the order of Jacotot’s exercises and even the exercises 
themselves sometimes change depending on the who is summarizing them, just as they 
often do in the ancient iterations of the progymnasmata (preliminary exercises).89 Jacotot 
himself believes that “varying the exercises and changing their order” is basically 
                                                
89 For example, see the summaries by Aphthonius, Theon, Hermogenes, and Nicholas the Sophist in 
Kennedy’s Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric, and compare them with 
the summaries by Payne (39) and Tourrier (72).  
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unimportant (Langue x)—all that matters is that one learn something, repeat it, and then 
refer everything else to it. A full exposition of the exercises articulated in Langue is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, but for the purpose of learning to speak on any subject, 
three exercises in particular stand out. The first is imitation, which is of course also a 
staple of the progymnasmata following the memorization of a fable:  
“In writing an imitation, the student applies the terms which express a 
general sentiment by means of special facts to the development of the 
same sentiment under different circumstances. Thus, Calypso regretted the 
departure of Ulysses, and Philoctetes, in the fifteenth book, regretted his 
perjury, in betraying the secret of the burial place of Hercules. Inasmuch, 
then, as the same sentiment is exhibited in the two instances, so will the 
general terms of expression be the same, or very similar. The 
circumstances alone entirely differ . . . [thus,] all the points of distinction 
in the two cases must be noticed, while those only are to be preserved in 
the composition, which belong to the subject of the imitation” (Payne 39-
40).  
Just as in the progymnasmata, exercises in imitation prepare a student to begin 
substituting expressions, phrases, and synonyms, and these comparative activities lead to 
the exercise of translation.90 Rather than dealing strictly in comparisons, translation also 
generalizes about known facts. The basic idea, according to Payne, is that “the regret of 
                                                
90 B. Cornelius refers to this exercise as traduction, and insists that “By the term Traduction you are not to 
understand merely what is implied by the word translation, but a sort of generalising imitation” (34). 
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Calypso, stripped of the accessory circumstances, must resemble, in certain points, all 
regrets whatever. Hence, [a subject like] the regrets of the victim of ambition, may be 
modeled on the regret of Calypso, and . . . every passage in the [epitome] may furnish 
materials for [this translation], and by the combination of passages, one with another, the 
resources become positively inexhaustible” (44).9192 Once students have learned to 
extract from known facts the sorts of general sentiments that can be applied to other 
subjects, they are in a good position to begin exercises in improvisation. As Cornelius 
points out, improvisation “is not to be understood according to our ordinary interpretation 
of the term, that of extemporaneous versification, but as the exercise of writing themes, 
and pronouncing oral discourses, off-hand on any given subject” (36). At this point, the 
difference between the two activities has, I think, been reasonably established, but a few 
specifics related to improvisation deserve further attention, since they are intimately 
related to the purpose of learning to discourse on any subject.  
PURPOSE 
According to Jacotot, there are three essential rules for improvising: first, “learn 
to get a hold of yourself;” second, “don’t get intimidated by the shouting [from the 
audience];” and third, whenever improvising, “start, keep going, and finish” (184; 186; 
192). The first rule is a reminder to compare. Unfortunately, at the outset of improvising 
discourse, anxiety and palpitations of the heart often overtake us. We freeze up and 
                                                
91 Cf. Langue (52). 
92 For examples of translations composed by students, see Cornelius (34-35). For a list of possible 
translation exercises related to the Telemachus, see Jacotot (83-84). 
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become embarrassed; everything shuts down, and we lose our ability to reason. Lacking a 
sense of self-possession, we forget to compare, which is another way of saying we forget 
to remember what we know, and improvisation stalls or never even gets off the ground. 
The second rule is a reminder to remain calm in the midst of distractions. While making 
observations on a subject, the discourser must resist being carried away by the sentiments 
of the audience, whether they sound of applause or censure; in other words, attention is 
required to improvise well. Finally, the third rule is a reminder to speak. When people say 
they cannot improvise discourse, it is often an indication that they are simply not willing 
to risk failure. They will not put aside their vanity and their pride to make the experiment. 
“You are ashamed, you live in fear of saying something wrong,” observes Jacotot, “but 
are we convinced that you can speak? You had promised me that you would have the 
courage to speak even if you would speak badly” (193). Payne explains that a student “is 
not allowed to say, he cannot do what he is told to do, for he soon finds that if he will try, 
he can overcome what at first he may have considered an insuperable difficulty. And if he 
once succeeds, why not again? and why not always?” (13). The third rule therefore 
encompasses all three: start by getting ahold of your physical and emotional responses so 
that you can remember to make comparisons; keep going regardless of how the audience 
reacts such that you remain calm throughout the entirety of your discourse and can see 
more; finally, finish whether or not you fail, for “if you don’t have the courage to speak 
badly, you will never learn to speak well” (Jacotot 193).  
Clearly, in light of these rules for improvisation, the purpose of learning to 
generate persuasive discourse on any subject is not reducible to winning the approbations 
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of an audience (though it appears that if one follows Jacotot’s method, one may very well 
end up doing so). If anything, the purpose is to overcome the fear of not being able to 
generate skillful links in a given situation. By regularly entering into agônes without 
foreknowledge of the subject to be discoursed upon, one learns to overcome this fear by 
remembering what has been seen (the known) and comparing it to what will have been 
seen (the unknown). In other words, by presupposing that each of the individual logoi 
that constitute any subject are comparable to motives, beliefs, arguments, ideas, or 
practices that one knows already, one recognizes that all discourses are equally available 
for linking. Jacotot acknowledges this, but his distrust of rhetoric prevents him from 
making the one observation that most closely aligns Universal Education with early-
sophistic pedagogy: skillfully linking to the unknown by presupposing the known is 
nothing other than the art of antilogy, an art that discovers “such a thing as you have 
never yet heard of” by presupposing what has been heard already.  
CONCLUSION 
Jacotot, as many have confirmed, was able to teach his students French, painting, 
piano and design without explaining anything; instead, his students learned to presuppose 
that they were equally capable of understanding the basic facts in any human creation (a 
book, a painting, a piece of music, a building, and so on) if they only paid close enough 
attention to them, repeated what they saw or heard, and observed the similarities and 
differences between what was unknown and what was known already. By presupposing 
this sort of equality, they were able to train themselves to learn what they did not know 
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without being told what they needed to know, bucking nearly every traditional 
pedagogical supposition about how a legitimate knowledge of a subject is acquired. The 
notion that a student’s inability to learn is a reflection of distraction also represents a 
fairly significant departure from pedagogies that emphasize the need for training or 
practice but argue that not all students are equally capable or teachable. In fact, these 
sorts of conclusions are entirely at odds with Jacotot’s most strident opinion, which is 
that “all people have equal intelligence” (viii), even if not all people choose to exercise 
their intelligence equally. While Jacotot freely admits his opinion is disputable—since it 
is, after all, an opinion and not a fact—he remains steadfast in his belief that the equality 
of intelligence ultimately enables speaking beings to discourse persuasively on any 
subject. 
If we link Jacotot’s opinion on the equality of intelligence to Gorgias’s 
performative utterance, it is possible to conclude that when he invites his audience to 
“suggest a subject,” the speech act institutes a concept of equality that democratizes 
intelligence93—in the manner of Jacotot, Gorgias presupposes that one can always move 
from the known to the unknown, since all intelligences are equally capable of remarking 
on differences and similarities between what is unknown and what is known already, of 
connecting the unknown subject to known facts. This helps us to understand why there is 
                                                
93 Walker points out a parallel idea in Plato’s Protagoras: i.e., Protagoras’ argument in his  “Great Speech” 
for the distribution of justice and civic virtue to all persons. I find the connection persuasive, especially as it 
concerns deliberative matters that pertain to the establishment and maintenance of a democratic state. But 
Protagoras also argues that this distribution does not apply to the arts. This may have been the opinion of 
Gorgias (though I find it unlikely, given his purported willingness to enter agônes with acknowledged 
experts of different arts), but it does not seem to have been the opinion of Jacotot, who found arts like 
painting, piano and design equally accessible to all.  
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no essential method or strict order of exercises given for learning to discourse impromptu 
on any subject, and, at least theoretically, why anyone can learn do it. Just as there is no 
privileged method for producing truths, there is no privileged method for making links to 
contingent truths. Each situation will be different, and each intelligence engaged in an 
agôn will exercise itself differently when it links to the unknown. Indeed, as John 
Poulakos points out, Gorgias demonstrates this movement from the known to the 
unknown in the Helen, making it perhaps an exemplary epitome for his students to learn 
and then refer to when called upon to address other subjects.  
If educators feel compelled to account for this technê, the best thing they can do, I 
think, especially in higher education, is to propose the unfamiliar, the impossible, the 
intractable, and leave it up to students to discover what wants to be said. This exercise 
would be tantamount to a rhetorical kobayashi-maru, if you will, that tests one’s ability to 
remain composed in the face of unfamiliar subjects and encourages creative solutions to 
what seem like intractable problems. In other words, the technê would provoke students 
to make links that add another logos to a given discourse. Evaluation in terms of set 
expectations would be futile in these situations because the new logos always will have 
been one that is unexpected or unaccounted for in the discourse. Verification, on the other 
hand, would be invaluable. Educators could verify that students are researching and 
seeking, that they are paying attention to a subject and making persuasive comparisons. 
In this way, educators would cease to maintain an intellectual distance from those whom 
they teach, since they would understand that their explications are not the royal road to 
learning, that students can learn algebra and physics, how to speak, read, write, paint, 
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play music, and even make shoes by training themselves to link to those subjects. That 
said, I think it would be difficult to recommend this pedagogy for widespread 
institutional adoption. In the end, it is simply too easy to dismiss it as pedagogy because 
there appears to be no method before the effects of the method, and for this reason, the 
idea of specialization becomes a difficult sell. This also might explain why Jacotot’s 
pedagogy vanished with the rise of modern university at the turn of the twentieth century.  
While the modern university may never ultimately embrace the educational 
practices of Gorgias and Jacotot, that doesn’t necessarily mean they are going anywhere. 
In fact, my hunch is that they will continue to reiterate a form of democracy that does not 
depend on institutional assimilation. In no way do I wish to suggest that this rhetorical 
technê automatically creates events of democracy—that would be an absurd return to the 
kind of guarantee most pedagogies are prone to making. According to the counter-
narrative, the technê itself is an event of democracy. It covertly challenges and creatively 
unsettles an anti-intellectual ideology by disidentifying with the mystery of mastery on 
every dominant point of academic identification. It changes what get counted in 
educational discourse by demonstrating measurable results that are impossible to achieve, 
a method that is not a method, and a purpose that calls into question our own. In the 
pages that remain, my intention is to marshal evidence that will suggest this technê is 





Chapter Four: Digital Signs 
 
The experiments conducted in chapters II and III were designed to test the logos 
of the counter-narrative by examining rhetorical patterns in Gorgias’s Palamêdês and in 
Jacotot’s pedagogy, each of which, I argued, presupposes equality with a dominant logos 
and creatively unsettles a mystery produced by ideological mystification. Foremost, the 
results of these of experiments indicate that, broadly speaking, histories of rhetoric have 
yet to articulate a particular relation between rhetoric, democracy and epistemology that 
hinges on presuppositions of equality. To establish the exigency of including this relation 
in future histories, let us briefly review the four narrative possibilities that were 
introduced in Chapter One.  
First, we examined the two genetic narratives that tend to organize most histories 
of rhetoric. In these stories, certain formalized rhetorical activities (namely those related 
to “practical” oratory) appear to flourish or languish either in relation to the level of 
democracy present in a politics, or in relation to the level of empirical epistemology 
endorsed by the polis. The rise of law courts and the Assembly in Athens, for example, 
coincides with the formal study, practice, and development of forensic and deliberative 
rhetoric, which then languishes in the absence of these institutions and their sanctioned 
agônes (e.g., under the autocratic regimes of the Hellenistic and Roman-imperial 
periods). Similarly, rhetoric flourishes under the sophists with and because of empirical 
epistemology—which “knows” how to make the weaker argument defeat the stronger, 
and can therefore challenge received wisdom in sanctioned agônes—but later declines 
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under Platonic metaphysics and other foundationalist epistemologies, such as those 
espoused by ecclesiastical monarchies during the Middle Ages. And of course, both 
stories have in common the assumption that sanctioned agônes necessarily arbitrate the 
legitimacy of rhetorical practices. 
The third narrative considered was the alternative account (of the history of 
rhetoric) given by Walker in his Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity. Early on in the 
preface, he ventures a hypothesis in response to the genetic narratives that continues to 
gain steam over the next four chapters: “‘rhetoric,’” he suggests, “(as broadly conceived 
in the sophistic/Isocratean tradition) . . . may be democracy’s condition of possibility” 
(x), since “through its culture-shaping, psychagogic functions in the varieties of epideictic 
discourse and through paideia, rhetoric cultivated the general, cultural consenses on 
which civil institutions and a public discourse might be based” (134). As was surmised in 
Chapter One, since the scene of epideictic discourse is one of ideological contest or 
struggle, the democratic potential of epideictic rhetoric effectively derives from a 
speaker’s ability to enter a variety of agônes and forward arguments in favor of different 
ideologies, while simultaneously operating within the constraints imposed by specific 
audiences. In Walker’s narrative, then, the democratic potential of rhetoric lies in the 
nature of the speaker/audience transaction and not necessarily in the forms of rhetoric 
practiced exclusively in and by civil institutions (i.e., in forms of oratory which appear 
under the heading of logos politikos).  
Finally, we arrived at the counter-narrative, which theorizes that the degree to 
which rhetorical patterns presuppose the equality of intelligence as an epistemological 
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starting point in agônes deregulates the degree to which democracy (as discursive 
insurgency) flourishes or fails to flourish. Based on the experiments conducted in 
Chapters II and III, if we are now willing to grant that, in addition to the genetic 
narratives and to the account given by Walker, it is equally tenable to conceive of another 
tale wherein certain rhetorical patterns, predicated on equality, generate alternate 
conditions of possibility for democracy, thereby opening democracy to another fate 
(deregulating it, so to speak), an obvious question is whether these narratives—taken 
together, in combination, or considered separately—contribute to an ethology and 
historiography that can adequately account for the relations between rhetoric, democracy 
and epistemology in the present era. If they can, what kinds of conclusions—however 
tentative—might be drawn about the future of rhetoric and the fate of democracy?  
There are no easy answers to this line of questioning. I am fairly certain George 
Kennedy, Patricia Bizzell, Bruce Herzberg and other scholars who continue to circulate 
various articulations of the genetic narratives have opinions on these matters, just as I am 
reasonably certain those who subscribe to Walker’s narrative do. But in this chapter, I 
will not assume the indignity of speaking for them. I will, however, attempt to take the 
logoi of these narratives into account as I conduct one more experiment to test the logos 
of the counter-narrative. By using a series of contemporary examples, my intention is not 
to anachronistically invalidate the stories that others have told, which have value whether 
they address (or are capable of addressing) more recent phenomena. My intention, quite 
simply, is to make the experiment of linking these tales—tales that I know well—to what 
I want to know. 
 166 
As in the previous chapters, because the test subjects I have selected represent 
only a fraction of the material presently available for analysis, I readily acknowledge that 
any findings derived from this experiment will be partial and, therefore, not necessarily 
indicative of contemporary discursive activity in its full rhetorical scales. For this reason, 
neither will I attempt to forecast the future of rhetoric, nor will I attempt to circumscribe 
the fate of democracy. Instead, I hope to give some indication as to how future histories 
of rhetoric will have manifested when democracy is opened to different fates. Certainly, 
there are many forms of rhetorical activity from the present era that could be used for this 
purpose (political speeches, poetry, novels, popular debates, advertisements, and so on), 
but in light of the fact that computerized technologies now mediate discursive activity in 
nearly all facets of contemporary life, I have chosen to examine forms of rhetorical 
activity that utilize various digital technologies, including networks, websites, code, and 
social media.  
As a final matter of course, this epilogue will not attempt to argue for or against 
the use of digital technologies in the service of creating a better politics, democratic or 
otherwise. It will instead examine the ways in which different individuals and groups of 
people mobilize these technologies to generate rhetorical activity, some of which is 
explicitly dedicated to political enterprises, some of which is not. My working hypothesis 
is that the rhetorical patterns of these individuals and groups can be situated along a 
continuum of presuppositions. At one extreme, we find rhetorical patterns wherein 
speakers and writers presuppose a high degree of inequality in agônes (and only a 
modicum of equality); accordingly, at the other extreme, we find rhetorical patterns 
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wherein speakers and writers presuppose a high degree of equality in agônes (and only a 
modicum of inequality). Consequently, I will argue that the movement from the former to 
the latter also signals a movement from mobilizing digital technologies for the purpose of 
competing against dominant discourses and correcting political inequalities to mobilizing 
them for the purpose of competing with dominant discourses and contesting the limits of 
acceptable speech.  
At its most basic, the continuum that moves from “correctors” to “contesters” 
recognizes two different motives characterized by different presuppositions. In the first 
case, I will argue that we encounter individuals and groups who presuppose greater 
degrees of inequality with a dominant logos; consequently, they tend to mobilize digital 
technologies in an effort to rectify the structural inequalities they feel they have 
suffered—and generally have suffered—as a result of unequal power distributions. In the 
second case, we encounter groups and individuals who presuppose greater degrees of 
equality with a dominant logos; consequently, they tend to mobilize digital technologies 
to covertly access dominant discourses that would eschew, in advance, the legitimacy of 
their speech positions. For the extreme correctors, we will briefly consider how groups 
and individuals involved in the Egyptian revolution and the Bay Area Rapid Transit 
protests mobilized social media and cellular technologies to coordinate acts of civil 
disobedience; as equality increases, our focus turns to Anonymous and WikiLeaks, who 
mobilize networked technologies and code to expose economic and political 
improprieties; and for the extreme contesters, we will examine two cases in which private 
citizens mobilized digital technologies to circumvent traditional modes of knowledge 
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production. Finally, in relation to the conclusion I draw near the end of Chapter Three, I 
will attempt to confirm that those whom I identify as contesters are in fact staging 
discursive insurgencies by practicing forms of the early-sophistic pedagogy in which 
speakers and writers move from the known to the unknown. If contesters are indeed 
accessing dominant discourses by teaching themselves to make links between what they 
want to know and what they know already, then it seems reasonable to suggest that early-
sophistic rhetorical pedagogy is, at the very least, currently in practice (in some form) in 
the digital age.  
THE KINGDOM OF DOMAIN NAMES 
In February of 1995, Newsweek editors of the Tech and Science section published 
an article by the eccentric and often desultory astronomer Clifford Stoll. Already by this 
time Stoll had received a fair amount of public recognition for his 1989 book, The 
Cuckoo’s Egg, which recounts his experience tracking and eventually capturing a hacker 
named Markus Hess, better known in underground cyber-circles by his online handle, 
Urmel. According to Stoll, in 1986 Hess successfully gained access to a computer 
terminal at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL). Shortly thereafter, the 
LBNL, completely unaware of the breach, contacted Stoll to help them resolve a small 
accounting error in their system logs. As he was churning through the code, Stoll detected 
an intrusion into the system and began investigating the origin of the activity. In the 
process, he discovered that Hess had been, for quite some time, stealing highly classified 
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intelligence from several government organizations in the United States and selling it to 
the Soviet KGB.  
While Stoll has been credited with thwarting one of the first known cyber 
terrorists, his article in Newsweek, which he later referred to as “my 1995 howler,” had 
nothing to do with hackers, digital forensics, or even his scholarly profession, astronomy 
(“Boing Boing”). First titled “The Internet? Bah!” and subtitled “Hype alert: Why 
cyberspace isn’t, and will never be, nirvana,” in a recent reprint publishers revised the 
title to “Why the Web Won’t be Nirvana” (Newsweek). In both iterations, however, 
Stoll’s argument remains quite clear: technocratic prognosticators certain the Internet is 
destined to revolutionize the economy, education, and politics are completely wrong. The 
sentiment is best expressed in the opening paragraphs of his article: 
After two decades online, I’m perplexed. It’s not that I haven’t had a gas 
of a good time on the Internet. I’ve met great people and even caught a 
hacker or two. But today, I’m uneasy about this most trendy and oversold 
community. Visionaries see a future of telecommuting workers, interactive 
libraries and multimedia classrooms. They speak of electronic town 
meetings and virtual communities. Commerce and business will shift from 
offices and malls to networks and modems. And the freedom of digital 
networks will make government more democratic. 
Baloney. Do our computer pundits lack all common sense? The 
truth in [sic] no online database will replace your daily newspaper, no CD-
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ROM can take the place of a competent teacher and no computer network 
will change the way government works. (“The Internet? Bah!”) 
In hindsight, it’s not difficult to see that most of the predictions Stoll made in the 
Newsweek article were flat-out wrong. Presumably, the title revision was intended to 
frame his strident critique of the Internet in more prosaic terms (and, possibly, to wipe 
away some of the egg left on the faces of the editors who originally published his article). 
But even if most of Stoll’s predictions have failed to materialize, which he freely 
admits,94 I would argue that his critique regarding the democratizing power of the 
Internet is perhaps more relevant today than ever.  
It is no secret that near the end of the twentieth century, Internet and Web 
technologies like email, blogs, message boards, and social network sites firmly usurped 
the role of traditional media outlets and became the primary modes of transmission for 
local and global communications and information exchanges. But along with the dramatic 
                                                
94 The following comment was written by Stoll on February 26, 2012, shortly after a fragment of his 
original article was republished by Maggie Koerth-Baker, Science Editor at boingboing.net, under the 
headline “Curmudgeonly essay on ‘Why the Internet Will Fail’ from 1995:”  
Of my many mistakes, flubs, and howlers, few have been as public as my 1995 howler. 
Wrong? Yep. 
At the time, I was trying to speak against the tide of futuristic commentary on how The 
Internet Will Solve Our Problems. 
Gives me pause. Most of my screwups have had limited publicity: Forgetting my lines in 
my 4th grade play. Misidentifying a Gilbert and Sullivan song while suddenly drafted to 
fill in as announcer on a classical radio station. Wasting a week hunting for planets 
interior to Mercury’s orbit using an infrared system with a noise level so high that it 
couldn’t possibly detect ‘em. Heck—trying to dry my sneakers in a microwave oven (a 
quarter century later, there’s still a smudge on the kitchen ceiling) 
And, as I’ve laughed at others’ foibles, I think back to some of my own cringeworthy 
contributions. 
Now, whenever I think I know what’s happening, I temper my thoughts: Might be wrong, 
Cliff… 
Warm cheers to all, 
-Cliff Stoll on a rainy Friday afternoon in Oakland (boingboing.net) 
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increase in authorial and economic agency made available to the general public, many 
were quick to argue that the flat, non-hierarchical architecture of the Internet would usher 
in a new age for democracy and political activism. The Web, after all, made it possible 
for anyone with a modem and computer access to circumvent the traditional gatekeepers 
of information and communication (mainstream media outlets, economic cartels, 
repressive governments, and so on). Want your voice to be heard by millions? Forget the 
newspapers, and start your own blog. Can’t compete with monopolies in the 
marketplace? Ditch the brick-and-mortar, and build your own e-business. Afraid your 
actions will draw punitive measures from those in power? Disguise your IP address, sell 
your goods from a site housed in another country, and publish all of your subversive 
materials under the anonymity of a screen name. The infrastructure of the Internet 
(essentially a giant Network of linked networks), combined with the Web’s information-
sharing and dissemination capacities, effectively leveled the playing field, giving to those 
without the money or power to join the elite new avenues for social, political and 
economic participation, and to those without a press pass, a voice in public discourse.  
Of course, none of this is news in the twenty-teens. The question facing us now is 
whether the Internet and the Web actually delivered what many once believed they 
would. Stoll may have been wrong about the future of publishing, about the viability of a 
remote workforce, about the educational potential of interactive resource materials and 
networked classrooms, about e-commerce, online business models, and the role virtual 
communities would play in our personal and professional relationships. But what about 
politics? “Won’t the Internet be useful in governing?” asks Stoll (“The Internet? Bah!”). 
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In response to his own question, Stoll points out that “Internet addicts clamor for 
government reports. But when Andy Spano ran for county executive in Westchester 
County, N.Y., he put every press release and position paper onto a bulletin board. In that 
affluent county, with plenty of computer companies, how many voters logged in? Fewer 
than 30. Not a good omen” (“The Internet? Bah!”). Given that Stoll was writing in 1995, 
a time when Internet access was not nearly as ubiquitous as it is now (and whether it 
would ever become so was still very much up in the air), his failure to anticipate the 
telescopic dynamics of networked technologies is fairly easy to forgive. Nevertheless, I 
see enduring value in his original position, despite the wealth of recent evidence that 
would unflinchingly dismiss it. 
In the wake of the Arab Spring and now on the heels of the Occupy Movement, it 
is hardly surprising that arguments for the democratizing potentials of Internet 
technologies are more widespread than ever before.95 Typically, these arguments 
presume, much as they did twenty years ago, that the progressive politics of liberal 
democracy can be realized on the Internet because the two share the same formal 
principles of structural organization.96 Equally compelling, it appears that as the level of 
free information exchange and democratic agency afforded by networked technologies 
                                                
95 Landmark scholarship includes Yochai Benkler’s 2006 The Wealth of Networks (15), Clay Shirky’s 2009 
Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing without Organizations, and Jan Van Dijk’s 2012 edition 
of The Network Society (104).  
96 See John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill (2005), Matt Noyes’s chapter “Matters of Human Debate” in The 
Cyberunion Handbook: Transforming Labor Through Computer Technology, and Ed Schwartz’s 
NetActivism: How Citizens Use the Internet. 
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continues to rise, rhetorical activity related to logos politikos is flourishing on screens and 
on street corners across the globe.  
For my part, although I have chosen to look for recent examples of democracy by 
examining uses of digital technologies in online discourse, this choice was not influenced 
by arguments that the open-architecture of the Internet and widespread dissemination of 
information through the Web align with progressive politics. In fact, the reverse was the 
case. In the end, I chose to examine online discourses for events of democracy because 
the more research I did, the more I was persuaded that the Internet and the Web are 
increasingly beholden to dominant interests, which is precisely why discourses that 
circulate in online venues are ripe for discursive insurgencies. While the architecture of 
the Internet is open in theory, and the Web does provide a welcoming platform for the 
use and development of egalitarian technologies, as in previous attempts to realize 
democracy structurally (for example, in attempts made by governments to enforce laws 
guaranteeing social and economic equality, or by educational institutions to install 
liberatory pedagogies that shift entrenched power dynamics in classrooms), in the 
aftermath of any such formalization, a new hierarchy is born. As Stoll’s example 
highlights, the effectiveness of a bulletin board, even in an increasingly networked public 
sphere, requires that large numbers of people strap on their digital boots and walk past it, 
which is just another way of saying that free access to information vis-à-vis digital 
networks does not necessarily guarantee that a voice will improve its chances of being 
heard, even if the message being transmitted is particularly important or powerful. Still, 
that’s what we tend to believe about the Internet and the Web, particularly when they 
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become associated with phrases like “freedom of information exchange,” “open-source 
code,” “electronic advocacy,” and “digital democracy.” Indeed, one might question 
whether this grand march of democratic figures and tropes in fact betrays it obverse; 
namely, the codification of existing hierarchies by interest-motivated parties. And, really, 
it’s not difficult to find examples wherein the Internet (or at least a good chunk of the 
Surface Web—the Deep Web is another matter entirely) has been hierarchically 
organized to serve dominant interests.  
To cite a fairly recent example, those in charge of distributing generic Top-level 
Domains (gTLDs) recently passed legislation that allows them to squeeze out new 
competition for the dot-com’s, the dot-net’s, the dot-org’s, and so on by making it nearly 
impossible for the general public to establish new top-level domain names. Although 
once regulated by the American government, all gTLDs are now under the rule of a 
private “nonprofit” called the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN). In 2012, ICANN began charging a fee of $185,000 to register new gTLD 
names, and a $25,000 “maintenance fee” annually thereafter . . . in perpetuity (Einhorn). 
Since most people and businesses do not have at their disposal the kinds of funds 
required to register a top-level domain with an extension like “.example” or 
“.democracy” or “.Jacotot,” they simply go with a “.com,” which is also, incidentally, 
rising in cost. And what’s the motive behind pricing private citizens and small businesses 
out of new gTLDs? Money. Because if someone controls the “.democracy” extension, 
they also control (and can therefore sell) all the second-level domain names associated 
with it. If a person were to sell www.microsoft.democracy, it probably wouldn’t cause 
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much of a stir, since the two terms are basically unrelated (at least in my view—Gates 
may feel differently), but imagine the ruckus that would ensue if a person were to sell 
www.apple.computer to a company that made knockoff iPads, or www.exxon.energy to a 
solar panel installer, or www.ford.car to a Chinese manufacturer, or 
www.worldbank.finance to a hacker with a vendetta against the banking industry. 
Anytime a Web user typed “apple,” “exxon,” “ford” or “world bank” into a search 
engine, they could be unwittingly directed to website that is not associated with the actual 
business or trademark holder. Milton Mueller—who holds a seat on ICANN’s Generic 
Names Supporting Organization Council—explains in a 1999 article that while the 
Commerce Department, and not ICANN, was initially responsible for the “market 
dominance” of dot-coms, interest-motivated parties were (and still are) pulling the 
strings, regardless of who is now officially in charge: 
Although ICANN is now established as the authority for adding new 
TLDs, its procedures for doing so are multi-layered bureaucratic processes 
dominated by established stakeholders, such as trademark holders, country 
code TLD registries, and large businesses with an established stake in dot 
com. Many of these players have a vested interest in preventing the 
addition of new registries and new gTLDs. (518) 
Make no mistake: the kingdom of domain names is governed by an interest-motivated 
body of economic and political forces that consistently privileges specific flows of 
information on the Net at the expense of others. 
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A number of writers have made similar arguments about the hierarchical character 
of the Internet,97 but Mathew Hindman’s The Myth of Digital Democracy was one of the 
first large-scale studies to demonstrate it empirically. From the very beginning, his book 
challenges the idea that the Internet is a medium free of the kinds of information 
gatekeeping we find in traditional media outlets. The following paragraph provides a 
snapshot of his general thesis:  
From the start, claims that new media would weaken or eliminate 
gatekeepers focused on the Internet’s architecture . . . [and] the 
presumption was that the biggest changes in both politics and business 
would come from a host of new entrants who took advantage of lowered 
barriers to entry. Small, marginal interests and minor political parties were 
considered particularly likely to be advantaged by the open architecture of 
the Internet . . . [but] the Internet is not eliminating exclusivity in political 
life; instead, it is shifting the bar of exclusivity from the production to the 
filtering of political information. (13)  
Due to this shift, Hindman argues, that the only voices actually being heard on websites, 
blogs, and message boards are those that link, with extremely high frequency, to the first 
page of results on the major Web search engines. He refers to this strategic filtering 
arrangement as “Googlearchy,” or “the rule of the most heavily linked,” (55) and 
concludes that “direct political speech on the Internet—by which I mean the posting of 
                                                
97 In The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom, Evgeny Morozov even goes so far as to 
suggest that the Internet may in fact be a stronger tool for consolidating power in totalitarian regimes than 
for advancing democracy. 
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political views online by citizens—does not follow . . . egalitarian patterns. If we look at 
citizens’ voices in terms of the readership their posting receive,” he says, “political 
expression online is orders of magnitude more unequal than the disparities we are used to 
in voting, volunteer work, and even political fundraising” (17). In other words, while we 
have a tendency to believe that, for example, a blog I start today has the same ability to 
spread its message as a blog that links to the major search engines and appears on the first 
page of results, Hindman’s findings—which, he reminds us, use the most common social 
science metrics—suggest quite the opposite. Ironically, these findings also suggest that 
without the linking power of a Googlearchy, basic political efforts to freely disseminate 
information rarely stand a chance of succeeding on the Web. Andy Spano is by now an 
outdated example, but his inability to reach the public in his county by way of a bulletin 
board nevertheless continues to stand as a case in point: digital technologies do not, by 
virtue of an online presence, necessarily translate to the kinds of democratic agency that 
technocratic evangelists endlessly champion. 
The irony that links political democracy to Googlearchy is especially valuable to 
the distinctions I wish to draw along the continuum of correctors and contesters, largely 
because it points out that while networked technologies may give us increased 
opportunities to voice our opinions, nothing about these technologies guarantees that our 
voices will in fact be heard equally . . . or at all, or any more so than if we were to stand 
up in a coffee shop and begin speaking to whichever patrons happened to pass by. In fact, 
the latter might prove more effective for establishing the kind of “strong ties” that 
Malcolm Gladwell believes lead to large-scale social activism (“Small Change: Why the 
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Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted”). In his view, unlike the high-risk models of social 
activism utilized by those involved in the Greensboro lunch counter sit-ins during the 
Civil Rights Movement, the new model for social activism, which has increasingly used 
social media to coordinate acts civil disobedience, “makes it easier for activists to express 
themselves, and harder for that expression to have any impact” (“Small Change”). In 
response to Gladwell’s position, Clay Shirky counters:  
the fact that barely committed actors cannot click their way to a better 
world does not mean that committed actors cannot use social media 
effectively. Recent protest movements—including a movement against 
fundamentalist vigilantes in India in 2009, the beef protests in South 
Korea in 2008, and protests against education laws in Chile in 2006—have 
used social media not as a replacement for real-world action but as a way 
to coordinate it. As a result, all of those protests exposed participants to 
the threat of violence, and in some cases its actual use. In fact, the 
adoption of these tools (especially cell phones) as a way to coordinate and 
document real-world action is so ubiquitous that it will probably be a part 
of all future political movements. (“The Political Power of Social Media”)  
Despite their differences of opinion, both Gladwell and Shirky would probably agree that 
in some respects, networked technologies are doing the egalitarian legwork of democratic 
politics in the digital age, at least insofar as these technologies are helping committed 
activists to organize in greater numbers (Shirky) and are creating more opportunities for 
free expression and the exchange of information and ideas (Gladwell). But if Hindman’s 
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analysis is correct, and the current power structures that circumscribe the uses of these 
technologies are in fact hierarchical, we might question whether the very exchanges of 
information we value in the name of “digital” democracy are in fact the expected 
outcomes of “analog” hierarchies. For hierarchies, by design, are always capable of 
accommodating more voices into the official count, of subsuming them and situating 
them within the existing order. Moreover, hierarchies thrive on commodity exchanges; 
culture, information, ideas—these are simply the commodities they now trade for power 
in the digital age. The same can be said of any age, perhaps. The distinguishing feature of 
this age, however, is that digital tools have become the dominant mode of exchange.  
Those who use digital technologies to wage political battles for social equality, 
who refuse to resign themselves to a lesser station based on arbitrary identifications, are 
in no way to blame for this political reality. In fact, given the conditions they find 
themselves operating in, they can only be commended. Winning these agônes is no small 
feat. It requires dedication and organization, relies on patience and persistence, and in 
every conceivable case, demands some form of sacrifice. But the real question is whether 
dominant interests are primarily concerned with the outcomes of these agônes. Winning 
recognition from a dominant discourse is indeed a political victory, and an important one 
at that. But does it necessarily upend hierarchy? I’m not so sure. In fact, I would argue 
that more often than we assume, these victories end up reinforcing dominant interests. 
After all, the prize for winning political agônes is not complete, pure, unadulterated 
equality; it is instead more commonly the recognition of inequality, and hierarchies 
recognize inequality quite well. To accommodate the winners, small concessions are 
 180 
typically made until a new alliance is formed, in the name of equality, with the dominant 
order. The outsiders, having been invited inside, are then compelled to promote a higher 
purpose; namely, the promise of even more equality. In the digital age, what is the fate of 
democracy when rhetorical activity proceeds from this promise? 
REVOLUTION 
If we consider the revolution in Egypt that took place in 2010 and culminated 
with the resignation of President Mubarak in February of 2011, we find that protesters 
were initially thanking social media like Facebook for enabling them to raise their voices 
against a repressive regime. In turn, the international media was quick to attribute the 
success of the Egyptian revolution to new modes of digital communication, and the entire 
affair became a clear-cut example of Web technologies proving their democratic value by 
granting citizens increased opportunities for free speech. Years later, however, we see 
that instead of laying the groundwork for a democratic politics that would overturn the 
incumbent hierarchy and establish new civil institutions, the revolution seems to have 
basically produced its opposite: in December of 2012 the new Egyptian government 
ratified a fundamentalist constitution drafted by the Freedom and Justice Party, and 
power was reconsolidated in militant religious institutions. Not only did the basic 
framework of the constitution subordinate civil liberties to canon law, but it also gave 
 181 
“democratically elected” president Muhammad Morsi executive powers beyond judicial 
review.98  
In effect, the revolutionaries did not escape hierarchy by winning political agônes; 
instead, they were accommodated into the “new” order by way of a series of concessions: 
“On the surface, the constitution provides many liberties,” writes Juan Cole, including 
increases in freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and basic human rights, “but 
they are all made dependent on Sunni Muslim sharia or canon law, which can be used to 
take them back away” (Cole). Along with these reforms, Morsi similarly made 
concessions by appointing several liberals to the 270-member upper house of parliament. 
These appointments, however, amounted to only a small minority of the 90 members 
Morsi eventually appointed (Cole). What is perhaps most troubling is that this pattern is 
neither reducible to specific geographies nor to the machinations of theocratic regimes. 
Protesters in the United States, for example, fell victim to similar tactics less than six 
months after the Egyptian revolution took place.  
In July of 2011, San Francisco law enforcement received a 911-call that an 
intoxicated individual was causing a disturbance on the subway platform at the Civic 
Center Station (Fagan). When two Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) police officers 
arrived on scene, they alleged that Charles Blair Hill, a 45 year-old homeless man, threw 
a vodka bottle at one of them and then threatened both with a knife. According to the 
official report, Hill refused to relinquish his weapon, at which point officer James 
                                                
98 Though numbers varied from source to source, most reports indicated that the constitution passed with 
98% of the vote; however, it was estimated that only 38% of the eligible electorate actually voted, and 
multiple reports suggested that the Muslim Brotherhood, Morsi’s “in-house national gang,” were actively 
threatening dissenters from turning out (Cole).  
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Crowell opened fire and killed him. A week later, protesters responded by using mobile 
devices to organize at the Civic Center stop: “Riot police eventually drove them out of 
the station[,] but the unruly mob reconvened at the 16th Street Mission Station. Service 
was disrupted at the Civic Center, 16th Street and Powell Street stations” (Zito). This 
level of coordination signaled to many members of the press that the use of digital 
technologies was ushering in a new, more effective, more democratic form of political 
activism. Because these technologies afforded significant increases in both reach and 
speed of communication, pundits of Shirky’s stripe tended to assume that minority 
interests would henceforth be able to assemble more easily and that their voices would be 
heard more equally. Instead, one month later, when government officials received word 
that another protest was afoot, city operators persuaded the largest cell phone providers to 
shut down service at four major stations, and the protests were snuffed out before they 
could even take place. Ken Broder of AllGov California later reported:  
The BART board of director’s response to public outcry over the service 
curtailment was to pass a rule six months later enshrining the agency’s 
action in official policy. BART officials would be allowed to cut off cell 
service if there was strong evidence of imminent unlawful activity that 
threatened public safety, substantial disruption of public transit services or 
destruction of BART property. No court review was required. (Border) 
It is surely no coincidence that when the Occupy movement erupted in New York, shortly 
after this declaration, it immediately found a second home in Oakland.  
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Taking into consideration these brief examples, of note is that the Egyptians and 
the BART protesters, as well as the Occupy movement, all appear to share a similar 
presupposition—namely, they begin from the belief that they are in some way unequal to 
the existing order. Egyptian citizens are not equal to the regime; protesters are not equal 
to law enforcement; the 99% are not equal to the 1%. Considered in light of the four 
narrative possibilities introduced at the beginning of this chapter, how and where does 
rhetorical activity motivated by this presupposition fit?  
In some respects, the genetic narratives anticipate the outcomes of the Egyptian 
revolution, the BART protests, and even the Occupy movement with alarming accuracy: 
democratic and communally sanctioned institutions were on the rise in Egypt and being 
actively utilized by US citizens, and rhetorical activity related to logos politikos was, in 
turn, flourishing. At issue, of course, is whether democratic and/or communally 
sanctioned institutions can rightly take credit for a thriving rhetorical culture. And if they 
can, what does it tell us about the nature of rhetorical activity born from these 
institutions? The logos of the democracy narrative reasons that citizens need democratic 
institutions because they are not equal to those who have traditionally been authorized to 
speak (i.e., those of high birth, great wealth, and who are in positions of power). In many 
ways, the logos of the epistemology narrative reasons the same thing: uninitiated laity 
need the sanction of communal institutions because, unlike the elite, they are not given 
equal opportunities to affect the direction of public affairs without garnering the sanction 
of acknowledged experts, whose main purpose is to determine the legitimacy of novel 
arguments in relation to the status quo. Given the similarities that exist between these 
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logoi, if rhetorical activity in Egypt and the US did indeed rise and fall with the fortunes 
of democratic and/or communal institutions, we should not hesitate to conclude that the 
genetic narratives are in fact capable of accounting for rhetorical activity in the present 
era. We also should not hesitate to clarify that, generally speaking, the kinds of rhetorical 
activities these narratives take into account presuppose substantial degrees of inequality.   
Walker’s narrative both adds to and complicates this assessment. It adds to it by 
suggesting that democratic agency can be achieved with forms of rhetorical activity that 
are not reducible to logos politikos. But this addition also complicates the idea that 
institutions are a necessary precondition for a flourishing rhetorical culture, at least one 
that espouses democratic values. Consequently, because the democratic potential of 
rhetoric can be realized in lieu of established institutions through epideictic discourse, 
Walker’s narrative allows us to read the Egyptian and American examples differently. 
We might, for instance, view the speaker/audience transactions that took place between 
Egyptians on Facebook as creating the very conditions of possibility for establishing the 
kinds of civil institutions that would eventually foster or improve democracy. As such, 
his narrative would be capable of accounting for the relation between rhetoric and 
democracy even if democratic institutions never ultimately came to pass.  
For example, if we examine the video message that 26 year-old Asmaa Mahfouz 
posted to Facebook on January 18, which has been credited by many with inspiring the 
Egyptians to take to the streets, it is not difficult to see how her epideictic speech would 
put in question the genetic narratives’ reliance on institutional sanction and support the 
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viability of Walker’s formulation. To give a clearer picture of how this example would do 
so, it is worth quoting Mahfouz’s speech at some length:  
Four Egyptians have set themselves on fire to protest humiliation 
and hunger and poverty and degradation they had to live with for 30 years. 
Four Egyptians have set themselves on fire thinking maybe we can have a 
revolution like Tunisia, maybe we can have freedom, justice, honor and 
human dignity. Today, one of these four has died, and I saw people 
commenting and saying, “May God forgive him. He committed a sin and 
killed himself for nothing.” 
People, have some shame. 
I posted that I, a girl, am going down to Tahrir Square, and I will 
stand alone. And I’ll hold up a banner. Perhaps people will show some 
honor . . . I won’t even talk about any political rights. We just want our 
human rights and nothing else. This entire government is corrupt—a 
corrupt president and a corrupt security force. These self-immolaters were 
not afraid of death but were afraid of security forces. Can you imagine 
that? Are you going to kill yourselves, too, or are you completely clueless? 
I’m going down on January 25th, and from now ‘til then I’m going to 
distribute fliers in the streets. I will not set myself on fire. If the security 
forces want to set me on fire, let them come and do it. 
If you think yourself a man, come with me on January 25th. 
Whoever says women shouldn’t go to protests because they will get 
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beaten, let him have some honor and manhood and come with me on 
January 25th. Whoever says it is not worth it because there will only be a 
handful of people, I want to tell him, “You are the reason behind this, and 
you are a traitor, just like the president or any security cop who beats us in 
the streets.” Your presence with us will make a difference, a big 
difference. Talk to your neighbors, your colleagues, friends and family, 
and tell them to come. They don’t have to come to Tahrir Square. Just go 
down anywhere and say it, that we are free human beings. Sitting at home 
and just following us on news or Facebook leads to our humiliation, leads 
to my own humiliation. If you have honor and dignity as a man, come. 
Come and protect me and other girls in the protest. If you stay at home, 
then you deserve all that is being done, and you will be guilty before your 
nation and your people. And you’ll be responsible for what happens to us 
on the streets while you sit at home. 
Go down to the street. Send SMSes. Post it on the Net. Make 
people aware. You know your own social circle, your building, your 
family, your friends. Tell them to come with us. Bring five people or 10 
people. If each one of us manages to bring five or 10 to Tahrir Square and 
talk to people and tell them, “This is enough. Instead of setting ourselves 
on fire, let us do something positive,” it will make a difference, a big 
difference. 
 187 
Never say there’s no hope. Hope disappears only when you say 
there’s none. So long as you come down with us, there will be hope. Don’t 
be afraid of the government. Fear none but God. God says He will not 
change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves. 
Don’t think you can be safe anymore. None of us are. Come down with us 
and demand your rights, my rights, your family’s rights. I am going down 
on January 25th, and I will say no to corruption, no to this regime. (qtd. in 
democracynow.org) 
Mahfouz’s speech is a classic example of the didactic nature of epideictic discourse and 
its capacity to foster cooperative efforts. Moreover, based solely on the fact that her 
speech was shared by such a large number of users on Facebook, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that the “psychagogic function” of her discourse might positively contribute to 
the “general, cultural consenses on which civil institutions and a public discourse might 
be based.”  
Although the rhetorical activity that takes place on Facebook is not, in a strict 
sense, permitted to engage in the agônes of Egypt’s new civil institutions (for these 
institutions do not make available to the general public a scene in which ideological 
contestation is possible), the question that lingers is not whether the epideictic rhetoric 
that circulated on Facebook during the revolution fostered democratic agency. It is, once 
again, whether much of a speaker/audience transaction generally takes place in online 
discourse. To some degree, of course, it does—but to what degree? 
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As of 2011, Egypt had more Facebook accounts than any other country in the 
Middle East, totaling approximately five million users (Malin). By 2012, that number had 
risen to roughly eleven million users, and in 2013 it jumped to 16 million users (Farid). 
But user statistics can be deceiving. In “The Structural Virality of Online Discussions,” 
Sharad Goel, Ashton Anderson, Jake Hofman and Duncan Watts “analyze a billion links 
(news, images, videos, petitions) shared on Twitter. One of out every 3,000 links 
produced a ‘large event,’ or a sharing phenomenon that reached 100 additional persons 
beyond the seed node; but truly viral events (many multiple generations of sharing, 
several thousand adoptions at least) occurred only about once in a million instances” (qtd. 
in Wihbey, “niemanlab.org”). The beauty of Walker’s narrative is that it can anticipate 
these viral events by framing them as effects of especially persuasive epideictic 
discourse, or as highly successful rhetorical transactions between speakers and audiences. 
Moreover, in terms of the transaction between Mahfouz and her audience, Walker’s 
suggestion that epideictic discourse may be a precondition for building democratic 
institutions also appears tenable, at least insofar as Mahfouz’s speech on Facebook paved 
the way for the establishment of Egyptian civil institutions that were ostensibly going to 
be more democratic.  
On the other hand, it is troubling that, given the persuasive power of Mahfouz’s 
speech and the impacts it had on the public, democratic institutions never materialized in 
Egypt, and the institutions that did materialize, under the auspices of democracy, ended 
up reinforcing a new hierarchy (or the old one, depending on one’s view). Walker’s 
narrative can, I think, account for this backfire in at least two ways. First, his argument 
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does not claim that rhetoric necessarily leads to democracy; rather, his argument 
forecasts that rhetoric may be democracy’s condition of possibility. In other words, 
Walker makes no guarantees that rhetoric will cultivate the general, cultural consenses on 
which civil institutions and public discourse might be based.  
An additional way his narrative might account for the backfire concerns a central 
focus of Rhetoric and Poetics: in antiquity, argues Walker, logôn paideia was essential to 
the cultural and intellectual education of the populace. Without it, education was 
basically reduced to learning a series of ready-made speeches for logos politikos. 
Certainly, the absence of a genuine paideia could help to explain why, despite one 
woman’s extraordinarily persuasive epideictic speech, no democratic institutions finally 
materialized in Egypt, and it would similarly help to explain why rhetorical activity 
generated by the BART protesters and the Occupy movement did not have a lasting effect 
on the democratic institutions already in place in the United States. In both cases, we find 
a lack of critical “discourse education” that would enable more of the populace to contest 
established ideologies through epideictic rhetoric. Without a logôn paideia in place, then, 
perhaps these sorts of backfires can be viewed as consequences of a training regimen 
centered almost exclusively on pragmatic discourse.  
According to the counter-narrative, because the rhetorical patterns of the BART 
protesters, the Occupy movement and the Egyptian revolution presuppose a significant 
degree of inequality with incumbent logoi, they tend to engage with and in the political 
fate of democracy. The protesters, having suffered as a result of unequal power 
distributions, clamor for structural changes in the dominant political order. What they 
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demand from those in power is, quite simply, some combination of economic, social, 
political and/or human rights. To voice this demand, they coordinate acts of civil 
disobedience using networked and cellular technologies. In essence, these technologies 
allow them to compete against dominant discourses for equal voice. What they receive in 
return for winning these agônes is the right to have their unequal voices publically 
recognized by the dominant order, and this recognition temporarily cauterizes the wounds 
of the marginalized by promising to institute equality. But this promise, both 
performative and constative, never delivers in full. Since those in power do not have 
equality to give, their promise of equality is a promise endlessly deferred. Small 
concessions will have been made to accommodate more voices into the existing 
hierarchy, but in the end, they come with a price, and for marginalized voices, it is always 
the same: to purchase their democratic freedoms, the oppressed must first make them 
available for sale. 
Despite the inevitability of this stock exchange, nothing prevents discursive 
insurgencies from occurring in the midst of revolutions and protests. During Gorgias’s 
residency in Athens, for example, Greek city-states were regularly staging uprisings 
against Athens in an attempt to secede from the increasingly imperialist powerhouse. And 
when Jacotot first invented his pedagogy in France, uprisings by factions who either 
favored Bourbon rule or continued to support Napoleon after his fall were commonplace. 
As evidenced by these examples and others to which we will turn shortly, even when the 
dominant rhetorical patterns of a given time, place, and people appear to presuppose large 
degrees of inequality, events of democracy always remain a possibility because it can 
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never be decided in advance whether these events will have occurred in the first place. 
Should we therefore class Mahfouz’s epideictic speech as a discursive insurgency? She 
certainly presupposes a substantial degree of equality with the incumbent logos. 
Moreover, her rhetorical pattern does not suggest structural correction so much as it does 
ideological contestation. I wonder, though, whether her threat to hold up a banner and 
pass out fliers in downtown Cairo effectively disrupted the counting practices of the 
political elite, since political hierarchies generally tend to account for explicit forms of 
dissent. Perhaps it did. As I have said, it can never be decided in advance whether events 
of democracy will have happened, and this undecidability is precisely why neither 
Gorgias’s speech nor Jacotot’s pedagogy are beyond question. But what is clear from the 
general rhetorical patterns of those who mobilize digital technologies to coordinate acts 
of civil disobedience is that when they largely presuppose inequality as an 
epistemological starting point, democratic agency is increasingly reduced to its political 
register. Put differently, the American and Egyptian revolutions are signs of a future 
history of rhetoric, a history where rhetorical activity, largely predicated on inequality, 
opens democracy to its recognizable, political fate. Given the overtly political nature of 
the Egyptian revolution, the BART protests and the Occupy movement, should we then 
assume that all forms of dissent enter into relations with the political fate of democracy? 
There are, I think, examples of rhetorical activity that may suggest otherwise. 
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REVELATION 
When WikiLeaks published its first document back in 2006 detailing Sheik 
Hassan Dahir Aweys’ plans to assassinate government officials, the organization’s 
website was initially structured as an editable forum (much like Wikipedia or any other 
“wiki”) wherein contributors were allowed to anonymously upload and comment upon 
leaked information. Since the credibility of the contributions and their contributors was 
always questionable, Assange and his team felt that using a wiki to crowd-source 
verification would place the burden of proof on the appropriate arbiters, that is, the 
general public. Then, in 2010, WikiLeaks decided to change its submission policy 
guidelines, privately vetting information to assess not only the credibility of its source (if 
known) but also the relative impact that releasing it would have on global affairs. 
According to the “About” page on the WikiLeaks.org site, the current verification process 
is exceptionally thorough:  
We use traditional investigative journalism techniques as well as more 
modern technology-based methods. Typically we will do a forensic 
analysis of the document, determine the cost of forgery, means, motive, 
opportunity, the claims of the apparent authoring organisation, and answer 
a set of other detailed questions about the document. We may also seek 
external verification of the document. (1.4) 
While the board does admit the possibility of error, they remain steadfast in their belief 
that by using this “mixed-methods” approach, “WikiLeaks has correctly identified the 
veracity of every document it has published” (1.4). Since their transition from the old 
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model, WikiLeaks also has established a practice of writing stories alongside the release 
of leaked documents. “Publishing the original source material behind each of our stories,” 
argues the organization, “is the way in which we show the public that our story is 
authentic. Readers don’t have to take our word for it; they can see for themselves” (1.5). 
Moreover, claims WikiLeaks, this practice also benefits the larger journalism community, 
“for they can view and use the original documents freely as well. Other journalists may 
well see an angle or detail in the document that we were not aware of in the first instance. 
By making the documents freely available, we hope to expand analysis and comment by 
all the media. Most of all, we want readers know the truth so they can make up their own 
minds” (1.5). 
 For many, WikiLeaks represents more than the advent of a new democratic 
publishing paradigm. By using networked technologies (encrypted dropboxes, encoded 
Internet communication channels, and Web dissemination, primarily) to expose 
improprieties, the organization also is able to provide to its contributors a viable platform 
for real political agency in the digital age. And from a numbers perspective, because 
WikiLeaks is indexed by all of the major search engines and appears on the first page of 
results, by Hindman’s calculus the organization’s messages are indeed being received by 
the online community; moreover, based on the number of times the information has been 
shared, most (if not all) of the leaks can be classed as viral events. Given these attributes, 
are leaks events in which democracy occurs? And what about WikiLeaks itself? Does it 
unsettle established ideologies, or does it perhaps unwittingly reinforce existing 
hierarchies? The answer in all cases could be, “yes.” 
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In 2011, Democracy Now interviewed Slavoj Žižek and Julian Assange about the 
impact of WikiLeaks on world politics. Near the end of the interview, Žižek remarks, 
“You know, again we’re in this situation with I know, you know—I know that you know, 
you know that I know—but we can still play this cynical game: let’s act as if we don’t 
know. [What’s] even more important I claim, in concrete ideological-political situations, 
than learning . . . [something new] through WikiLeaks, is to push us to this point where 
you cannot pretend not to know” (113:20-113:40). On the one hand, deemphasizing the 
relative importance of “learning something new” from WikiLeaks allows Žižek to 
identify our spontaneous disavowal of what we know, almost intuitively, is always 
already going on in politics. Unlike the Spano situation, we do not need to actually go to 
WikiLeaks and read the leaks it has published to know that improprieties are occurring 
behind closed doors. As a result, the WikiLeaks organization has made it more difficult to 
claim that political officials are the only people who know enough to generate rhetorical 
activity in political discourse, and for this reason, what the leaks reveal turns out to be 
less important for political agency than both governments and citizens disabusing 
themselves of any feigned ignorance about the reality of politics.  
On the other hand, because WikiLeaks is pushing us to this point where we 
cannot pretend not to know, we are also in a position to question why WikiLeaks does 
not publish everything that it knows. If we consider the change in editorial policy 
referenced previously, we might note that on the basis of this movement from an editable 
forum to a peer-reviewed publication, WikiLeaks has in effect become a sanctioning 
body. “Most of all,” they claim “we want readers to know the truth so they can make up 
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their own minds,” but in light of the fact that not all leaks make it to the public, exactly 
which truths do they want us to know? After all, Assange and his editorial collective have 
taken it upon themselves to arbitrate the legitimacy of the documents they publish. Now, 
aiming for accuracy and newsworthy investigative journalism is a model that most 
traditional media outlets have discarded in favor of sensationalist reporting, and given a 
choice between the two, the fact that WikiLeaks supplies its writers with vetted inartistic 
proofs for their stories is certainly a preferable alternative, at least in my view. The 
practice does, however, necessarily authorize one collection of narratives at the expense 
of full disclosure. So who ultimately wins the opportunity to gain a voice on WikiLeaks? 
Because the editorial review process is now completely opaque, it is difficult to say. 
What does seem clear is that if Assange and his partners do not trust a piece of 
information for whatever reason, it never sees the light of day.  
Of course, it is easy to understand why WikiLeaks would decline to publish 
certain stories. A leak detailing a weekend tryst between the president’s cat and a D.C. 
alley-walker is only tangentially related to political affairs, and publishing it would bring 
into question WikiLeaks’ rhetorical jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the potential exists that 
leaks concerning exigent matters could be discarded on the basis of arbitrary 
identifications. We might, for example, imagine a highly localized instance of 
impropriety as offering WikiLeaks too little in the way of newsworthy meat on the global 
bone. Alternatively, we might imagine an instance of impropriety appropriate in scope 
but reported through a source deemed mentally unfit, known to be a radical conspiracy 
theorist, or suspected of spying for the enemy. Although hypothetical, these are very real 
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possibilities given that WikiLeaks operates as a sanctioning body and, based on its 
interests, has the authority to legitimate certain flows of information at the expense of 
others. Perhaps more troubling, the organization apparently has withheld from the public 
a number of its most important leaks to ensure its own safety. In an interview with the 
BBC in December of 2010, attorney Mark Stephens went so far as to call one of these 
unreleased leaks a “thermo-nuclear device” (BBC.org). Since 2010, WikiLeaks has 
published links to six “insurance files” on their Facebook page, which range in size from 
1.4 GB to 349 GB. All are encrypted with 256-bit keys. In the comments section of the 
Facebook post on which the links appear, a user named Mikael Grön explains how long it 
would take to crack each insurance file: 
If you assume: 
• Every person on the planet owns 10 computers. 
• There are 7 billion people on the planet. 
• Each of these computers can test 1 billion key combinations per second. 
• On average, you can crack the key after testing 50% of the possibilities. 
Then the earth’s population can crack one 128-bit encryption key in 
77,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 years! 
These are encrypted with 256bit keys . . . No, they’re not crackable. 
(Grön) 
WikiLeaks claims that in the event Assange or others in the organization are harmed, 
imprisoned, or otherwise unlawfully detained, they will release the passkeys for these 
insurance files, which already have been shared and stored by thousands of users. In all 
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likelihood, WikiLeaks rationalizes the dead-man’s switch as an unfortunate consequence 
of dealing in secrets, one that wouldn’t be necessary if threats of imprisonment 
(specifically by US and Swedish authorities) were off the table. The fact remains, 
however, that WikiLeaks now controls exclusive access to information that, according to 
its own policies and (democratic) publishing philosophy, ought to have been released into 
the public domain. 
The insurance files were partly a response to escalating legal threats made by the 
US government following WikiLeaks’ release of hundreds of thousands of diplomatic 
cables allegedly supplied by former Army intelligence analyst Chelsea Manning. 
Bending to political pressure from Senator Joe Lieberman, in December of 2010 PayPal, 
Visa and MasterCard—companies that had been handling online donations for the 
WikiLeaks website—decided to cut ties with the organization and to suspend its existing 
accounts, leaving WikiLeaks operations all but dead in the digital water. As Quinn 
Norton remarks in an article for Wired, “Visa and MasterCard would let you make 
donations to Neo-Nazis, but not WikiLeaks, and it was clear that power was conspiring 
behind the scenes” (“Part Deux”). Shortly after the accounts were suspended, the 
hactivist group Anonymous responded by taking down PayPal servers in a distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attack, which they dubbed “Operation Avenge Assange.” “At a 
moment when it seemed the whole world was turning on WikiLeaks,” writes Norton, 
“Anonymous came in like the cavalry, shameless in its support of the controversial site 
and offering a voice to what turned out to be people online around the world that resented 
the persecution of the leaking site” (“Part Deux”).  
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Originally formed as an offshoot of the Web collective 4chan—a group of 
anonymous users who gained notoriety for their Internet pranks, many of which tricked 
unsuspecting visitors into clicking on links that would send them to memes, joke 
websites, or other hoax media—Anonymous initially followed in the tradition of 4chan 
tricksters who did things, often subversive things, just for the fun of doing them (hence, 
their moniker “lulz,” a play on the popular texting acronym “lol”). Biella Coleman 
notices:  
there are many links to be made between the trickster and hacking. Many 
of these figures push boundaries of all sorts: they upset ideas of propriety 
and property; they use their sharpened wits sometimes for play, sometimes 
for political ends; they get trapped by their cunning (which happens ALL 
the time with tricksters! That is how they learn); and they remake the 
world, technically, socially, and legally. (“Hacker and Troller as 
Trickster”) 
Coleman says that the idea of linking the trickster to the hacker occurred to her after 
reading Lewis Hyde’s Trickster Makes This World, in which he focuses on how myths 
involving tricksters “push the envelope of what is morally acceptable and in so doing . . . 
renew and revitalize culture, especially the moral stuff of culture. They are not only 
boundary crossers, they are boundary makers” (“Hacker”). More specifically, Coleman 
draws from Hyde’s argument concerning “a paradox that the myth asserts: that the 
origins, liveliness, and durability of cultures require that there be a space for figures 
whose function is to uncover and disrupt the very things that cultures are based on” (qtd. 
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in Coleman). Norton similarly concludes, “The trickster isn’t the good guy or the bad 
guy, it’s the character that exposes contradictions, initiates change and moves the plot 
forward. One minute, the loving and heroic trickster is saving civilization. A few minutes 
later the same trickster is cruel, kicking your ass and eating babies as a snack” 
(“Anonymous 101”). 
As the Anonymous collective grew, it began utilizing more sophisticated methods 
for enacting mayhem. Gone were the days of misleading links and joke websites. The 
new approach was more collaborative, more organized and, without question, more 
destructive—one “anon” described it, crudely but accurately, as “ultra-coordinated 
motherfuckery” (Norton, “Anonymous 101”). Norton explains, “This was the ability to 
use the technological tools of social coordination so quickly and well that anons working 
together could collectively attack targets for any perceived slight, or just for fun, without 
those targets ever having a chance to see it coming or defend themselves. These came to 
be called ‘raids’” (“Anonymous 101”). Ass kicking and baby eating, indeed. But despite 
Anonymous’s newfound talent for online coordination, its hacktivist ideology had not yet 
been codified into a coherent dogma; “raids could be devastating or funny,” writes 
Norton, “but either way they came and went quickly, the net’s own little tornado system. 
Anonymous was never anyone’s personal army, and never stayed on any one topic for 
very long. It took Tom Cruise to change all that and give Anonymous a political 
consciousness” (“Anonymous 101”). 
When Anonymous decided to go after the Church of Scientology in 2008 for their 
repeated attempts to censor a leaked video of Cruise, what started out as a loosely 
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organized community of online pranksters slowly began to morph into something else, 
something with a different purpose, an online watchdog, if you will, that would not be 
deterred from taking punitive measures against those whom they saw as impinging on 
Internet freedoms. Scientology fit the bill, and using a new digital tool called the Low 
Orbit Ion Canon, individual anons from across the globe collectively unleashed DDoS 
attacks on Church servers the size of which the world had never seen. These attacks not 
only helped define the digital tactics Anonymous would use going forward but also 
marked its first political victory. Still, as Norton argues, “it was never to get serious, 
because getting serious for anons meant losing” (“Anonymous 101”). In due time, 
however, that too would change—at least for some anons—with the rise of the Ops. 
If the Scientology attacks were still more-or-less ideologically neutral, Operation 
Payback (which would eventually lead to Operation Avenge Assange) marked the first 
time Anonymous “got serious” about Internet freedom, and it wasn’t the last. Following 
the success of OpTunisia—in which anons helped Tunisians hide their IP addresses from 
the regime while simultaneously bombarding government servers with DDoS attacks—in 
2011, Anonymous launched OpEgypt. While Ben Ali’s regime did not by any means go 
down quietly, its digital defenses proved no match for Anonymous collaborators. Egypt, 
however, ultimately presented a much larger challenge, not simply based on its size and 
population, but also on its counter-insurgency tactics. 
From the very first day of the protests in Tahrir Square, Anonymous was again 
helping Egyptians duck government IP detection and using its staple DDoS attacks to 
disrupt government servers. But three days later, Mubarak retaliated by doing the 
 201 
unthinkable: he turned off the Internet. “Anonymous was aghast,” writes Norton, “both at 
this display of existential threat to the net as a way of political expression, and to their 
impotence in the case of a nation just taken offline” (“2011: The Year Anonymous Took 
on Cops, Dictators and Existential Dread”). But when Mubarak was ousted just two 
weeks later, “Once again anons found they liked the sense of being part of history. For a 
few weeks, the pranksters-turned-activists were most known around the world for 
fighting the good fight beside the people, and they liked it. The Freedom Ops 
proliferated” (“2011”). 
In fact, the next proliferation of the Freedom Ops is already familiar to us: less 
than six months after OpEgypt, Anonymous threw its support behind the BART 
protesters: 
As OpBART progressed, it became a media circus. Anonymous released 
customer and police data, and talked about protests going on forever. They 
were perfecting their media hacking toolkit, sometimes addressing media 
professionals directly. 
A few anons showed up in masks at the protests and were mobbed 
by press. They amplified and encouraged voices on the ground, in 
particular the longstanding group calling for the dismantling of the BART 
police force, No Justice No BART. No one in the press could tell where 
the Anonymous protest ended and the local news story began. (Norton, 
“2011”) 
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The exposure from OpBart gave Anonymous a more recognizable identity and helped to 
codify its dogma. It also gave the collective an opportunity to align itself with the Occupy 
movement, further deepening its political commitments. “Not all anons support OWS,” 
explains Norton, “but many anons said to me when I would talk about Anonymous and 
OWS: ‘Same thing.’—not paraphrasing a shared idea—but those exact two words — 
‘Same thing.’ . . . In the Occupy movement, Anonymous seemed to find a body its 
peripatetic spirit could inhabit” (“2011”). 
By virtue of their insistence on institutional sanction, the genetic narratives 
undoubtedly have a harder time accounting for the rhetorical activity of WikiLeaks and 
Anonymous than either Walker’s narrative or the counter-narrative does. But the issue is 
not entirely clear-cut. When we talk about WikiLeaks, are we talking about its editorial 
board, or are we talking about its contributors? Likewise, when we talk about 
Anonymous, are we talking about the activists for whom “getting serious” about Internet 
freedom means engaging in political agônes, or are we talking about the tricksters for 
whom “getting serious” means losing the freedom to remake digital culture?  
If it’s the former in either case, the genetic narratives can account for the 
rhetorical activities generated by WikiLeaks and Anonymous quite easily. When the 
WikiLeaks organization acts as a sanctioning body that adjudicates the legitimacy of 
public information, and when Anonymous the political watchdog acts as a police force 
that adjudicates the legitimacy of Internet practices, they become similar to recognizable, 
formal institutions of democracy. As such, both would create opportunities for the 
production of logos politikos. Importantly, much like the Egyptian revolution, the BART 
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protests and the Occupy movement, the game for WikiLeaks and Anonymous is to 
generate rhetoric that will expose political, economic, or social inequalities, and that 
being the case, both groups appear to have won their agônes against dominant discourses. 
But like Egypt, BART, and Occupy, there is also some reason to believe that the 
dominant order is not necessarily concerned with the outcomes of these agônes. In 
“WikiLeaks’ War on Secrecy: Truth’s Consequences,” Massimo Calabresi comments on 
the aftermath of the US diplomatic cable releases:  
From the perspective of the U.S. government, which has just seen the 
unauthorized release of 11,000 secret documents, it may be hard to 
imagine what [a world of openness] would look like. But at least one 
senior government official seems comfortable with where things are 
headed. Defense Secretary Robert Gates—no stranger to real secrets, since 
he served as CIA chief and Deputy National Security Adviser under 
President George H. W. Bush—shrugged off the seriousness of the cable 
dump Nov. 30. Said Gates: “Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? 
Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly modest.”  
Norton similarly questions whether the political activities of Anonymous will have a 
lasting impact going forward: 
 The existential question that Anonymous still faces is this: Does it 
matter? And if so, how much does Anonymous matter? Will our way of 
life someday change because of some part Anonymous plays in history? 
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2011 posed the question, but didn’t answer it. Instead it showed 
that Anonymous changed anons. Anonymous became bolder, stranger, 
more threatening, and more comforting in turns. Last year, Anonymous, 
like the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street, picked a fight with the 
systems of society.  
Perhaps in 2012 we’ll see who wins. (“2011”) 
I’m not sure 2012 answered the existential question, but in 2014, the systems of society 
are arguably as entrenched in hierarchy as they were before Anonymous, the Arab Spring 
and the Occupy movement began picking their political fights.  
Walker’s narrative might again complicate this picture by suggesting that the 
rhetoric generated by the WikiLeaks organization and the Anonymous activists created 
the very conditions of possibility for establishing the kinds of democratic civil institutions 
that WikiLeaks and Anonymous now embody. Thus, even if global democracy did not 
materialize as an effect of rhetorical activity, some ideological contestation did happen as 
a result of rhetoric.  
According to the counter-narrative, the rhetorical patterns of the WikiLeaks 
organization and the Anonymous watchdogs both presuppose large degrees of inequality; 
however, unlike Egypt, BART and Occupy, they reverse the position of privilege: 
WikiLeaks is not equal to the public, since it knows better than the public what 
information should be published, discarded, or withheld; Anonymous also is not equal to 
the public, since it knows better than the public which companies and governments to 
target for impinging on Internet freedoms and how they should be punished.  
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On the other hand, if we’re talking about WikiLeaks contributors and Anonymous 
tricksters, the counter-narrative might argue that WikiLeaks is an event of democracy that 
happens on the Web when its contributors presuppose equality with government officials. 
By contesting the cynical game, “let’s act as if we don’t know,” WikiLeaks contributors 
make it clear that government officials are not the only people capable of speaking about 
what goes on in the government. We might also argue that Anonymous tricksters spark 
momentary events of democracy when they presuppose equality with government 
officials and corporate interests by using code and networked technologies to access 
discourses that eschew, in advance, the legitimacy of their speech positions. Neither 
group operates under the false promise that a particular digital technology will simply 
grant them the opportunity to be heard equally. Neither group purchases their liberty by 
selling their fealty to the existing order—they simply use technologies to steal their way 
into dominant discourses. And now, governments and businesses are forced to account 
for anonymous voices speaking in their discourses, which in turn forces the dominant 
order to reconsider the kinds claims it can make about the security of economic and 
political information on the Web. As Norton concludes, “after years of security staff 
complaining to their managers that security was abysmal and privacy dead—only to be 
told there wasn’t money for security, the [hackers did] what [the security staff] could 
never do: made people pay attention” (“2011”). Put differently, the ideologies that have 
mystified political and economic discourses in the digital age must now account for the 
voices of Anonymous tricksters and WikiLeaks contributors. Most importantly, these 
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voices do not mobilize digital technologies to gain recognition from the dominant order; 
they mobilize digital technologies to speak without being recognized.  
From the WikiLeaks and Anonymous examples, what becomes clear is that as the 
general rhetorical patterns of those who mobilize digital technologies increasingly 
presuppose equality, the question of which fate democracy will have been opened to also 
becomes increasingly undecidable. Put differently, these rhetorical activities are signs of 
another future history of rhetoric, a history where rhetorical activity will in some 
instances open democracy to its recognizable, political fate and will in others open 
democracy to a fate that, while not indifferent to juridico-political forms, cannot be 
properly identified with them.   
Whether WikiLeaks and Anonymous should be classed as democratic movements 
or as moments of democracy therefore remains open to future readings of their rhetorical 
patterns. In any case, considering that both WikiLeaks and Anonymous represent large 
collective efforts, it could easily be argued that, if any part of these efforts actually 
amount to events of democracy, the sheer number of marginalized voices that are being 
given new opportunities to be heard by way of these technologies is really what is doing 




In 2000, the BBC funded a team of “pro web surfers” to help author Michael 
Lewis “scour the Internet for telling examples of human perversion” (Next: The Future 
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Just Happened 15). “When they found something worth seeing,” writes Lewis, “they 
would tell me about it. Then we would all go out together and knock on the front doors of 
the people behind the events and see what they were like in the flesh” (15). One of these 
people ended up being Jonathan Lebed, who in 1998 had amassed $800,000 by trading 
stocks on the US exchange. If you remember going to Yahoo Finance message boards in 
the late nineties and reading posts with subject lines like “The Most Undervalued Stock 
Ever,” with content exclaiming things like “FTCE is starting to break out! Next week, 
this thing will EXPLODE,” there’s a good chance they were sent from one of Lebed’s 
many accounts (Lewis 35). “He’d figured out the advantage, after he’d bought shares in a 
small company, in publicizing his interest,” explains Lewis. “‘I came up with it myself,’ 
[Lebed] now says of the idea. ‘It was obvious from the newspapers and CNBC. Of course 
stocks respond to publicity’” (75)! When SEC chairman Arthur Levitt got wind of 
Lebed’s activities and proceeded to investigate him, he claimed that Lebed was 
manipulating the stock market by providing information to potential investors without 
“any basis for making these predictions” (Lewis 70). Interestingly, Lebed did admit that 
he was manipulating the market, but he also made it clear that brokers and analysts 
manipulate the market every time they recommend a stock to investors on CNBC.  
At bottom, there was nothing inherently illegal about Lebed’s activities; in fact, 
he typically researched the companies he promoted before recommending any trades, and 
in at least one instance he visited the facilities in person. Still, because he was not 
affiliated with any financial institution, because he had never worked on Wall Street, the 
SEC made Lebed repay $300,000 of the money he made during the two years he traded. 
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At the time, he was only fourteen years old. But neither his age nor his résumé caused 
him to presuppose that he was unequal to the investment class on Wall Street; instead, he 
presupposed equality with an institutional discourse that a priori eschewed the legitimacy 
of his speech position due to his age and lack of formal training. He was not authorized to 
speak as a financial expert, but he nevertheless did, and in so doing, he covertly 
challenged the established counting practices of an economic discourse. Lewis believes:  
The whole point of Jonathan Lebed was that he had invented himself on 
the Internet. The Internet had taught him how hazy the line was between 
perception and reality. When people could see him, they treated him as 
they would treat a fourteen year-old boy. When all they saw were his 
thoughts on financial matters, they treated him as if he were a serious 
trader. On the Internet, where no one could see who he was, he became 
who he was. (74) 
Lebed wasn’t the only example of “human perversion” Lewis found on the 
Internet that no one could see. In 2000, Lewis came into contact with Marcus Arnold, 
who at the time had temporarily become famous by successfully answering legal 
questions on AskMe.com. In order to participate as a responder to questions posted on the 
site, a person simply had to create a profile. Arnold used an alias (Billy Sheridan) created 
an online handle that gave the impression he was one of the initiated (LawGuy1975), and 
said he was twenty-five years old. Within months, he had become the tenth ranked legal 
expert on AskMe.com. “So my adrenaline was pumping to answer more questions,” he 
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tells Lewis; “I was just like, ‘You know what, let me show these people I know what I’m 
doing’” (94). So he updated his profile with the following blurb:  
I AM A LAW EXPERT WITH TWO YEARS OF FORMAL TRAINING 
IN THE LAW. I WILL HELP ANYONE I CAN! I HAVE BEEN 
INVOLVED IN TRIALS, LEGAL STUDIES AND CERTAIN FORMS 
OF JURISPRUDENCE. I AM NOT ACCREDITED BY THE STATE 
BAR ASSOCIATION YET TO PRACTICE LAW . . . SINCERELY, 
JUSTIN ANTHONY WYRICK, JR. (94) 
According to Lewis, following the update, Arnold’s popularity skyrocketed: “In one two-
week stretch he received 943 legal questions and answered 939. When I asked him why 
he hadn’t answered the other four, a look of profound exasperation crossed his broad 
face. ‘Traffic law,’ he said. ‘I’m sorry, I don’t know traffic law’” (95). Three weeks later, 
Arnold became the third ranked expert in criminal law on AskMe.com.  
In truth, Arnold was only fifteen and had no formal training whatsoever. He 
hadn’t read a single book or taken a single class related to the subject. Everything he 
knew about the law he had learned from watching courtroom television and surfing a few 
websites. When he finally revealed who he was to the AskMe.com community, he 
received numerous threats from other responders on the website, many of whom were 
practicing attorneys. They decided to test his knowledge by asking him to answer very 
difficult questions about nuanced aspects of the law, many of which he was unable to 
answer. Now, I am not interested in commenting on the quality of Arnold’s legal advice 
or the need for formal training. What interests me is that, just like Jonathan Lebed, and 
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Anonymous tricksters, and WikiLeaks contributors, Marcus Arnold presupposes that he 
is equally capable of speaking within a discourse where he is not authorized to do so. By 
using digital technologies to avoid detection, his illegitimate voice goes unnoticed. Until 
it’s too late. Until he pushes us to this point where we cannot pretend not to know that the 
line between the legitimacy of experts and the illegitimacy of uninitiated laity is often 
decided by way of arbitrary identifications. Because Arnold’s voice is nearly 
indistinguishable from the voices of experts who arbitrate the legitimacy of rhetorical 
activity, and who therefore enforce the ideological boundaries of the discourse, his voice 
changes what gets counted as legitimate speech within the discourse itself, heralding a 
breakdown in official counting practices. In effect, what must be accounted for is the fact 
that someone like Arnold is capable generating skillful rhetorical activity in a discourse 
that a priori forecloses the legitimacy of his speech position. What must be accounted for 
is the fact that someone like Arnold is equally capable of speaking legalese. 
LINKING 
—When he’d come home from school, he’d turn on CNBC and watch the 
stock market ticker stream across the bottom of the screen, searching it for 
the symbols inside his father’s portfolio—After, like, watching so many 
TV shows about the law . . . it’s just like you know everything you need to 
know—He’d never described to a single adult exactly what he had done 
on the Internet. So far as he could tell, the people at the SEC didn’t really 
understand what he had done. No one did—I can always spot a crummy 
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attorney . . . There are people on the web site who have no clue what 
they’re talking about, that are just there to get rankings and to sell their 
services and to get paid—He knew what he was doing, or thought he did. 
He’d learned how to find everything he wanted to know about a company 
on the Internet; what he couldn’t find he ran down in the flesh—Basically, 
you picked up what you know from watching Court TV shows . . . 
Basically . . . And from these web sites that you browse . . . Basically—[I] 
would sit there for hours staring at them . . . I just liked to watch the 
numbers go across the screen . . . I don’t know . . . I just wondered, like, 
what they meant—he’d been shot dead in cold blood by an old 
acquaintance in the middle of a family barbecue. The man who shot him 
had avoided the death penalty. He was up for parole in 2013—no one had 
ever asked him to sit down at the computer and to explain exactly what he 
had done or why he had done it—. (Lewis 38; 97; 79; 91; 41; 99; 38-39; 
196; 79) 
Rather than being motivated by the promise of gaining an equal voice vis-à-vis 
digital technologies, contesters seem to be motived by an opinion—the opinion that they 
already are equal, that they already can speak, that they are capable of teaching 
themselves what they want to know by linking it with what they know already. Lebed, for 
example, appears to have learned how to speak in a financial discourse by constantly 
watching his father track “the market’s daily upward leaps and jerks with keen interest” 
(38) and then comparing those movements to the commentary given by financial experts 
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on CNBC. Arnold similarly appears to have learned how to speak in a legal discourse by 
watching endless reruns of defense attorneys helping their clients on Court TV and then 
comparing those cases to the questions that were posted on AskMe.com. But neither 
Lebed nor Arnold was authorized to make these links. Established ideologies dictated 
how to link to financial and legal subjects by authorizing certain ways of linking to the 
unknown at the expense of others—that is, by sanctioning only the linking practices 
acquired through formal education. Given this restriction, for contesters the real value in 
mobilizing digital technologies appears to be that they offer alternative modes for 
covertly accessing dominant discourses. 
Insofar as the contesters are concerned, I will not speculate on whether any of the 
historical narratives can adequately account for their rhetorical activities, nor will I argue 
that any of the historical narratives—taken together, considered separately, or in some 
combination—ultimately contribute to an ethology and historiography that can 
adequately account for the relations between rhetoric, democracy and epistemology in the 
present era. But based on the ways in which contesters seem to engage in agônes (and 
despite Stoll’s cautionary tale about making predictions), I will venture a conclusion—
however tentative—that we might draw about the future of rhetoric and the fate of 
democracy.  
What is often unclear from the general rhetorical patterns of those who mobilize 
digital technologies to covertly compete with dominant discourses, who contest 
established ideologies by iterating an incumbent logos, who circumvent traditional modes 
of knowledge production by using forms of early-sophistic rhetorical pedagogy, is 
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precisely that these speakers and writers presuppose equality as an epistemological 
starting point in agônes. Discursive insurgents like Lebed and Arnold neither clamor for 
political rights nor any other kinds of rights in the name of equality. We know their 
insurgencies only by way of the effects they will have had on what gets counted. They 
are accounting errors in the ledger, so to speak, that the old bookkeeper cannot reconcile 
with his dusty adding machine. Perhaps their rhetorical activities are indeed signs of yet 
another future history of rhetoric, a future that will have opened democracy to an 
alternative fate, a fate where rhetorical activity—predicated on equality—no longer 
requires institutional sanction to confirm its legitimacy.  
Whether this history will have come to pass remains a matter of discovering our 
failure to account for it; however, I would contend that at the very least, where we will 
have found presuppositions of equality, we will have discovered a rhetorical continuity 
between democratic events. More importantly, the very possibility of discovering this 
continuity, which may or may not exist, suggests that the fate of democracy is no longer 
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